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Abstract 
In the tumultuous period of the 1790s, the English anarchist philosopher William 
Godwin was a seminal figure whose 1793 Enquiry Concerning PoliticalJustice and Its 
Influence on Morals and Happiness stood as a touchstone for the reform movement in 
Britain. Godwin is primarily known today as the author of Political Justice and Things 
As They Are; Or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams, a 1794 novel which many readers, 
past and present, have regarded as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical claims 
outlined in Political Justice. 
Although his fame as a novelist largely rests on this one popular novel, Godwin 
wrote and published five more novels after Caleb Williams: St. Leon (1799); Fleetwood 
(1805); Mandeville (1817); Cloudesley (1830); and, finally, Deloraine (1833). Other 
than Caleb Williams, however, Godwin's novels are little read today, even by specialists 
in the literature of the period. Moreover, relative to Caleb Williams, these other novels 
have received only marginal critical attention. The bulk of the scholarly work on 
Godwin still tends to focus on either his Political Justice or Caleb Williams. 
Furthermore, most earlier studies of Godwin's novels have placed his texts in an almost 
exclusive dialogue with the radical "jacobin" political climate of 1790s England, or with 
the philosophical rationalism of Political Justice. 
My own examination of Godwin's fiction differs in emphasis from most of these 
earlier studies in its sustained focus on the development of masculine identity within the 
context of personal agency, language, and modes of self-expression. I take as my starting 
point Godwin's Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, a 1797 
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collection of essays in which he puts forth an educational theory for the proper 
development of virtue, benevolence, and rational potential in the young mind. In the 
Enquirer, Godwin details the pedagogical and social conditions necessary for the creation 
of an "active" and "well regulated" mind committed to benevolence and reason. He also 
acknowledges, however, the blighting effects of "unfavourable circumstances" in 
childhood-the range of unpropitious pedagogical and social conditions that conspire to 
produce a mind that is not "well regulated." As I argue in this study, Godwin's 
educational theory carries within it a model of ww-education that serves as a productive 
framework for examining his fiction. 
In this study, I provide readings of four of Godwin's novels-Ca/e& Williams, St. 
Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville-examming how this model of "mis-education" 
operates in all four texts in distinctly different ways, shaping the psychological 
development of the protagonists in such a way that their later years are marked by crises 
in their experience of identity and, more specifically, in their sense of masculine 
authority. Although a handful of critics have briefly examined the forms of "mis-
education" experienced by each of these Godwinian heroes, none has explored the effects 
of such mis-education within the context of identity formation-that is, on the hero's 
ability to self-actualize without the experience of profound personal and social alienation. 
This study thus offers a detailed examination of a cluster of interdependent 
themes that has received little or no critical attention in the scholarly examinations of 
these four novels: the central role that education, as the totalizing effect of one's 
childhood lessons and experiences, has on the moral and psychological development of 
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the subject, and-more specifically-how unfavourable circumstances conspire, in these 
texts, to create forms of "mis-education" that lead to later crises in identity and 
subjectivity; the importance of personal agency in the development of the 
subject-specifically, the ability to have "authorship" over the narratives of one's life; the 
roles that language, self-expression, the imagination, and social convention play in the 
development of such agency and in the formation of an especially masculine identity; 
and, finally, the mediating function of women in the development of this masculine 
identity. The readings offered in this study should enrich the critical discussion of 
Godwin's fiction, especially as such discussion relates to themes of gender and identity 
formation. 
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Mis-Education and the Crisis in Male Subjectivity: William Godwin's Middle Novels 
For the general student of literature, William Godwin (1756-1836) is more famous 
for his connections to other writers of the Romantic Period than he is for his own 
considerable philosophical and literary achievements. As the husband of feminist 
philosopher and novelist Mary Wollstonecraft, the father of novelist Mary Shelley, the 
father-in-law of the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, and the philosophical mentor of the young 
William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Godwin serves as a pivotal, yet often 
marginalized, figure in the network of literary relationships that gave such momentum to 
the intellectual and artistic energy of the Romantic Age. Godwin was not always so 
marginalized, however. In the tumultuous period of the 1790s-when the social and 
political agitation of reform-minded "radicals," energized by the recent events of the 
French Revolution, threatened the conservative hegemony of Georgian England-Godwin 
was a seminal figure whose 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice audits Influence 
on Morals and Happiness stood as a touchstone for the reform movement in England. 
With the publication of Political Justice, Godwin achieved an instant celebrity 
that won him the admiration of many leading intellectuals of the period. With its 
indictment of contemporary social prejudice, coupled with its reification of reason as the 
only way to expose such social prejudice and effect political change, Godwin's 
philosophy of rationalism proved, at least initially, both popular and useful to the radical 
cause in Britain. As William Hazlitt famously remarked in his 1825 The Spirit of the 
Age, "five-and-twenty years ago [Godwin] was in the very zenith of a sultry and 
unwholesome popularity; he blazed as a sun in the firmament of reputation; no one was 
more talked of, more looked up to, more sought after, and wherever liberty, truth, justice 
was the theme, his name was not far off' (31). 
Godwin's fame was solidified by the publication of Things As They Are; Or, The 
Adventures of Caleb Williams, a 1794 novel which many readers, past and present, have 
regarded as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical claims outlined in Political 
Justice. In Caleb Williams, Godwin tells the tale of a young servant, Caleb, who is taken 
into the employ of a powerful local aristocrat, Falkland. After Caleb discovers an awful 
secret buried in Falkland's past-namely, that Falkand has committed a murder and 
allowed two innocent men to hang for his crime-his patron engages in a sustained 
persecution of his young employee that throws into relief the unjust nature of "things as 
they are" in Georgian England. Although his fame as a novelist largely rests on this one 
wildly popular novel-Hazlitt claims that "no one ever began Caleb Williams that did not 
read it through" (49)-Godwin wrote and published five more novels after Caleb 
Williams: St. Leon (1799); Fleetwood (1805); Mandeville (1817); Cloudesley (1830); 
and, finally, Deloraine (1833). Other than Caleb Williams, however, Godwin's novels 
are little read today, even by specialists in the literature of the period. Indeed, in his 1989 
introduction to the second edition of his William Godwin: A Biographical Study, George 
Woodcock lamented that his biography, which was originally published in 1946, failed to 
inspire a scholarly or popular interest in the philosopher beyond Political Justice and 
Caleb Williams, and that none of his other works, including his novels, had been reissued 
in new editions (xiii-xiv). 
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Moreover, relative to Caleb Williams, Godwin's other novels have received only 
marginal critical attention. The bulk of the scholarly work on Godwin still tends to focus 
on either his PoliticalJustice or Caleb Williams. There is surprisingly little critical work 
on St. Ieo«-especially given that novel's use of the gothic form so popular at the time 
and its rich intertextuality with Mary Shelley's Frankenstein-and even less on Fleetwood, 
Mandeville, Cloudesley, and Deloraine. Furthermore, most earlier studies of Godwin's 
later novels have placed his texts in an almost exclusive dialogue both with the radical 
"jacobin" political climate of 1790s England, and with the philosophical rationalism of 
PoliticalJustice. Perhaps most notably, this is Gary Kelly's approach to Caleb Williams, 
St. Leon, and Fleetwood in The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805, published in 1976. 
My own examination of Godwin's fiction differs in emphasis from most of these 
earlier studies in its sustained focus on the development of masculine identity within the 
context of personal agency, language, and modes of self-expression. I take as my starting 
point Godwin's Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, a 1797 
collection of essays in which he puts forth an educational theory for the proper 
development of virtue and rational potential in the young mind. As I argue in the next 
chapter, Godwin's philosophical vision of universal benevolence achieved through the 
gradual enlightenment of humanity was inextricably bound up with his moral philosophy 
of education. Education, for Godwin, was very much a "moral process" (Enquirer 1), and 
the success of "juvenile education" should be measured in terms of its ability "to provide 
against the age of five and twenty a mind well regulated, active, and prepared to learn" 
(Enquirer 5). 
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In the Enquirer, Godwin details the pedagogical and social conditions necessary 
for the creation of this "active" and "well regulated" mind. He also acknowledges, 
however, the "excesses of youth" which frequently "corrupt the disposition, and debase 
the character" (Enquirer 158), particularly in terms of their long-term effects on the 
developing mind. Although Godwin emphasizes the inherent pliability of a young mind 
that can be shaped and "bent in a thousand directions" to desirable ends, he nevertheless 
laments that this mind eventually solidifies into the permanent habits and behaviours of 
an entrenched character (Enquirer 15). The young mind, argues Godwin in the Enquirer, 
is frequently blighted in this way, its potential for virtue, benevolence, and personal 
happiness "frost-nipped, or stunted, or distorted in its proportions" (287). 
If Godwin offers in the Enquirer a blueprint for a salutary educational model, he 
also provides, in his description of the "frost-nipped, [] stunted, or distorted" mind, a 
model of ww-education whereby unfavourable circumstances in childhood combine to 
create a mind that is not "well regulated." In this study, I provide readings of four of 
Godwin's novels-Ca/eZ> Williams, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville-ex&mmmg how 
this model of "mis-education" operates in all four texts in distinctly different ways, 
shaping the psychological development of the protagonists in such a way that their later 
years are marked by crises in their experience of identity and, more specifically, in their 
sense of masculine authority. While Godwin, as a philosopher, was focussed on the 
ultimate development of a utopic state effected through humanity's unlimited potential 
for reason, as a novelist, he was repeatedly drawn to the creation of psychologically 
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troubled and irrational characters, whose later crises can be traced back to childhood mis-
education. 
Indeed, in most of Godwin's novels, the narrative centres on the extended and 
often detailed representation of a single protagonist, a man who is usually (although not 
always) an aristocrat, and a man who is almost always tormented by a complex 
psychology which alienates him from the social context around him. In his 
representations of these men, Godwin makes use of the Bildungsroman as the structuring 
frame for his exploration of themes relating to misanthropy, marriage, friendship, 
domestic happiness, ambition, envy, madness, and masculine subjectivity. Critical 
scholarship on the novels, moreover, has emphasized the way in which Godwin's use of 
the Bildungsroman dovetails with the psychological realism of the texts. William 
Brewer, for example, has argued that Godwin's novels "serve as thought-experiments in 
the 'science' of mental anatomy" {Mental Anatomies 19), case studies of the 
psychological development of complex characters in distress. Significantly, Godwin's 
psychological "experiments" are most often of a pathological nature, in that his 
protagonists suffer mental distress and social alienation stemming from misanthropy, 
neuroses, and even insanity. As Mona Scheuermann has pointed out, Godwin is 
fundamentally fascinated with the "mind as it ^functions" ("Study of Mind" 17; 
emphasis added). 
Even the early critics of Godwin's work recognized the pathological nature of his 
psychological narrative style: Godwin has "proved himself intimately skilled in the 
perversity of the human mind, and in all the blackest and most horrible passions of the 
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human heart," contends the Quarterly Review in an 1817 assessment of Mandeville 
(Graham 368). In his Sketches of Modern Literature, and Eminent Literary Men, Being A 
Gallery of Literary Portraits (1846), George Gilfillan similarly recognized the intensity 
of Godwin's representations of "morbid" character: "He imagines a character after his 
own heart; a quiet, curious, prying, philosophical being, with a strong underdash of the 
morbid, if not of the mad; and he thickens around him circumstances, which, by making 
him altogether a misanthrope, and nearly a maniac, bring out all the powers and the 
passions of his nature" (32). 
These critical responses underscore the conflicted nature of Godwin's protagonists 
and their troubled relationships with the world around them. Woodcock argues that, in 
Godwin's fiction, the "hero is always victim," and he identifies the "crushing of the 
individual by social and moral forces" as a recurrent theme running throughout his novels 
("Notes" 687). In this study, I combine an attention to the psychology of the Godwinian 
hero with an examination of the deleterious effects certain "social and moral forces," as 
forms of mis-education, have on the childhood development of the character. Although a 
handful of critics have briefly examined the forms of mis-education experienced by each 
of these Godwinian heroes, none has explored the effects of such mis-education within 
the context of identity formation-that is, on the hero's ability to self-actualize without the 
experience of profound personal and social alienation. In Caleb Williams, St. Leon, 
Fleetwood, and Mandeville, the central characters experience a host of unfavourable 
circumstances in childhood: excessive isolation, exposure to destructive value systems, 
and unhealthy relationships with parents or parental figures (or, alternatively, the absence 
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of such figures). These circumstances produce in the novels toxic environments that 
function to corrupt the developing mind and foster later crises in identity. 
Godwin's first in-depth exploration of this theme of mis-education occurs in 
Caleb Williams, a novel in which defective childhood education produces, in both Caleb 
and Falkland, the kind of distorted psychological state that renders each man acutely 
vulnerable to the destructive passions of the other. Caleb is both a victim of his own 
curiosity and a victimizer, a young man whose passion "for the unravelling of an 
adventure" (60) destroys his patron's tenuous hold on rational existence. Caleb's 
childhood reading in books of "narrative and romance" (60)-unsupervised by a rational 
"preceptor" who, in Godwin's view, helps to shape and regulate the student's "temper of 
mind" {Enquirer 144-46)-operates as a form of mis-education, exacerbating the reckless 
curiosity already present in his character. 
Mis-education also underpins the moral development of Falkland, whose early 
reading in the "heroic poets of Italy" (67) inculcates a love for chivalric values at odds 
with benevolence and justice. Falkland's embrace of chivalry compels him to reify his 
reputation at the expense of all other moral considerations, and his subsequent experience 
of public disgrace is aggravated by a fatal sensibility which heightens his experience of 
dishonour and causes him to feel, too acutely, its effects. As a man of both chivalry and 
feeling, Falkland prefigures Godwin's next two fictional heroes-St. Leon and 
Fleetwood-and his significance in this study is largely as a "prototype" for the mis-
education of these two later figures. 
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In St. Leon, his first novel after Caleb Williams, Godwin revisits the theme of 
chivalry, once again representing the chivalric value system as a destructive ideology that 
mis-educates young men by encouraging them to embrace ideals antithetical to 
benevolence and virtue. The narrative centres on a French aristocrat of the sixteenth 
century, a man who fails, in his youth, to achieve a defined sense of self independent of 
the social codes around him. The recipient of a childhood "education" that emphasized, 
above all else, a form of identity organized around the aristocratic traditions of public 
honour and acclaim, St. Leon develops into a man driven by a destructive desire for 
"fame" and social recognition. His need for public validation is symptomatic of his 
fractured sense of self, and becomes a central factor in his subsequent tragedies, as he 
falls victim to the seductive allure of the Philosopher's Stone and finds himself 
increasingly alienated from the domestic and social orders. For St. Leon, his early mis-
education ultimately results in a dramatic alienation of the self on both a literal and a 
symbolic level. 
In Fleetwood, the interdependent themes of sensibility and misanthropy underpin 
Godwin's portrait of a young man neurotically focussed on the development and 
operation of his own mind. As Godwin calls him in the novel's subtitle, Fleetwood is the 
"New Man of Feeling," a figure whose sensibility, like Falkland's, ironically divorces 
him from the benevolence and empathy associated with traditional men of feeling like 
Harley, the sympathetic and charitable hero of Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling 
(1771). As I argue in chapter one, emotional sensitivity, in Godwin's view, ideally results 
in outward expressions of philanthropy. With Fleetwood, however, sensibility follows a 
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self-reflexive pattern in which emotional response stays rooted within the subject. 
Instead of stimulating benevolence, Fleetwood's sensibility devolves into a pathological 
self-absorption. This self-absorption, as I argue in chapter three, stems from a childhood 
mis-education characterized by excessive isolation, a childhood informed by indulgent 
"reveries" structured around the imaginative "consumption" of the beautiful scenes of 
nature surrounding him in North Wales. Fleetwood's developing sense of manhood is 
simultaneously staged against, and cultivated by, the natural world he genders female, and 
his later misanthropy stems from his realization-as he grows older and enters public and 
domestic life-that the social world of human interaction falls outside of his imaginative 
authority. Presented with a wife who refuses to submit to his transcribing hand, 
Fleetwood experiences marriage as a threat to his identity and masculine authority. He 
subsequently experiences an emotional breakdown that radically compromises his sense 
of self. 
Although, in Mandeville, Godwin revisits the theme of misanthropy once again, in 
that novel, the misanthropy of the protagonist degenerates into a form of paranoid 
madness that ultimately divorces Mandeville from the social community and fractures his 
identity. As I argue in chapter four, Mandeville experiences, from a very young age, a 
crisis in self-actualization stemming from a childhood mis-education that demanded 
constant repression on his part. This repression takes its most notable form in the 
suppression of voice that ultimately consumes his character. Mandeville's inability to 
express himself in the face of crisis compromises not only his sense of masculine 
authority, but his very appreciation of his own identity. Unable, through self expression, 
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to consolidate a coherent sense of selfhood, Mandeville turns increasingly inward, 
ultimately sliding into a state of madness that eventually effaces his own subjectivity. 
This study thus offers a detailed examination of a cluster of interdependent themes 
that has received little or no critical attention in the scholarly examinations of these four 
novels: the central role that education, as the totalizing effect of one's childhood lessons 
and experiences, has on the moral and psychological development of the subject, 
and-more specifically-how unfavourable circumstances conspire, in these texts, to create 
forms of "mis-education" that lead to later crises in identity and subjectivity; the 
importance of personal agency in the development of the subject-specifically, the ability 
to have "authorship" over the narratives of one's life; the role that language, self-
expression, the imagination, and social convention plays in the development of such 
agency and in the formation of an especially masculine identity; and, finally, the 
mediating function of women in the development of this masculine identity. The 
readings offered in this study should enrich the critical discussion of Godwin's fiction, 
especially as such discussion relates to themes of gender and identity formation. 
My study also differs from other critical examinations of Godwin's novels in its 
focus on the representation of women in these texts. In these novels, female characters 
play a central role in the identity crises suffered by the male protagonists. St. Leon 
experiences his marriage to Marguerite as a very specific threat to his masculine public 
identity, and he is partially driven to accept the Philosopher's Stone as a testament to his 
masculine autonomy in the face of a domestic sphere he perceives as emasculating. For 
Fleetwood, marriage is similarly experienced as something which threatens his masculine 
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authority, as his wife, Mary, becomes the last in a line of female partners who escapes the 
confines of his controlling hand. Finally, Mandeville's sister, Henrietta, functions as his 
most significant connective link to humanity, and he thus perceives her as the socializing 
agent through which he can assert his own voice and selfhood. His failure to achieve 
complete communion with her drives him into madness. 
Godwin's exploration of masculine subjectivity in these four novels is resonant of 
wider cultural anxieties regarding the ideal and appropriate forms of behaviour for men in 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century British society. In his study of the changing 
conceptions of gender in the eighteenth century, G.J. Barker-Benfield has charted the 
influence of the emerging cult of sensibility on new visions of masculinity. As Barker-
Benfield argues, the public sphere, throughout the eighteenth century, served as an active 
site for the re-negotiation of a masculine identity organized around a kind of bourgeois 
chivalry that emphasized honour and polite manliness as the new standards of socially 
ideal behaviour. 
Such re-negotiations imply certain anxieties about the shifting roles of men in the 
political and social climates of the late eighteenth-century, anxieties which Tim Fulford 
examines in Romanticism and Masculinity. Traditional conceptions of "chivalric" 
masculinity, contends Fulford, were destabilized by the political turmoil of the 1790s. 
The war with France, the disruptive effects of revolutionary discourse, and the political 
and social agitation of previously marginalized groups within society (most notably, 
women and the working classes)-all of these cultural forces implied the perceived failure 
of British men (especially those in traditional positions of power) to "live up" to the 
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conventional ideals of chivalric manliness which were understood by some to maintain 
social order and political stability. These anxieties are perhaps most famously articulated 
in Edmund Burke's lament, in the Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), that 
the "the age of chivalry is gone" (80). Although Burke makes his declaration within the 
context of the French Revolution, locating chivalry's death in the French men who failed 
to protect their Queen from the assaults of the revolutionary mob, his lament nevertheless 
conveys the sense of a cautionary warning to British men who would overthrow the 
established codes of traditional masculine behaviour. 
In Volume 2 of Political Justice, Godwin reframes Burke's eulogy for the passing 
of chivalry as an elegy for political justice instead, declaring, "indeed 'the age of chivalry 
is' not 'gone'! The feudal spirit still survives that reduced the great mass of mankind to 
the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of a few" (454-55). However, despite 
Godwin's dismissal of chivalry as an ideology synonymous with political oppression and 
social injustice, he nevertheless registered his own anxieties about the crisis in modern 
masculinity and the failure of modern men to achieve their psychological and intellectual 
potential. In the Enquirer essay, "Of Posthumous Fame," Godwin enters into the well-
worn debate comparing the merits of ancient men with those of modern men, voting 
firmly on the side of the ancients, who rise far above the "miserable level of the men of 
modern times" (291). "One would have thought that no man could have perused the 
history of Rome and the history of England, without seeing that in the one was presented 
the substance of men, and in the other the shadow," he declares (291). 
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Godwin elaborates on the distinctions between modern and ancient men in "Of 
History and Romance," a 1797 essay that remained unpublished in his lifetime. For 
Godwin, the value of a written history resides in its ability to inspire moral excellence in 
its readers, and he goes on to compare "modern" history unfavourably with "ancient" 
history on the basis of the fact that the subjects of modern histories-that is, modern 
men-are inferior in character and spirit to their ancient predecessors. Whereas the 
ancients were "men of a free and undaunted spirit," the moderns are their "degenerate 
successors," "pygmies" who are stunted, distorted and "weighed down," unable to 
develop the "bold and masculine virtues" that are the product of intellectual 
enlightenment and political freedom (458-59). Modern men, argues Godwin, are 
degenerate not on account of their own inherent weaknesses, but because a corrupt 
political system combines with irrational social prejudice to enslave and debase them. 
"There is something in the nature of modern governments and institutions," he argues in 
the essay, "that seems to blight in the bud every grander and more ample development of 
the soul" (459). 
In Volume 1 ofPoliticalJustice, Godwin articulates his broad vision of education 
as a process to be understood in the "most comprehensive sense" as "including every 
incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" 
(45). It is clear, therefore, that Godwin's perception of the political-the "modern 
governments and institutions" which are responsible for modern man's crisis-also 
includes social practices like education. The mis-education of modern man, like his 
exposure to political oppression, thus contributes to this crisis in masculine self-
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actualization. Indeed, his description in the Enquirer of childhood potential corrupted by 
the social forces of mis-education deploys the same gardening metaphor used to convey 
the political debasement of modern man: whereas "every grander and more ample 
development of the soul" is "blight[ed] in the bud" by the political injustice of "modern 
governments and institutions" ("Of History and Romance" 459), genius is "almost 
constantly frost-nipped" by the mis-education of unfavourable circumstances in 
childhood {Enquirer 287). 
Within Godwin's theory of education, therefore, is a concern for the potential 
crisis of masculinity experienced by modern men, a crisis that can be traced back to 
childhood mis-education grounded in a host of pedagogical, social, and political forces. 
If Godwin turned to ancient men to find the "bold and masculine virtues" he felt were 
lacking in modern British men, the British nation, argues Fulford, symbolically looked to 
the naval hero Lord Horatio Nelson to articulate a powerful image of a vigorous 
masculinity worthy of emulation. Nelson conveyed a vision of manliness organized 
around the chivalric ideals of self-sacrifice, duty, and courage in the face of danger: 
Nelson was revered for defeating Napoleon, for his adherence to duty, for 
his gentlemanly conduct towards his men, and for his bravery. His body, 
mutilated by many battles in which he had exposed himself to fire, was 
proof of a manliness defined by the ability to command himself and others. 
He was resolute rather than vainglorious, a hero who redefined chivalric 
duty and courtesy in terms of a self-controlled and self-sacrificial 
patriotism. Dying to ensure victory, Nelson then became subject to a 
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popular cult which immortalised him in monuments and mementoes. And 
his heroism was made available to all through the fictional heroes in the 
romances of Sir Walter Scott, heroes who resembled him in their courage, 
courtesy and defeat of foreign invasion. (Fulford 6-7) 
Literature, as Fulford here recognizes, has the potential to both celebrate and 
interrogate this image of idealized masculinity. Moreover, the image of Nelson, as 
described by Fulford in this passage, is a productive starting point for considering how 
Godwin engages with this idealized model of chivalric manliness. As I argue in chapters 
one and two, Godwin was quite critical of chivalry and the way in which apologists for 
the status quo like Burke yoked chivalric ideals with benevolence, honour, and the 
maintenance of a stable social order. Indeed, in both Falkland and St. Leon, Godwin 
creates protagonists whose embrace of chivalric values results not in benevolence but in 
dishonourable and self-interested behaviour that completely alienates them from society 
and robs them of their happiness. 
Although Godwin clearly resists the image of chivalric manliness represented by 
Nelson, in other ways, he engages with many of the central values underpinning this 
idealized model of manhood. Within such a model, ideal masculinity is equated with 
honour, duty, and self-sacrifice. Perhaps more importantly, this ideal man, to use 
Fulford's terminology, is "resolute," "self-controlled," and "able to command himself and 
others." He is, in other words, the picture of uncompromised masculine authority-self-
assured, successful militarily and socially, and confident both in himself and with his 
place and role in society. With his personal self-assurance and social success, this ideal 
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man serves as a compelling foil to the Godwinian heroes, who are all experiencing 
profound crises of identity and masculine authority. Driven by a curiosity which takes 
"possession of [his] soul" (60), Caleb is the very anti-thesis of the "self-controlled" man; 
his failure in this regard is even more significant given that one of the primary purposes 
of "juvenile education," according to Godwin, was the creation of a "well regulated" 
mind (Enquirer 5). Falkland, as well, with his "paroxysms" of anguish and rage (63), and 
his self-interested obsession with reputation, is far from the controlled and self-sacrificing 
vision of heroic manliness. 
In the three novels after Caleb Williams, Godwin continues to chart the mis-
education of his heroes in terms evocative of this image of chivalric manliness. As a man 
who beggars his family through his compulsive gambling, St. Leon, for example, fails to 
exhibit both a sense of paternal duty and the kind of self-control for which Nelson is so 
celebrated; completely reliant on the social codes of aristocratic identity for any sense of 
selfhood, St. Leon is caught up in the "vainglorious" quest for a social acclaim that is 
always beyond his reach. Fleetwood is likewise mired in "vainglory," sunk in a self-
indulgent preoccupation with his own imaginative desires; whereas the chivalric man 
enjoys a benevolent relationship with a humanity he feels duty bound to protect, 
Fleetwood, with his excessive sensibility, experiences only misanthropic alienation when 
interacting with society. Mandeville is no doubt the furthest removed of all the 
Godwinian heroes from this ideal of chivalric masculinity. He feels no sense of duty or 
benevolence towards humanity, only alienation and hatred. Unable to express himself in 
the face of crisis, Mandeville is the very antithesis of the man who can "command 
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himself and others." In each of these novels, childhood mis-education, itself the result of 
unfavourable social and familial circumstances, produces in the protagonist a crisis in 
identity which underscores the discrepancy between this ideal vision of masculinity and 
the fractured subjectivity of the hero. 
In chapter one of this study, I discuss Caleb Williams, Godwin's most famous and 
widely read novel, within this context of mis-education, limiting my examination of that 
text to its engagement with forms of mis-education prefiguring those of Godwin's later 
fictional heroes-namely, St. Leon and Fleetwood. My analysis of Caleb Williams, 
therefore, is accordingly limited to the ways in which the characters of Caleb and 
Falkland stand as early examples of Godwin's engagement with this notion of mis-
education. My examination of that novel also focusses on Falkland as a kind of 
"prototype" for the later characterization of St. Leon and Fleetwood. The bulk of this 
study-chapters two, three, and four-are devoted to sustained examinations of what I am 
calling the three "middle" novels of Godwin's fictional corpus-S^. Leon, Fleetwood, and 
Mandeville. It is my contention that these three novels, each of which is structured 
around the subjective narration of the eponymous male hero, serve as Godwin's most 
compelling studies of childhood mis-education culminating in crises of identity and 
masculine authority.1 
In limiting my focus to these four texts, I am excluding from my study the three 
short novels Godwin wrote and published when he was in his late twenties and in the 
early stages of his career as a professional writer. Although Damon and Delia, Italian 
Letters, and Imogen are of definite interest in terms of both their publication history2 and 
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Godwin's development as a novelist, most critics, while recognizing some admirable 
qualities of style and sentiment in these early tales, regard the texts as minimally 
significant in the larger scope of the philosopher's literary achievements. To be sure, 
these early novels do not provide the kind of sustained study of mis-education and 
masculine identity in crisis that is found in Godwin's later fiction. 
I am also excluding Godwin's last two novels from my examination-C/owafe.s7ey 
and Deloraine, which were published in 1830 and 1833, respectively. Written at the end 
of his career, and a decade and a half after the publication of his last novel, Mandeville, 
both Cloudesley and Deloraine are quite removed in time from the earlier phase of 
Godwin's career when he was, as nearly all critics agree, at the height of his imaginative 
powers as a novelist. In this sense, both of these later texts fail to offer up psychological 
studies as compelling as those found in the earlier novels.3 For the purposes of my own 
study, therefore, I have chosen to focus on the three novels which I feel provide the most 
intense and sustained examinations of mis-education and masculinity in crisis-^. Leon, 
Fleetwood, and Mandeville. 
Now that I have delineated the parameters of my study, and the theoretical 
approach informing my analysis of Godwin's middle novels, I want to provide, in the 
remainder of this introduction, a brief overview of Godwin's historical reception as both a 
philosopher and a novelist. 
* * * 
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As a philosopher, Godwin was influenced by the utilitarian theory that society 
should be governed by principles which result in the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people. The fundamental argument of Godwin's Political Justice was that humanity, 
through the sustained and intensive cultivation of reason, could reach a point of 
"perfectibility" in its moral conduct that would allow society to gradually shed the 
political and social institutions which the philosopher saw as inherently oppressive to the 
human condition and a testament of humanity's failure to govern itself through its rational 
powers alone. In this sense, Godwin is often regarded as the first "anarchist" philosopher, 
in that his Utopian society would function without government (even a democratic one), 
religion, and even social institutions like marriage. "It is earnestly to be desired," argued 
Godwin in Volume 1 of Political Justice, "that each man should be wise enough to 
govern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint; and, since 
government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object principally to be aimed at is, that 
we should have as little of it, as the general peace of human society will permit" (246). 
Only the intensive application of rational thought will allow humanity to acquire 
the amount of wisdom necessary to govern itself in this anarchic state, and reason must 
therefore be the foundation of our political and social interactions. "The salutary 
condition of the human mind," asserted Godwin in the 1797 Enquirer, "is that in which it 
is prepared to bring every principle upon which it proceeds, within the scope of its own 
examination; to derive assistance from every means of information, oral or scriptory; but 
to admit nothing, upon the score of authority, to limit or supersede the touchstone of 
reason" (223). 
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Central to Godwin's philosophical anarchism is his notion of "universal 
benevolence," the argument being that the "private" or "domestic" affections of 
individual attachments which we may feel for family members and close friends must, in 
order to achieve this perfect society governed by unadulterated reason, be sacrificed for 
the greater good. Thus, universal benevolence must take precedence over the domestic 
affections, so that society can achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people, 
a central principle of the utilitarian philosophy that Godwin favoured. In what was 
perhaps the most controversial passage in Political Justice, Godwin constructs a 
hypothetical situation in which the rational man, governed by reason alone and entirely 
committed to this principle of universal benevolence, must make the "correct" choice for 
the greater good of humanity by choosing to sacrifice his brother's life to save the life of 
the French poet Francois Fenelon: 
In a loose and general view I and my neighbour are both of us men; and of 
consequence entitled to equal attention. But, in reality, it is probable that 
one of us, is a being of more worth and importance than the other [....] 
In the same manner the illustrious archbishop of Cambray [Fenelon] was 
of more worth than his valet, and there are few of us that would hesitate to 
pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them 
could be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred [...] that life 
ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good. 
In saving the life of Fenelon, suppose at the moment when he conceived 
the project of his immortal Telemachus [a didactic epic poem by Fenelon], 
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I should have been promoting the benefit of thousands, who have been 
cured by the perusal of that work, of some error, vice and consequent 
unhappiness [....] Suppose the valet had been my brother, my father or 
my benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life 
of Fenelon would still be more valuable than that of the valet; and justice, 
pure, unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most 
valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fenelon at the 
expence of the other.4 (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 126-28) 
For Hazlitt, writing a generation after the publication of PoliticalJustice, the 
intellectual significance of Godwin's magnum opus was clear: "No work in our time gave 
such a blow to the philosophical mind of the country as the celebrated Enquiry 
concerning PoliticalJustice," he declares (33). For the later Victorians, Godwin's 
philosophical vision was perhaps even more radical. Gilfillan, in his Sketches of Modern 
Literature, declared that "on titles and on property, on monarchy and on marriage, on 
commerce and on gratitude, [Godwin] trode with disdain" (29). Likewise, in his 1902 
Studies of a Biographer, Leslie Stephen spoke ofPolitical Justice as a book "crammed 
with intellectual explosives" (128). "It was a brilliant, but dangerous vision," Gilfillan 
had recognized, "one of those sun-tinted phantasmatas which rose from the gulf of the 
French Revolution, ere it had yet become an abyss of blood" (30). 
Although later generations joined Godwin's contemporaries in emphasizing the 
radical or "dangerous" nature of the philosopher's views, Godwin's anarchic vision was 
actually quite conservative in its description of political and social innovation. While 
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Gilfillan declared that Godwin "trode with disdain" on established institutions, the 
philosopher, in reality, advocated for slow, cautious, and incremental change. As he 
asserted in the Enquirer, "the rational advocate of new systems of government, would 
touch actual institutions with a careful hand. He would desire further changes and fresh 
improvements; but he would consider the task of innovation as an arduous business, nor 
is there any thing that would excite more the apprehensiveness of his mind, than a 
precipitate and headlong spirit" (322). "Innovation," he argued, "is a measure attended 
with peculiar peril" and "should be entered upon with caution, and introduced in portions, 
small and detached" {Enquirer 320). 
Despite Godwin's aversion to the "precipitate and headlong spirit" that, in his 
view, led to irrational social upheaval, his philosophy became a touchstone for the radical 
cause in England, to the eventual detriment of his reputation. As the ideals of the French 
Revolution degenerated into the Terror (Gilfillan's "abyss of blood"), Godwin and his 
philosophy became increasingly open to virulent attack from the conservative forces in 
England threatened by the social and political upheaval in France. By the middle of the 
1790s, the ongoing war between Britain and France, combined with the images of violent 
excess associated with French revolutionary turmoil, had made the sort of reformist 
philosophy espoused by Godwin dangerously unpopular and left its adherents open to 
direct personal attacks from anti-jacobin conservatives like Richard Polwhele.5 
The reformers were also targeted politically. In 1795, William Pitt's government 
passed the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act (informally known as the "gagging 
acts" by those sympathetic to the cause of reform) in an effort to suppress the voice of the 
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radical movement agitating for social and political change in England. The Act-which 
made it punishable by transportation to write, speak, publish, or disseminate anything that 
might threaten the authority of the monarchy-came just months after Godwin's close 
friend, Thomas Holcroft, was indicted for high treason in the autumn of 1794. A well-
known reformist who had been actively involved in the publication of Thomas Paine's 
The Rights of Man (1791), Holcroft was only saved from trial after Godwin penned his 
Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand 
Jury, a pamphlet which successfully challenged the government's interpretation of 
treason as it had been applied in the charges against Holcroft and the reformers with 
whom he had been indicted. Indeed, it was the "sharpness of Mr. Godwin's pen," Hazlitt 
tells us, that "saved the lives of twelve innocent individuals, marked out as political 
victims" (52-53). Moreover, as Stephen relates in Studies of a Biographer, Godwin 
himself was likely only saved from government prosecution on account that the two-
volume Political Justice, at a cost of three guineas, was simply too expensive for the 
average Englishman, and thus had little chance of encouraging wide-spread social unrest 
(128). 
While Godwin might have been saved from formal government prosecution, he 
was not so lucky in the courts of public opinion, as the popularity he enjoyed in the mid 
1790s gave way to an obscure existence tinged by the shadows of notoriety. Indeed, 
immediately after the passage in which he extols Godwin's fame, Hazlitt laments that the 
philosopher now, in the year 1825, has 
24 
sunk below the horizon, and enjoys the serene twilight of a doubtful 
immortality [ . . . . ] Mr. Godwin's person is not known, he is not pointed 
out in the street, his conversation is not courted, his opinions are not 
asked, he is at the head of no cabal, he belongs to no party in the State, he 
has no train of admirers, no one thinks it worth his while even to traduce 
and vilify him, he has scarcely friend or foe, the world make a point [...] 
of taking no more notice of him than if such an individual had never 
existed; he is to all ordinary intents and purposes dead and buried. 
(31-32) 
Godwin's obscurity was so great in the early years of the nineteenth century that his 
future son-in-law Shelley, in his first correspondence with the infamous philosopher he so 
admired in early 1812, had to register the '"inconceivable emotion'" he experienced upon 
first finding out that Godwin was in fact still alive and not yet '"enrolled [...] in the list 
of the honourable dead'" (qtd. in Woodcock, Biographical Study 208). A little more than 
twenty years later in 1834, two years before Godwin's death, William Maginn of Fraser's 
Magazine constructed the aged philosopher as a "strange" oddity of a bygone era, a 
defeated figure whose radical ideas have been rendered benign by the passage of time and 
by the social and political hegemony of Victorian culture (463). 
The roots of Godwin's obscurity in the nineteenth century lie no doubt in the slow 
slide from fame to infamy which he experienced from the mid 1790s. As the 
conservative establishment tightened its hold on the English cultural landscaipe in the 
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wake of the French Revolution and the war with France, a backlash against the so-called 
"jacobins" resulted in a wide-ranging smear campaign against the more outspoken of the 
reformers, Godwin being a favourite target. Indeed, Godwin, describing the "fickleness 
of reputation and popularity" in the 1797 Enquirer (293), was well aware of the personal 
price people often pay for their commitment to ideological principles which run contrary 
to, or which challenge, popular opinion. "Particularly in the case of reputation," argues 
Godwin, "no man can without pain realise as to himself, the facility with which 
partialities are discarded, friendships dissolved, and the man who was your warmest 
advocate, subsides into indifference or worse" (Enquirer 293). Kenneth W. Graham's 
William Godwin Reviewed: A Reception History, 1783-1834 charts the way in which 
Godwin's reputation suffered, throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
a result of reviews of his work in literary magazines increasingly committed to upholding 
the conservative status quo and punishing those who were not so inclined. Godwin's 
ideas were "anathema to the most powerful interests during his lifetime," points out 
Graham, and thus were "seldom fairly represented by reviewers sensitive to the wishes of 
the powerful" (8). 
As the reviews collected in Graham's book illustrate, assessments of Godwin's 
work were often, especially during the polarized years of the late 1790s, not much more 
than simple attacks on his character and ideas. By 1798, the conservative British Critic 
readily dismissed any publication that issued from the pen of "this dangerous and 
extravagant author" (Graham 114), and the negative responses to Godwin's work and 
character only intensified after the 1798 publication of the Memoirs, Godwin's biography 
of his deceased wife Mary Wollstonecraft, a text which shocked contemporary readers 
and reviewers with its frank discussion of her life and ideas. Godwin published his 
Memoirs of the Author of A. Vindication of the Rights of Woman in an attempt to "give to 
the public some account of the life of a person of eminent merit deceased," an attempt 
meant to counter and defuse the "thoughtless calumny" that had dogged his wife in the 
final years of her life {Memoirs 43). In composing the Memoirs, Godwin expressed his 
hope that a balanced, affective, and sincere portrayal of Wollstonecraft's "picture and 
story" would do much to combat the "pernicious sentiments" spread in the "malignant 
misrepresentation" of his late wife {Memoirs 43). 
To be sure, Godwin must be given credit for his commitment to Wollstonecraft's 
legacy: as her biographer, and as the editor of her unpublished and unfinished 
manuscripts, the philosopher devoted himself in the immediate wake of his wife's death 
to the public preservation of her history and literary accomplishments.6 Godwin's 
unyielding commitment to an uncensored narration of Wollstonecraft's "picture and 
story," however, meant that readers were privy to all the details of a scandalous personal 
history replete with such indiscretions as pre-marital sex, suicide attempts, and the birth 
of an illegitimate child. Mary Jacobus has characterized the Memoirs as "a case of 
published indiscretion" (274), and "indiscreet" is perhaps the most insistent adjective 
used—in both contemporary and later critical evaluations—to characterize the text and its 
author. In 1798, The Monthly Review expressed its shock over the narration of events 
that "we should have advised the author to bury in oblivion" (Graham 150), and every 
subsequent critic has felt compelled to foreground what Pamela Clemit and Gina Luria 
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Walker call the "unprecedented biographical frankness" of Godwin's text (11). Nicola 
Trott points to the "double exposure" of Wollstonecraft, whereby Godwin's commitment 
to biographical honesty resulted in a wave of contemporary satirical representations of the 
feminist philosopher as a debauched and disorderly threat to the chastity of a bourgeois 
feminine subjectivity cultivated for, and by, middle-class women (34). Indeed, in the 
index to its inaugural issue in 1798, The Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine would 
unequivocally mark Wollstonecraft in these terms, cross-referencing her name with a 
superfluous notation for "Prostitution."7 
After enjoying literary success and tremendous social celebrity with the 
publications of PoliticalJustice and Caleb Williams in the early to mid 1790s, Godwin 
became known after 1798 as the scandalous biographer who, according to the poet Robert 
Southey, "strippfed] his dead wife naked" (qtd. in Luria and Walker 11). Throughout the 
early years of the nineteenth century, it "became fashionable to pour [abuse] upon 
[Godwin's] head," Gilfillan tells us (50-51), and his legacy was surely not helped by 
Stephen's 1890 Dictionary of National Biography article, in which he dwells in great 
length on Godwin's financial troubles in the last decades of his life and famously 
characterizes the philosopher as the "venerable horseleech" who "tried to extort money 
from his son-in-law" (67). Ironically, in the Enquirer, Godwin seemed to anticipate 
Stephen's prejudicial representation, calling attention to society's intolerant attitudes 
towards debtors: "People in general accustom themselves to forget the anguish of the 
insolvent debtor, and the unwearied struggles he has perhaps made to appear in a different 
character," he laments (266). 
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This is the image of Godwin inherited by modern readers, an image which has 
coloured our knowledge and perception of the man as both a philosopher and a novelist. 
In the 1834 Fraser's Magazine article already mentioned, Maginn declares Caleb 
Williams and St. Leon to be the only two of Godwin's novels "which will be 
remembered" (463), and even Hazlitt, while lavish in his praise of Caleb Williams and St. 
Leon, regards Fleetwood Q.& "mawkish" and Mandeville as "morbid" (52). By the time of 
Cloudesley's publication in 1830, the reviewers of the Athenaeum felt the need to lament 
that "the announcement of a new novel by so distinguished a writer as Mr. Godwin, was 
received with more indifference than we looked for by the reading world" (Graham 512). 
Moreover, if the reviews in Graham's collection are any indication, Godwin's last novel, 
Deloraine, received little notice in the periodical press, although the reviews it did 
receive were, for the most part, positive. Little was said of Godwin's work as a novelist 
throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, but Stephen's 1902 Studies of a Biographer 
did include an essay on "William Godwin's Novels." Curiously, however, while the title 
of the piece logically leads one to expect a discussion of all, or at least most, of Godwin's 
novels, Stephen dismisses all of the books after St. Leon as unworthy of any commentary. 
Even for St. Leon he has little praise, and Stephen ultimately ends his essay with the 
assessment that, "if any one should be prompted to push his study into [Godwin's] other 
novels [besides Caleb Williams], I fear that he is destined to disappointment" (154). 
There are, no doubt, a number of reasons for this critical and readerly neglect. As 
Woodcock pointed out in a mid-1970s review of Godwin's work in the genre, his "novels 
have certainly grown less readable over the generations" ("Notes" 685). To be sure, 
Godwin's rather verbose and heavily philosophical prose style can be off-putting to a 
modern reader-in 1955, P.N. Furbank conceded that Godwin was sometimes "painfully 
prosy in language" (222)-and his formal prose is often not helped by his tendency to 
insert, into the narratives of his stories, extended digressions on moral and philosophical 
matters. Combine this with what George Sherburn has deemed Godwin's "tendency to 
exhibit his learning" (77), in the form of lengthy historical and literary allusions, and you 
have a prose style that sometimes acts as an impediment to the narrative momentum of 
the plot. 
Moreover, there are deficiencies in the narrative structure of many of his novels 
that also have a deleterious effect on the development of the plot. Godwin's inclination 
towards multiple narrators, for example, often leads him to embed lengthy sub-narratives 
into his novels that sometimes stall, rather than complement, the development of the main 
story. This is perhaps most apparent in Fleetwood-where Ruffigny's life story continues 
for ten chapters, comprising almost a fifth of the entire text-and in Cloudesley, where an 
even larger chunk of the text is given over to the life story and adventures of a character 
who plays no central role in the main plot. On a related note, there is sometimes very 
little in the way of plot in Godwin's novels, a flaw his reviewers often highlighted: very 
little happens in Fleetwood until the end of the second volume, when the narrator's 
marriage seems to kick start the action of the story; in Mandeville, there is very little 
action at all outside of the delusional mind of the main character. Even with St. Leon, 
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which is perhaps Godwin's most plot-driven novel after Caleb Williams, one reviewer 
complained that, "considering the length of [the tale], it is bare of incident" (Graham 
158). 
In addition to these issues of style and narrative structure, Godwin's novels 
concern themselves with themes and characters that are no doubt unappealing to some 
readers. Misanthropy is one of his favourite themes-most of his protagonists suffer some 
sort of neurotic alienation from society and the people in their lives-but, as Sherburn 
aptly points out, "misanthropy makes for rather doleful material for novels" (67). Indeed, 
in its 1817 review of Mandeville, the Quarterly Review remarks on the "morbid anatomy" 
informing so many of Godwin's stories and characters: "It appears to us somewhat 
singular, that this gloomy style should have such charms for Mr. Godwin, that it should 
be, in fact, the one in which he seems to feel himself most truly in his element; but so it 
is; all the heroes of all his novels are infected with this malady" (Graham 367). 
Ultimately, to read Godwin's novels is to spend a considerable amount of time in the 
company of what are, in many cases, some fairly unlikeable characters. 
Notwithstanding such reservations, many critics have recognized the unique value 
of Godwin's texts and his role as a novelist. Hazlitt, of course, was effusive in his praise 
of Caleb Williams and St. Leon, deeming both novels to be "two of the most splendid and 
impressive works of the imagination that have appeared in our times" (48). Indeed, 
Hazlitt's enthusiasm for Godwin's early fiction is reflective of the broader assessment by 
the more generous reviewers of the nineteenth century that regarded Godwin as the only 
substantial peer to Sir Walter Scott in the genre of historical fiction. At numerous points 
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throughout his 1846 "sketch" of Godwin, for example, Gilfillan favourably compares the 
philosopher with Scott (36, 47). Moreover, by the early 1830s, most of Godwin's novels 
were apparently sufficiently established within the canon of British literature to warrant 
their inclusion in the Bentley's Standard Novels Series, a collection of cheap editions of 
"classic" novels printed by the London publishers Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley. 
Caleb Williams, St. Leon, and Fleetwood were reissued as numbers 2, 5, and 22, 
respectively, in the Bentley's Series. 
Twentieth-century critics, as well, have praised Godwin's achievements as a 
novelist. In his 1981 William Godwin As Novelist, B.J. Tysdahl recognized the 
philosopher's unique role as an experimentalist in narrative forms, arguing that his novels 
stand as "some of the most interesting technical experiments of the Romantic period" (3). 
Likewise, Woodcock regards Godwin as the first major British author to use fiction as a 
"vehicle of socio-political criticism" ("Notes" 685). On a more particular note, Ivanka 
Kovacevic, referring to Fleetwood's extended description of Ruffigny's experiences in a 
silk mill at Lyons, credits Godwin with writing fiction's first critical representation of the 
'"factory system'" (qtd. in Tysdahl 109). Indeed, Ruffigny's narrative may very well be 
one of the first representations of child labour in British literature. 
Fortunately, Godwin's novels have also become increasingly available to modern 
readers in new editions published throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. 
In 1992, the Collected Novels and Memoirs of William Godwin was released by Pickering 
& Chatto, making all of Godwin's novels available to modern readers in one complete, 
eight-volume scholarly collection. More recently, Broadview Press has published new 
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editions of many of Godwin's works, including Caleb Williams, in 2000; the Memoirs 
and Fleetwood, in 2001; and St. Leon, in 2006. The availability of these new editions is 
perhaps partially responsible for what seems to be a moderate surge of scholarly interest 
in Godwin's novels of late. William Brewer and A.A. Markley have both examined 
representations of masculinity and homosociality in the novels, and Gary Handwerk and 
Steven Bruhm have each put forth provocative readings of Fleetwood. Justine Crump 
and Anne Chandler, moreover, have provided their own interesting analyses of St. Leon. 
The work of these scholars has been instrumental in shaping my own critical approach to 
Godwin's texts, and I hope that my work will in turn encourage further scholarly enquiry 
into Godwin's much-neglected fiction. 
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The Well-Regulated Mind: Enlightenment, Education, and Caleb Williams 
For Godwin, political justice could only be achieved through the progressive 
enlightenment of humanity. The progressive nature of this enlightenment means that, 
through the cultivation of reason and the rational faculties, humanity will one day reach 
the state of "perfectibility" necessary to establish the anarchic state freed from 
government institutions and the oppression of social prejudice. Godwin's philosophical 
vision is thus fundamentally also a vision of ideal education, for the ultimate success of 
the anarchic state depends on the proper process of enlightenment. Indeed, Godwin's 
political argument is so inextricably bound up with the educative process that Gary 
Handwerk and A. A. Markley have described Political Justice as "less a theory of 
political institutions and processes [...] than a theory of political psychology and social 
education" (Introduction to Caleb Williams 21). 
In the Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature-published in 
1797, four years after the political treatise which made him famous-Godwin tackles the 
question of how best to prepare the young mind for the long process of gradual 
enlightenment. The key, argues Godwin, is to cultivate in the young pupil a certain frame 
of mind that will be well adapted for the intensive study required later in life. Godwin 
shows little interest in detailing the specifics of a prescribed curriculum. Instead, he 
asserts that the content of childhood education should be subordinate to the larger, and 
much more important, process of fostering a certain mental disposition. "The true object 
of juvenile education," contends the philosopher, is "to teach no one thing in particular, 
but to provide against the age of five and twenty a mind well regulated, active, and 
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prepared to learn" (Enquirer 5). As if to stress its centrality to his theory of education, 
Godwin reiterates this assertion, verbatim, later in the text (78). If content is subordinate 
to the formation of a certain frame of mind, then the tutor-or "preceptor," as Godwin 
often calls him-should assume the position of a farmer who cultivates untilled land in 
order that it may one day yield fruit. "The preceptor," argues Godwin, "is like the 
incloser of uncultivated land; his first crops are not valued for their intrinsic excellence; 
they are sown that the land may brought into order" (Enquirer 5-6). The tutor thus 
functions as the force which "tames" the juvenile mind, regulating its growth and 
ordering its activity; in the fertile soil of such a mind, the seeds of intellectual curiosity, 
rational examination, and habits of industry can take proper root. 
Godwin makes it clear at the beginning of the Enquirer that education, like "every 
other moral process," benefits both the individual and society (1). "The true object of 
education," he argues, "is the generation of happiness"-"happiness to the individual in 
the first place," and to society in the second, for "if individuals were universally happy, 
the species would be happy" (Enquirer 1). People are happy, moreover, because they are 
virtuous, virtue being "essential to human happiness" (Enquirer 2). A well-ordered and 
regulated mind, a mind "prepared to learn" (Enquirer 5), is capable of great 
enlightenment through the development and use of its rational powers, and this 
enlightenment necessarily leads in Godwin's view to virtuous sentiments. Godwin 
furthermore associates virtue with benevolence, arguing that virtue is inherently in 
sympathy with what is good for humanity and will inevitably encourage philanthropic 
behaviour: "The first object of virtue is to contribute to the welfare of mankind. The 
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most essential attribute of right conduct therefore is, that it shall have a beneficent and 
salutary tendency" (Enquirer 252). That which is not beneficent, argues Godwin, cannot 
be virtuous (Enquirer 252-53). We see here the utilitarian influence of Godwin's moral 
theory: virtuous conduct, by his definition, is that which benefits humanity and which 
furthers the Godwinian ideal of universal benevolence. It is through the cultivation of 
virtue-itself the product of a well-designed education-that society will reach its 
"perfected" state. 
Godwin's philosophy of education was shaped by what was no doubt the most 
influential eighteenth-century work on educational theory-Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 
Entile (1762). Rousseau, a Swiss philosopher and novelist, combined in Emile theory and 
fiction to create his portrait of the hypothetical Emile and his education, as conducted by 
his enlightened tutor. Rousseau's pedagogical approach in Emile was a radical departure 
from conventional practices of child-rearing, and his "half treatise half novel," as P.D. 
Jimack calls it (vii), made practical recommendations on almost every aspect of a child's 
physical, intellectual, and psychological development: he advocated against swaddling, 
arguing instead for loose clothing that allowed free movement of the limbs (10-11); he 
recommended fresh air and exercise as indispensable to proper development (26, 42); and 
wrote that mothers should breast feed their own children, rather than sending them out to 
wet nurses (11-14); if a nurse must be used, she should be healthy, of good disposition, 
and a vegetarian (24-26). 
In Volume 1 of Political Justice, Godwin defines "education" in the "most 
comprehensive sense that can possibly be annexed to that word, including every incident 
36 
that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" (45). 
Rousseau puts forth a similarly broad vision of education as a totalizing process involving 
every aspect of our experience and development. "All that we lack at birth, all that we 
need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of education," argues Rousseau at the 
beginning of Entile (6), and "we begin to learn when we begin to live" (9). The object of 
a good education, contends Rousseau, is to both respect and promote the child's "natural 
tendencies" so that he can ward off the corrupting influences of society. According to 
Rousseau, the child is born into a natural state, the very primitivism of which signifies its 
superiority, and misguided social customs and oppressive institutions then function to 
destroy the inherent goodness of this "natural" child-they "stifle nature in him" and 
distort his natural state: 
God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil. 
He forces one soil to yield the products of another, one tree to bear 
another's fruit. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural 
conditions. He mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave. He destroys 
and defaces all things; he loves all that is deformed and monstrous; he will 
have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his 
paces like a saddle-horse, and be shaped to his master's taste like the trees 
in his garden. {EmileS) 
This, argues Rousseau, is the tendency of dominant educational practice, as he knew it in 
the eighteenth century-to remove man from his "natural" state and impose on him habits 
and customs antithetical to his physical, psychological, and moral well-being. Through 
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the hypothetical Emile, Rousseau delineates an educational programme that would allow 
man to cultivate his natural tendencies so that they can be reconciled with the inevitable 
demands of society. 
Rousseau's ideal model of education is experiential and student-centred. The 
teacher's primary responsibility is to cultivate an interactive learning environment 
whereby his student can engage in a sustained relationship with the natural world. 
"Nature, not man, is his schoolmaster," asserts Rousseau of his imaginary pupil (Emile 
84). Education, moreover, should be limited to those things which are directly relevant to 
the student's life and experiences, and he warns the tutor not to begin the process of 
reasoning with his charge too soon. Instead, the enlightened tutor will emphasize activity 
of the body and the senses over that of the mind. The rational capacities of the mind 
should be developed at a later stage, when the child is more capable of reason. "Since 
everything that comes into the human mind," argues Rousseau, "enters through the gates 
of sense, man's first reason is a reason of sense-experience. It is this that serves as a 
foundation for the reason of the intelligence" (Emile 90). Childhood education, for 
Rousseau, is therefore predominantly an empiricist process, the student receiving all of 
his knowledge through a sensory exploration of the environment. 
Rousseau makes it clear that the tutor plays an indispensable role in structuring 
this kind of interactive education. While the student must feel, at all times, that his 
education is an entirely self-directed and improvisational exploration of the world around 
him, in reality, the tutor must play a controlling role in manipulating that world to create 
the series of scripted lessons experienced by the student as impromptu explorations. In 
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order to encourage independence and self-assertion in his student, the tutor must strive to 
construct the appearance of equality between him and his pupil, ostensibly repudiating his 
role as the superior in both power and knowledge. However, while the tutor adopts the 
appearance of equality, portraying himself as a fellow explorer in the learning process, he 
nevertheless maintains complete control of events as they unfold. "Let [the student] 
always think he is master while you are really master," advises Rousseau to the 
prospective tutor (Emile 84). This, he argues, is how the tutor tames the student and 
brings him fully under his controlling sway, for "there is no subjection so complete as that 
which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive" 
(Emile 84). The tutor must therefore maintain the illusion of freedom, while 
simultaneously ensuring a complete manipulation of his student's thoughts and actions. 
The tutor must actively shape his pupil's behaviour and sentiments, but must veil that 
shaping influence so that the pupil experiences a sense of complete autonomy in his 
education. "No doubt he ought only to do what he wants," argues Rousseau of the 
hypothetical pupil, "but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do. He 
should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell" 
(Emile 85). In developing and delivering this Rousseauvian model of education, one 
which will not "stifle nature in the child" (Emile 5), the teacher must master the "art of 
controlling without precepts, and doing everything without doing anything at all" (Emile 
84). This, contends Rousseau, is the "only road to success" (Emile 84). 
While Godwin admired Emile as a "work of the highest value" (Enquirer 107), 
and Rousseau for the "magnitude and originality of his speculations" (Enquirer 106), he 
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was deeply suspicious of what he saw as the deception inherent in the philosopher's 
system of education. For Godwin, all education should be predicated on the intrinsic 
motivation of the student, on the student's desire to learn for the sake of knowledge itself, 
and for the self-improvement that such knowledge will inevitably foster. "The most 
desirable mode of education," writes Godwin in the Enquirer, "is that which is careful 
that all the acquisitions of the pupil shall be preceded and accompanied by desire. The 
best motive to learn, is a perception of the value of the thing learned" (78). "The boy, 
like the man, studies, because he desires it," continues Godwin. "He proceeds upon a 
plan of his own invention, or which, by adopting, he has made his own. Every thing 
bespeaks independence and equality" (Enquirer 80). It is vital that the student achieves 
this independence; the "preceptor" should guide the student and facilitate his learning, but 
should never dictate the process. "Let [the student] explore the path for himself," advises 
Godwin. "Without increasing his difficulties, you may venture to leave him for a 
moment, and suffer him to ask himself the question before he asks you, or, in other 
words, to ask the question before he receives the information" (Enquirer 82). 
While the preceptor should cultivate independence in his student, and strive for a 
relationship of equality, he should nevertheless acknowledge his place as the instructor 
and should not play the part of deception by pretending to be less skilled or 
knowledgeable than he truly is. Such disingenuousness on the part of the tutor is 
Godwin's main complaint against Rousseau's educative model: "his whole system of 
education," laments Godwin, 
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is a series of tricks, a puppet-show exhibition, of which the master holds 
the wires, and the scholar is never to suspect in what manner they are 
moved. The scholar is never to imagine that his instructor is wiser than 
himself. They are to be companions; they are to enter upon their studies 
together; they are to make a similar progress; if the instructor drop a 
remark which facilitates their progress, it is to seem the pure effect of 
accident. While [the tutor] is conducting a process of the most uncommon 
philosophical research, and is watching every change and motion of the 
machine, he is to seem in the utmost degree frank, simple, ignorant and 
undesigning. (Enquirer 106) 
This pedagogical approach, argues Godwin, is not much more than a "system of incessant 
hypocrisy and lying," whereby an ostensibly "undesigning" tutor constructs a relationship 
of "fictitious equality" with his pupil in order to veil the contrived and duplicitous nature 
of his educational programme (Enquirer 120). The Rousseauvian teacher, in Godwin's 
view, commits the unjustifiable error of practicing deception on his student, and his 
pedagogy-predicated as it is on this foundation of insincerity-becomes a programme of 
manipulation made that much more insidious by the fact that it masquerades as a 
relationship of equality. Indeed, for Godwin, this system seeks to conceal the power 
imbalance which he recognizes as inherent in the educational dynamic of teacher and 
student. "Whatever may be [the] merit [of Emile] as a vehicle of fundamental truths, as a 
guide of practice it will be found of the most pernicious tendency," argues Godwin 
(Enquirer 107).1 
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Rousseau believed in the inherent virtue of humanity in its natural state-"God 
makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil," asserts the 
philosopher at the beginning of Emile (5). For Godwin, however, the young mind is 
neither good nor evil. Instead, the child enters the world as an empty space ready to 
receive the "impressions" of everything around him or her: 
In infancy the mind is peculiarly ductile. We bring into the world with us 
nothing that deserves the name of habit; are neither virtuous nor vicious, 
active nor idle, inattentive nor curious. The infant comes into our hands a 
subject, capable of certain impressions and of being led on to a certain 
degree of improvement. {Enquirer 15) 
In this respect, Godwin follows in the empiricist tradition of John Locke, the seventeenth-
century English philosopher whose conception of the mind as a tabula rasa or "blank 
slate" is similar to Godwin's later vision of the "ductile" mind. In An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690), Locke argues against the existence of innate ideas in 
humanity, instead contending that all knowledge and understanding develops from our 
sensory impressions of the world. "The senses," asserts Locke, 
at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the 
mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in 
the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding 
farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In 
this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the 
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materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty [....] The 
knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way 
that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it 
still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: it being about those first, 
which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to 
do, and which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. 
(11-12) 
Like Locke, Godwin conceives of the mind in these non-essentialist terms, as a pliable 
object that can be shaped in any number of ways by sense experience and the forces of 
history and culture-all of which, for Godwin, qualifies as "education." Indeed, in many 
ways, Godwin prefigures later twentieth-century conceptions of subjectivity in his 
recognition of the infant as a "subject" who comes into the world ready to receive the 
"impressions" of the cultural order. 
Although the infant mind is initially "ductile," it does not always remain so. 
Impressions will take, argues Godwin, and the initial pliability of the mind will inevitably 
give way to the developed habits and behaviours of an entrenched character. The child's 
mind, contends Godwin, "is like his body. What at first was cartilage, gradually becomes 
bone. Just so the mind acquires its solidity; and what might originally have been bent in a 
thousand directions, becomes stiff, unmanageable, and unimpressible" {Enquirer 15). 
Godwin particularly laments this "solidity" of the mind in terms of the errors and 
character flaws which so often develop in youth, and which prove so difficult, if not 
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impossible, to ameliorate. Indeed, Rousseau had voiced a similar concern for the young 
pupil in Entile, calling the first twelve years of the boy's existence "the most dangerous 
period in human life" (57). This period, contends the philosopher, "is the time when 
errors and vices spring up, while as yet there is no means to destroy them; when the 
means of destruction are ready [i.e., the ability to reason], the roots have gone too deep to 
be pulled up" {Entile 57). 
For Godwin, the bad habits cultivated in childhood are just as damaging to the 
later character of the man. "It too frequently happens that the excesses of youth, not only 
leave an unfavourable stain upon the reputation, but that they corrupt the disposition, and 
debase the character," he contends {Enquirer 158). "It is not every youthful folly that 
men shake off when they arrive at years of discretion. The wild and inconsiderate boy 
will often entail some of the worst features of his character on the man" {Enquirer 158). 
It is for this reason, asserts Godwin, "that we frequently meet with that mixed character in 
the adult over which humanity weeps. We have often occasion to observe the most 
admirable talents, and even the most excellent dispositions, in men, whose talents and 
virtues are nevertheless rendered abortive by some habitual indiscretion" {Enquirer 158). 
Education-understood by Godwin as the totality of the child's experiences in the 
world, as well as the more direct pedagogical guidance he may or may not receive-is 
therefore essential to human development, for a sound education, as the single most 
important factor in the ultimate development of the subject, serves as the best way to 
guard against the production of such a "mixed character." As Godwin argues at the 
beginning of the Enquirer, education is a "moral process," and without a sound education 
founded on the principles of reason, justice, and benevolence, there can be no happiness 
or virtue (1-2). A proper education is indispensable to the development of a happy, 
virtuous, and rational human being, and even those born with great potential still must 
receive the improving benefits of a salutary education: 
Genius perhaps is indebted for its earliest birth to the occurrence of 
favourable circumstances. But, be this as it will, certain it is that it stands 
in need of every advantage to nurse it to perfection, and that for this 
reason, it is almost constantly frost-nipped, or stunted, or distorted in its 
proportions, and scarcely in any instance arrives at what genius is capable 
of being. (Enquirer 286-87) 
While the educative process plays, for Godwin, a central role in producing the 
virtuous and happy subject, it is also an inherently precarious process whereby early 
promise and ability are easily blighted by a lack of "favourable circumstances" in 
childhood, a "mis-education." For Godwin (as for Rousseau), the corrupt nature of 
political and social institutions contributes to the mis-education of the subject. This 
reality is perhaps best captured by Caleb Williams, who portrays Falkland's fall into 
immorality and despair as the inevitable consequence of a corrupt social order that 
destroys even its most promising. "Of what use are talents and sentiments in the corrupt 
wilderness of human society?" asks Caleb at the end of the novel. "It is a rank and rotten 
soil, from which every finer shrub draws poison as it grows. All that, in a happier field 
and a purer air, would expand into virtue and germinate into usefulness, is thus converted 
into henbane and deadly nightshade" (434). Indeed, in the two central characters of this 
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novel-Caleb and Falkland-we encounter two separate narratives underscoring the 
connection between character flaws fostered by a childhood "miseducation" and later 
personal tragedy. 
There is a tension in Caleb Williams between psychology and social critique. On 
one level, Godwin seems drawn to the troubled psychologies of his characters in 
documenting their moral degeneration. This is particularly true for Caleb, whose passion 
for the "unravelling of an adventure" (60) is at certain moments suggestive of an innate 
psychological failure that transcends the influence of education. Indeed, the earliest 
memories shared in his memoir all relate to the fundamental curiosity which Caleb 
presents as the primal impulse of his character. Godwin himself seemed to perceive 
curiosity as almost intrinsic to the human condition, calling it "one of the strongest 
impulses of the human heart" {Enquirer 131). 
On another level, however, Godwin insists on having Caleb document the 
pedagogical conditions of his early years, a strategy which underscores the central role 
these educational challenges play in his process of mis-education. The limitations of 
Caleb's humble upbringing are specifically highlighted by Godwin: his parents have little 
education beyond the utilitarian kind, and do not have the resources to offer their son 
supplementary guidance in the form of a tutor (59-60). As a consequence, Caleb is left to 
his own limited resources in cobbling together an education that ultimately makes him ill-
suited for his own class position as a peasant. Of course, his education cannot make him 
into a gentleman either. Caleb is thus mired in the injustice of "things as they are," and 
his dilemma operates as a form of social critique in the novel, an indictment of a class 
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system that fails to meet the educational and social needs of promising young men like 
Caleb. In another class milieu, Caleb's curiosity may have developed into an asset, rather 
than a liability. As I argue shortly, a tutor or enlightened "preceptor" might have 
channeled Caleb's curious energies in more fruitful directions, directions more suited to 
benevolence and personal happiness. Without such a resource, however, his curiosity 
remains unchecked, and ultimately develops into the destructive passion that forms the 
basis of his mis-education. 
In his portrait of Falkland, Godwin similarly deploys the theme of mis-education 
to critique the established class system. A member of the landed gentry, Falkland has the 
economic power and social privilege denied Caleb, and these resources allow him to 
wage his campaign of persecution against his young employee. Despite his very real 
power, however, Falkland is also presented as a victim in the text, a man corrupted by the 
ideologies that underpin his class position. Falkland is not just duped into worshiping a 
false "idol," as he later comes to recognize (215); he is literally destroyed-
psychologically, morally, and even physically-by the chivalric value system he embraces. 
The romance of chivalry is not just "'idle and groundless,'" as Falkland's steward asserts 
(166); it is a vitiating ideology that corrupts Falkland's psychological development and 
blights his potential for virtue and benevolence. 
For both Caleb and Falkland, therefore, childhood mis-education is rooted in the 
flawed nature of an established class system that oppresses one man and turns the other 
into his oppressor. Although it is Caleb who cries out at novel's end against the "corrupt 
wilderness of human society," with its "rank and rotten soil" (434), it is clearly Godwin, 
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as philosopher and social reformer, who makes this lament. In much of his fiction, 
including Caleb Williams, Godwin marries social critique to psychological realism 
through the theme of mis-education. 
Habits of Mind and Meditations: Caleb Williams 
Published in 1794, one year after Political Justice, Caleb Williams puts into 
narrative form the philosophical arguments of that text regarding the systemic corruption 
of contemporary class and social structures, or "things as they are." A huge success, the 
novel solidified Godwin's celebrity in Britain where, as William Hazlitt tells us, "he 
blazed as a sun in the firmament of reputation; no one was more talked of, more looked 
up to, more sought after, and wherever liberty, truth, justice was the theme, his name was 
not far off' (31). With its thematic treatment of secret histories and their exposure, as 
well as its chase narrative and murder plot, Caleb Williams was as much gothic novel as 
it was social critique, a fact that no doubt contributed to its success, as Godwin adeptly 
heightens the suspenseful tension of the narrative through a tortuous pursuit sequence that 
postpones the final confrontation between the protagonist and his oppressor and thus 
allows readers to witness the slow psychological and physical deterioration of Caleb.2 
It is in Caleb Williams that Godwin first explores the theme of mis-education as it 
impacts the novel's two central characters, Caleb and his employer, the country squire 
Ferdinando Falkland. The opening pages of the novel chart the physical and intellectual 
development of Caleb as a child, and the reader is informed at some length of Caleb's 
"habits of [] mind" and "meditations" (59-60). Largely left to his own devices in terms of 
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his education, Caleb gravitates towards activities and books that gratify what he calls the 
"spring of action" informing the "whole train of [his] life"-curiosity: 
The spring of action which, perhaps more than any other, characterised the 
whole train of my life was curiosity [....] [T]his produced in me an 
invincible attachment to books of narrative and romance. I panted for the 
unravelling of an adventure with an anxiety, perhaps almost equal to that 
of the man whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue. I read, 
I devoured compositions of this sort. They took possession of my soul. 
(60) 
As Caleb himself recognizes, his later misfortunes are rooted in this unbridled curiosity, 
in this propensity for the " unravelling of an adventure." Indeed, he mentions these 
"habits" and "meditations" of his mind precisely because they have "influenced the 
history of [his] future life" (59). 
Caleb constructs his curiosity as an inherent feature of his personality, something 
present in him from birth, and he regards the stories he "devours" as the natural means of 
gratifying this innate element in his psyche. In reality, however, Caleb's curiosity and 
passion for adventure are as much the products of his reading as they are the instigating 
forces stimulating it. Caleb's curiosity and thirst for adventure are no doubt satisfied by 
the "books of narrative and romance" he devours, but they are also simultaneously fueled 
by these books, his curiosity developing and growing in response to this steady diet of 
adventure and romance. In this sense, Caleb's reading can be interpreted as a form of 
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"mis-education," for it exacerbates the destructive propensity for curiosity already present 
in his character. Significantly, Caleb has no tutor or "preceptor" to act as a guiding hand 
in his education. "Born of humble parents," he is "taught the rudiments of no science, 
except reading, writing, and arithmetic" (59). The education he receives from his parents 
is of the most basic, utilitarian kind, and Caleb must consequently fashion for himself an 
education "greater than [his] condition in life afforded room to expect" (59). With his 
"inquisitive mind," he "neglected no means of information from conversation or books" 
(59). 
As a largely self-taught student, therefore, Caleb is left to his own resources in not 
only choosing his reading materials, but also in evaluating the moral tendencies of these 
materials and in monitoring their effects on his developing character. In the Enquirer, 
Godwin argued against censoring the reading choices of the pupil-"suffer him to wander 
in the wilds of literature," he advises (144). "The impression we derive from a book," 
argues Godwin, "depends much less upon its real contents, than upon the temper of mind 
and preparation with which we read it" (Enquirer 144-45). Of course, that "temper of 
mind and preparation" is shaped by the "skilful preceptor," whose sound judgement 
teaches the student to think critically and rationally. Even in cases where the pupil's 
reading contains the "thickest clouds of error," the mindful preceptor should be able to 
"triumph over corruption and sophistry, with the advantage of being continually at hand, 
of watching every change and symptom as they may arise, and more especially with the 
advantage of real voice, of accommodated eloquence, and of living sympathies, over a 
dead letter" (Enquirer 145-46). 
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Caleb, however, has no such guidance. With no preceptor available to shape his 
education, and to monitor the moral effects of the "books of narrative and romance" he 
devours, he indulges in the "excesses of youth" which Godwin warned would "corrupt 
the disposition, and debase the character" of the man (Enquirer 158). Caleb's improvised 
education ultimately functions as a kind of mis-education which fails to produce the 
"well-regulated mind" which Godwin identified as one of the primary objects of "juvenile 
education" (Enquirer 5). Instead, Caleb's mis-education allows for the destructive 
passion of curiosity to take deep root in his character. Without the guidance of an 
enlightened teacher, who might have channeled his student's thirst for tales of adventure 
into more productive or appropriate pursuits, Caleb allows his curiosity to take 
"possession of [his] soul," overwhelming his better judgment and leading him into 
recklessness. Indeed, even in Caleb's assertion that his childhood curiosity was not 
"entirely ignoble"-"village anecdotes and scandal had no charms for me," he claims 
(60)-lies his awareness of its potential indiscretion. 
Once employed by Falkland, Caleb becomes a quintessential example of the man 
later described by Godwin in the Enquirer-a man whose "talents and virtues are 
nevertheless rendered abortive by some habitual indiscretion," an indiscretion which 
takes its root in the corrupting "excesses of youth" (158). After hearing the story of 
Falkland's history from the steward Collins, he allows his curiosity about his employer's 
mysterious past to consume all his mental energy: "The story I had heard was for ever in 
my thoughts, and I was peculiarly interested to comprehend its full import. I turned it a 
thousand ways, and examined it in every point of view" (179). It became, writes Caleb, 
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"the great enquiry which drank up all the currents of my soul" (203). Indeed, his intense 
curiosity induces him to enter into the narrative of Falkland's life as a psychological spy. 
In his relentless pursuit of Falkland's secrets, he acts as a "watch upon [his] patron" 
(180), and the very recklessness of his behaviour heightens its appeal: "The instant I had 
chosen this employment for myself," remarks Caleb, "I found a strange sort of pleasure in 
it" (180). "That there was danger in the employment, served to give an alluring pungency 
to the choice" (180). 
Godwin had reflected, in the Enquirer, on the negative correlation which so often 
exists between curiosity and the possibility of its gratification: 
Curiosity is one of the strongest impulses of the human heart. To curiosity 
it is peculiarly incident, to grow and expand itself under difficulties and 
opposition. The greater are the obstacles to its being gratified, the more it 
seems to swell, and labour to burst the mounds that confine it. Many an 
object is passed by with indifference, till it is rendered a subject of 
prohibition, and then it starts up into a source of inextinguishable passion. 
(131) 
This dynamic certainly characterizes Caleb's increasingly reckless pursuit of Falkland's 
secrets. He laments the "restless propensity" of curiosity, which "often does but hurry us 
forward the more irresistibly, the greater is the danger that attends its indulgence" (187). 
Caleb's behaviour, moreover, becomes increasingly irrational, as his desire for details 
turns into a need for complete omniscience regarding his patron: "I will watch him 
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without remission," he vows. "I will trace all the mazes of his thought" (203). Indeed, 
Caleb ultimately loses control of his own capacity for self-regulation, as his judgment, 
reason, and instincts for self-preservation are all overwhelmed by the "demon" of 
curiosity: "The more impenetrable Mr. Falkland was determined to be, the more 
uncontrollable was my curiosity," Caleb remarks (181); "I had a confused apprehension 
of what I was doing, but I could not stop myself," he later laments (188); '"I have always 
tried to stop myself, but the demon that possessed me was too strong for me,'" he finally 
admits to Falkland (195). Indeed, the overwrought nature of Caleb's mental state during 
these psychological exchanges with Falkland has led Peter Melville Logan to classify 
Caleb as a "nervous narrator" whose first-person narration, fraught with the signs of his 
emotional distress, is symptomatic of the sickly state of his mind and body (48-55). 
Caleb is not the only character in the novel whose early reading constitutes a mis-
education that proves fatal to his future happiness. Falkland is almost always analyzed in 
terms of the relationship he shares with Caleb, critical examinations of the novel often 
positioning patron and servant as either "doubles" of one another (a relationship 
sometimes read in erotic terms, as both Robert J. Corber and Alex Gold, Jr. do), or as 
representatives of opposing value systems.3 In terms of characterization, however, 
Falkland signifies more broadly in Godwin's fictional corpus as a seminal figure 
informing the characterization of the philosopher's later fictional heroes-namely, St. 
Leon and Fleetwood. Indeed, in Falkland we find a figure whose mis-education gives rise 
to the specific forms of moral failure characterizing these later heroes. Like St. Leon, 
whose childhood education in the chivalric code leads him to embrace the ideals of fame 
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and public honour largely to the exclusion of all else, Falkland nurses a similar passion 
for chivalry that compels him to regard '"honour and the esteem of mankind as a good [] 
preferred to all others'" (Caleb Williams 195-96). Falkland's acute awareness of the stain 
of dishonour, moreover, is symptomatic of, and feeds into, an underlying sensibility that 
foreshadows the destructive misanthropy of Fleetwood, the "New Man of Feeling." We 
find in Falkland, therefore, a prototype of sorts for Godwin's next two fictional heroes, 
and his characterization in Caleb Williams foreshadows the later identity crises 
experienced by St. Leon and Fleetwood. 
Godwin's critique of chivalric ideology can be traced back to his position as the 
radical reformer who actively agitated throughout the 1790s against Britain's established 
class structures, structures which allowed an aristocratic oligarchy made up of men like 
Falkland to oppress those below them in the social order. Perhaps the most famous 
apologist for the old order was Edmund Burke, whose impassioned response to the 
revolutionary turmoil in France, the 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, stood 
as a lightning rod for the radical movement, and which partly inspired Mary 
Wollstonecraft and Godwin to write their own philosophical rebuttals-^ Vindication of 
the Rights of Men (1790) and Political Justice (1793). A number of critics have pointed 
out the way in which Godwin's Caleb Williams also critiques Burke's veneration of the 
old order as it is embodied in aristocratic value systems. As Marilyn Butler has argued, 
the novel "re-enacts and even verbally echoes the debate on the merits of the old system 
conducted since 1790 by Burke and his republican opponents" (252). Godwin's story, 
contends Butler, particularly the first volume in which the misfortunes of Emily Melville 
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and the Hawkins family are recounted to Caleb by Collins, exists to illustrate the "variety 
and range of circumstances in which the power of the upper orders can be felt by other 
citizens" (245).4 
Godwin himself was quite blunt about the political aims of his novel, arguing, in 
the original Preface to the text in 1794, that he "proposed, in the invention of the 
following work, to comprehend, as far as the progressive nature of a single story would 
allow, a general review of the modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism by which 
man becomes the destroyer of man" (55). In a 1795 letter to the British Critic, he 
reiterated the polemical intention of the text to "expose the evils which arise out of the 
present system of civilized society" (451). One of these evils, of course, was the 
contemporary class system, and Butler is surely correct in arguing that Falkland was 
largely modelled on a vision of the chivalric aristocratic order venerated by Burke. 
Central to Godwin's critique is the notorious passage from the Reflections in 
which Burke paints the highly sexualized scene of Marie Antoinette's arrest by a "band of 
cruel ruffians and assassins," who, after bursting into the Queen's chambers, "pierced 
with a hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted 
woman had but just time to fly almost naked" (Reflections 75-76). Burke laments this 
moment as symbolic of the fall of chivalry-the demise of a golden age in which men, 
actuated by gallantry and honour, would have felt compelled to react immediately and 
violently in the defense of a noble woman: "Little did I dream that I should have lived to 
see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour, 
and of cavaliers," laments Burke (Reflections 80). 
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I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to 
avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry 
is gone [...] and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, 
never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that 
proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the 
heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted 
freedom. (Reflections 80) 
In Volume 2 of Political Justice, Godwin directly evokes Burke's language but 
reverses his lament. In his argument against the unequal distribution of wealth and 
property, Godwin contends that chivalry, unfortunately, is still alive and well in Britain, 
corrupting the rich and cultivating servility, moral weakness, and despair in the poor: 
"Indeed 'the age of chivalry is' not 'gone'!" he declares. "The feudal spirit still survives 
that reduced the great mass of mankind to the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of a 
few" (454-55). In Caleb Williams, this corrupting feudal spirit is best expressed through 
Falkland, who serves as Godwin's paradigm for the ignoble and blighting potential of 
chivalric ideology on those who embrace its ideals, as well as on those who are its 
recipients. 
Falkland's passion for chivalry takes root in his youth, and his reading, like 
Caleb's, plays a central role in the development of the passion which will prove so 
destructive to his future happiness. "Among the favourite authors of his early years were 
the heroic poets of Italy," Caleb tells his reader. "From them he imbibed the love of 
chivalry and romance" (67). Caleb's use of the verb "imbibed" posits chivalric ideology 
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as a form of sustenance that should theoretically foster Falkland's moral development. 
The nourishing potential of chivalry, however, is belied by the reality of its effects on 
Falkland's character. Having in his youth "drunk so deeply of the fountain of chivalry" 
(67), Falkland finds himself poisoned, rather than nourished, by the corruption of his 
ideological fare. Falkland's love of chivalry is so entrenched that it shapes every aspect 
of his imaginative development, as evidenced by the "Ode to the Genius of Chivalry" he 
composes as a young man (84). He subsequently grows up to embrace a chivalric code 
that emphasizes not only benevolent and philanthropic behaviour, but also the honour 
attached to rank and reputation. Indeed, for Falkland, his sensibility to public reputation 
is a direct function of his virtue. "He believed that nothing was so well calculated to 
make men delicate, gallant, and humane, as a temper pereptually alive to the sentiments 
of birth and honour," writes Caleb (67). 
To be sure, Falkland's early education in the ideals of chivalry produces an 
accomplished young man celebrated for his honour and integrity. While in Italy, and 
mired in a lover's quarrel, he deftly avoids a duel while still managing to maintain the 
'"reputation of [his] courage'" (73). Even in this situation, however, Falkland's embrace 
of the chivalric code has a darker side: he admits to Count Malvesi, his antagonist in the 
quarrel, that his strict adherence to the '"rigid"' rules governing chivalric interactions 
between men might have compelled him to take the life of his challenger. '"The laws of 
honour are in the utmost degree rigid,'" he tells Malvesi, '"and there was reason to fear 
that, however anxious I were to be your friend, I might be obliged to be your murderer'" 
(73). It is only lucky, he remarks, that Malvesi's challenge had been made privately 
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rather than publicly, as a public accusation would have forced him to defend his courage 
and honour, whatever the costs. '"It would not have been in my power,'" he tells 
Malvesi, '"to have avoided the combat'" (73). 
Despite the ostensible beneficence of Falkland's conduct in this situation, it is 
clear that he unequivocally embraces and is the proud representative of what Daniela 
Garofalo has called the "carefully codified and gentlemanly violence of chivalry" (238). 
As Falkland's behaviour in this affair suggests, all other values-including the sanctity of 
human life-must ultimately be sacrificed for the protection of his good name, a sentiment 
which foreshadows his later tragedies. Indeed, he admits as much to Caleb: '"As soon as 
I was capable of a choice, I chose honour and the esteem of mankind as a good I preferred 
to all others,'" he tells his young employee (195-96). '"I have sworn to preserve my 
reputation, whatever be the expense,'" he later warns Caleb. '"I love it more than the 
whole world and its inhabitants taken together[]'" (235). 
Collins, too, recognizes Falkland's fatal sensibility to dishonour and the way in 
which it threatens to overwhelm his judgment and philanthropic potential. As he 
recounts to Caleb the story of Falkland's combative history with the neighbourhood bully 
Barnabas Tyrell, Collins characterizes his employer as "a man whom, in the pursuit of 
reputation, nothing could divert; who would have purchased the character of a true, 
gallant, and undaunted hero, at the expense of worlds, and who thought every calamity 
nominal but a stain upon his honour" (172). For Collins, the beating Falkland suffers at 
the hands of Tyrell in the rural assembly hall constitutes a public "disgrace," an attack on 
his honour from which it was impossible he should ever recover: "To Mr. Falkland 
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disgrace was worse than death," he tells Caleb. "The slightest breath of dishonour would 
have stung him to the very soul. What must it have been with this complication of 
ignominy, base, humiliating, and public?" (164). "Every passion of his life was 
calculated to make him feel it more acutely" (164). 
This moment, Caleb learns, marks the '"crisis of Mr. Falkland's history'" (166). 
With Tyrell mysteriously murdered immediately after this confrontation, Falkland finds 
himself under suspicion of having committed the crime. While Falkland must suffer the 
public disgrace of defending himself against a "'crime, the most black that any human 
creature is capable of perpetrating'" (170), he must also compound his psychological 
distress in the service of preserving his reputation. Lying to the magistrates, feigning 
innocence, and allowing the execution of two innocent men may be abhorrent to 
Falkland's sense of virtue and his philanthropic sentiments, as well as fatal to his future 
happiness and psychological stability, but these acts are nevertheless constructed as 
necessary "sacrifices" to the larger project of protecting his good name. Although 
Falkland claims that he has now only the '"empty remains of honour'" to protect-his 
reputation having been "blemished" beyond repair by the simple taint of suspicion-he 
still demands of the magistrates that they offer him the '"feeble consolation'" of 
vindicating his public image (172). 
The public beating-that '"complicated personal insult,'" as Collins calls it 
(168)-and the taint of public suspicion combine to create an existential crisis for 
Falkland. After his confrontation with Tyrell, Falkland yearns for "annihilation, to lie 
down in eternal oblivion" (164); after his defense, he is alienated from humanity by a 
59 
"stately coldness and reserve" punctuated only by periods "of a furious insanity" (175). 
As Collins remarks, Falkland was 
'too deeply pervaded with the idle and groundless romances of chivalry, 
ever to forget the situation, humiliating and dishonourable according to his 
ideas, in which he had been placed upon this occasion. There is a 
mysterious sort of divinity annexed to the person of a true knight, that 
makes any species of brute violence committed upon it indelible and 
immortal.' (166) 
Collins's language yokes the chivalric with the divine and initiates a recurrent motif in 
the novel whereby honour and reputation become "idols" requiring both worship and 
sacrifice. Falkland tells Caleb that '"reputation has been the idol, the jewel of [his] life,'" 
a '"deity"' he has chosen to '"worship"' (171-72). The public humiliation in the 
assembly hall, coupled with the suspicion of murder attached to his name, render the 
sacred-Falkland's honour and reputation-profane, a sacrilege he experiences as 
irreversible. For Falkland, the divinity attached to an '"unblemished reputation'" can 
never be recovered after these events, despite his being ultimately cleared of the charge 
with much celebration and "every circumstance of credit" (172). It becomes a paradise 
forever lost to him: '"It is not in the power of your decision to restore to me my 
unblemished reputation, to obliterate the disgrace I have suffered, or to prevent it from 
being remembered that I have been brought to examination upon a charge of murder,'" 
Falkland tells the magistrates who gather to hear his defense (171). '"No future lustration 
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could ever remove the stain'" of the dishonour attached to Falkland's name, laments 
Collins, continuing the religious motif (166). 
While the stain of ignominy cannot be washed away, Falkland nevertheless 
protects the '"empty remains of [his] honour'" (172) by offering up his '"virtue, [] 
honesty, [] [and] everlasting peace of mind'" to the preservation of his public image 
(215). These, he tells Caleb, are '"cheap sacrifices to be made at the shrine of this 
divinity'" (215). Towards the end of the novel, Falkland accuses Caleb of inappropriately 
sacrificing benevolence, and compassion for his former master, to '"barren truth'" when 
he refuses to sign a declaration recanting his accusation against Falkland. '"Perhaps you 
may scruple out of a regard to truth,'" he tells Caleb. '"Is truth then entitled to adoration 
for its own sake, and not for the sake of the happiness it is calculated to produce? Will a 
reasonable man sacrifice to barren truth, when benevolence, humanity, and every 
consideration that is dear to the human heart, require that it should be superseded?'" 
(384). Caleb, however, reverses this language of sacrifice, arguing that, by signing such a 
declaration, he would be sacrificing '"benevolence and humanity"' to Falkland's '"mad 
and misguided love of fame,-to that passion which has been the source of all [his] 
miseries'" (384). 
That Falkland's "love of fame" has been both misguided and the cause of his 
personal anguish is evident to everyone, including himself. Collins calls his employer the 
"fool of honour and fame" (172), a sentiment Falkland echoes later in the text (215). 
Caleb's indictment of Falkland's obsession with reputation is even more damning, and 
his description of his patron's tragic history identifies Falkland's early mis-education in 
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the "poison of chivalry" as the root cause of his blighted potential and later misfortunes: 
Falkland! thou enteredst upon thy career with the purest and most 
laudable intentions. But thou imbibedst the poison of chivalry with thy 
earliest youth; and the base and low-minded envy that met thee on thy 
return to thy native seats, operated with this poison to hurry thee into 
madness. Soon, too soon, by this fatal coincidence, were the blooming 
hopes of thy youth blasted for ever. From that moment thou only 
continuedst to live to the phantom of departed honour. From that moment 
thy benevolence was, in a great part, turned into rankling jealousy and 
inexorable precaution. (434) 
i 
Just like Caleb, whose early education fosters a destructive propensity for curiosity that 
turns his later years into a "theatre of calamity" (59), Falkland also receives a youthful 
mis-education that blights the most promising qualities of his character. Caleb's 
description of his patron's embrace of chivalric ideals is appropriately couched in archaic 
language which underscores the outmoded nature of Falkland's values, values that poison 
his character and its potential for benevolence. 
As we see in the next chapter, Godwin returns to the theme of chivalry in his next 
novel, St. Leon, in which the eponymous hero also "livefs] to the phantom of departed 
honour" to similarly destructive ends. Falkland also foreshadows another Godwinian 
hero, however-Fleetwood, whose status as the "New Man of Feeling" evokes Falkland's 
emotional turmoil and his highly developed capacity for feeling. Indeed, when Caleb first 
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encounters his patron, he radiates sensibility: "I found Mr. Falkland a man of small 
stature," remembers Caleb, 
with an extreme delicacy of form and appearance. In place of the hard-
favoured and inflexible visages I had been accustomed to observe, every 
muscle and petty line of his countenance seemed to be in an inconceivable 
degree pregnant with meaning. His manner was kind, attentive, and 
humane. His eye was full of animation; but there was a grave and sad 
solemnity in his air [....] His look bespoke the unquietness of his mind, 
and frequently wandered with an expression of disconsolateness and 
anxiety. (61) 
While the delicacy of Falkland's body is perhaps reflective of his highly refined 
sentiments and powers of feeling, his modest stature and delicate form also belie the 
ferocious intensity of his inner turmoil, as expressed in the emotional outbursts frequently 
witnessed by Caleb. "His disposition was extremely unequal," remarks Caleb, and 
the distemper which afflicted him with incessant gloom had its paroxysms. 
Sometimes he was hasty, peevish, and tyrannical [....] Sometimes he 
entirely lost his self-possession, and his behaviour was changed into 
frenzy: he would strike his forehead, his brows became knit, his features 
distorted, and his teeth ground one against the other. (63) 
Like Audley Mandeville, the melancholic uncle of Godwin's 1817 novel, Mandeville, 
Falkland, by the time Caleb encounters him, is a broken man, reclusive and mired in 
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sadness. "His mode of living was in the utmost degree recluse and solitary," Caleb 
writes. "He had no inclination to scenes of revelry and mirth. He avoided the busy 
haunts of men; nor did he seem desirous to compensate for this privation by the 
confidence of friendship" (62). Falkland's anguish is made that much more apparent to 
Caleb on account of the older man's innate sensibility, which reveals itself in "every 
muscle and petty line of his countenance" (61). 
Collins describes for Caleb a young Falkland renowned for his happiness and 
levity, both of which were nevertheless '"chastened with reflection and sensibility'" (65). 
The youthful Falkland had enough sensibility to give him "a spirit of the most ardent 
enthusiasm" (67), a '"genuine hilarity of heart'" which '"imparted an inconceivable 
brilliancy to his company and conversation'" (65). His "frankness, ingenuity, and 
unreserve" (67), however, were '"always accompanied with dignity'" (65), and 
functioned to cultivate compassion and respect for humanity. The current Falkland, 
Collins tells Caleb, is but the '"ruin"' of this younger version, and this ruin is manifested 
in the blighting of that dignified sensibility which so distinguished him in his youth: 
'"The most unusual promise'" of Falkland's youth is '"tarnished,"' and the result is a 
sensibility '"shrunk up and withered'" (65). 
Sensibility is initially cast as Falkland's most admirable and promising quality-a 
testament to his moral superiority over those with less refined feelings and sentiments. Its 
degeneration into the kind of emotional frenzy witnessed by Caleb is thus a reflection of 
Falkland's fall, of his "shrunken" and "withered" state. Collins-and later Falkland, as 
well-identifies his master's excessive and misguided love of chivalry as the root cause of 
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his emotional degeneration. In Collins's view, the '"idle and groundless romances of 
chivalry'" (166) served to create in the young Falkland a '"mind [] fraught with all the 
rhapsodies of visionary honour'" (65-66). The perceived dishonour he subsequently 
experiences proves too much for Falkland's pride, argues Collins. 
However, sensibility itself can also be read as the reason for Falkland's moral 
deterioration: as a man "impatien[t] of stain or dishonour" (73), he feels too acutely the 
taint of ignominy; his feelings are too attuned to the allure of chivalry, rank, and 
reputation, and threaten to subsume the more dignified and reflective aspects of his 
character. Indeed, Mr. Clare, the famous poet who comes to reside in the county and who 
befriends Falkland, ultimately characterizes the younger man as '"too passionate, too 
acutely sensible of injury'" (94). Celebrated as much for his moral excellence and 
sagacity as for his imaginative powers, Clare recognizes Falkland's dangerous flaw as one 
of excessive sensibility that may overwhelm his benevolent potential. '"I am acquainted 
with your weakness as well as your strength,'" Clare, on his deathbed, tells Falkland. 
'"You have an impetuosity, and an impatience of imagined dishonour, that, if once set 
wrong, may make you as eminently mischievous as you will otherwise be useful'" (94). 
As a man of sensibility, Falkland follows in a long cultural and literary tradition 
featuring men with highly developed capacities for emotional response. As Janet Todd 
has pointed out, the eighteenth-century cult of sensibility was both reflected in, and grew 
out of, a spate of sentimental novels featuring hyperbolic portrayals of distress, suffering, 
and emotion. Sentimental novels, argues Todd, served a "pedagogical function" (4) by 
yoking the affective power of literature to its didactic potential for the moral purpose of 
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shaping the emotional responses of the reader. A primary goal of the sentimental novel 
was to teach readers how to respond, both emotionally and behaviourally, to life and the 
people around them. The reading of such novels would show readers how to feel-that is, 
how to properly respond to another's suffering with their own appropriate emotional 
responses-and also instruct them in what to feel, by inculcating the virtues of sympathy, 
compassion, and empathy. Seeing literary displays of sentimental feeling in fictional 
characters would, theoretically, inspire such sensibility in the reader, whose new-found 
capacity for strong and refined emotion leads him or her to embrace the moral virtues of 
benevolence, philanthropism, sympathy, and empathy.5 
Sensibility, therefore, is constructed as an outward process, in that a highly 
developed capacity for feeling should ultimately result in philanthropic behaviour and 
acts of benevolence. Sensibility within the subject properly manifests itself in outward 
action: although the feeling is generated and experienced from within, it is channeled 
outward in the form of compassion and empathy for others, as well as through virtuous 
acts of charity and kindness. This is certainly true for Harley, the hero in what Todd calls 
"one of the great blockbusters of sentiment" (90), Henry Mackenzie's 1771 novel, The 
Man of Feeling. The novel, as Mackenzie describes in a 1769 letter, grew out of the 
premise of'"introducing a man of sensibility into different scenes where his feelings 
might be seen in their effects'" (qtd. in Vickers xii). Indeed, Mackenzie's emphasis on 
the effects of Harley's feelings underscores this causal link between sensibility and 
external action. As perhaps the quintessential figure of feeling in the eighteenth-century 
cult of sensibility, Harley combines virtue with emotion, moving through numerous 
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episodic encounters with a variety of formulaic victims of worldly injustice, all of which 
allow him to reveal his sentimental virtues and overwrought capacity for emotional 
response-the tears he copiously sheds throughout the text. 
Harley is the proper Man of Feeling in that the sensibility activated by his 
exposure to scenes and stories of misfortune moves him to virtuous acts. While visiting 
Bedlam, for example, he encounters a woman reduced to madness after her lover dies in 
the West Indies. Harley gives the keeper's cursory explanation of her history the "tribute 
of some tears," but first-hand exposure to her grief compels him to take her hand in his 
and "bathe it with his tears" (34); standing "fixed in astonishment and pity," he then gives 
the keeper two guineas, advising him to '"be kind to that unfortunate'" (35). Similarly, 
after witnessing first-hand the effects of starvation in the repentant prostitute Miss Atkins, 
Harley gives her a half-guinea to relieve her immediate distress (49-50); after hearing her 
extended story of seduction and subsequent abandonment by the eldest son of a country 
squire, he is so moved by the woman's story of misfortune, and by her father's display of 
grief, that he "undertakes] her cause," wins her father's forgiveness, and accommodates 
them both at his lodging (67-69). 
For Godwin, sensibility was similarly perceived as something which leads to 
outward expressions of sympathy and benevolence. In his Enquirer essay, "Of 
Politeness," the philosopher speaks of sensibility in external, public terms as a concern 
and appreciation for the feelings of others, and as an awareness of how one's behaviour 
affects the emotions of others. Sensibility, for Godwin, is much less about the indulgence 
in overwrought feeling, and more about how aware and empathetic one is regarding the 
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feelings of others-and, by extension, how solicitous one is in trying to alleviate the 
emotional distresses of another. "That man knows little of human nature," argues 
Godwin, "and is either endued with a very small portion of sensibility, or is seldom in the 
habit of putting himself in the place of another; who is not forward in the practice of 
minute attentions" (Enquirer 333-34). "When a modest and unassured person enters a 
room," he continues, "he is anxious about his gestures, and feels the disposition of every 
limb and feature as a sort of weight upon his mind. A supercilious look, a dubious smile, 
an unceremonious accost, from one of the company, pierces him to the soul" (Enquirer 
334). While a man of sensibility may be "pierced" by the slights and vagaries he 
experiences in social intercourse, he is perhaps more attentive to the "piercing" 
experienced by others. Indeed, for Godwin, it is the "practice of minute attentions" 
towards this "modest and unassured person" that truly distinguishes the man of 
sensibility. The man of sensibility will not only perceive the anxiety, and feel empathy 
for the person, but will also act in such a way as to minimize the discomfort, for, argues 
Godwin, "in proportion to the acuteness of any man's feelings, will be, in a majority of 
cases, his attention and deference to the feelings of others" (Enquirer 336). 
It is this "attention and deference" which underpins all civilized behaviour, 
contends Godwin. While reason still plays the central role in the philosopher's theory of 
progressive enlightenment, the feelings increasingly serve a complementary function in 
cultivating universal benevolence. The polite rituals of civilization both demonstrate our 
emotional capacity for empathy and foster the happiness of others: "The silent 
communication of the eye, the lively attention that marks every shade of gradation in 
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another's pleasure or pain, the nameless kindnesses that persuade the receiver more 
forcibly, or, at least, more cordially, of the attachment of the performer, than great 
services are ever enabled to do"-these, asserts Godwin, are the "great circumstances 
distinguishing between the civilised and the savage state" (Enquirer 332). Sensibility is 
thus inextricably bound up with "civilization" for Godwin, and sensibility itself is seen as 
inseparable from benevolence: "Where-ever civilization exists, sensibility will be its 
attendant; a sensibility, which cannot be satisfied without much kindness, nor without a 
kindness of that condescending nature, that considers the whole chain of our feelings, and 
is desirous, out of petty materials, to compose the sum of our happiness" (Enquirer 334-
35). 
For Godwin, individuals with the greatest potential for benevolence-those who 
"promise to be, in more than an ordinary degree, useful members of the commonwealth" 
(Enquirer 333)-are almost invariably also creatures of sensibility: "it is inconceivable 
how numerous and delicate are their sensations," he writes, "and how exquisite is their 
feeling of pleasure or pain" (Enquirer 333). To the extent that such individuals are 
sensible of their own "sensations" and impressions of "pleasure or pain," they are perhaps 
more perceptive of the subtle emotional reactions in the people around them: for these 
creatures of sensibility, argues Godwin, "the slightest circumstances, imperceptible to a 
common eye, and scarcely adverted to by the agent, often produce an indelible 
impression" (Enquirer 333). Furthermore, while those with great potential for 
benevolence may be inherent creatures of feeling (as Godwin seems to argue), sensibility 
itself also directly facilitates benevolent tendencies in others. As Godwin contends, "it is 
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rarely that the opportunity occurs for a man to confer on me a striking benefit. But, every 
time that I meet him, he may demonstrate his kindness, his sympathy, and, by attentions 
almost too minute for calculation, add new vigour to the stream of complacence and 
philanthropy that circulates in my veins" {Enquirer 329). 
It is clear that, far from viewing sensibility as an overwrought indulgence in one's 
own emotional responses, Godwin perceives sensibility in reciprocal terms-as a dynamic 
relationship between the feeling subject and the world around him or her. Sensibility, as 
originally modeled by archetypal men of feeling like Harley, and as theorized by Godwin 
in the Enquirer, is as much an outward extension of sympathetic feeling and kind 
behaviour as it is an internal acuteness of feeling. For Godwin, sensibility, if properly 
cultivated in the subject, should naturally lead to benevolence and virtue. In short, it 
should make one a more humane person, and the world around the feeling subject should 
be made better on account of his or her sensibility. 
Godwin's portrait of Falkland, therefore, is so compelling precisely because it 
departs from this model of sensibility outlined in the Enquirer. To be sure, in Falkland, 
sensibility is initially yoked with benevolence and virtue. Collins, in his narrative to 
Caleb, continually returns to the theme of his master's moral superiority and capacity for 
philanthropic behaviour, both of which still exist, in the steward's eyes, despite the 
"poison of chivalry" contaminating his character. As Mr. Clare recognizes, however, 
Falkland feels perhaps too much-he is '"too passionate, too acutely sensible of injury'" 
(94), particularly where his much-valued honour and public reputation are involved. 
Indeed, while his sensibility endows him with the potential for great benevolence, it is 
also dangerously self-reflexive and mired in an overwhelming sensitivity to his own 
feelings-his own '"impatience of imagined dishonour'" (94), as Mr. Clare deems it. 
For Godwin, sensibility is only healthy for the subject (and beneficial for society) 
so long as it functions along reciprocal lines: the subject's strong capacity for refined 
feeling and emotional response should ultimately be projected outward in the form of 
sensitivity to the feelings of others, empathy for their suffering, and virtuous acts of 
kindness. Falkland's sensibility, however, is perverted in that feeling, for the most part, 
stays within the subject, devolving into a paranoid and obsessive self-absorption that 
alienates him from both the world and his own philanthropic tendencies. As Isabelle 
Bour has aptly recognized, Falkland "exemplifies the deleterious solipsistic potential of 
sensibility" (815). His strong capacity for feeling thus functions as a kind of "inverted" 
sensibility: emotional response which should be channeled into benevolent, external 
action instead feeds Falkland's inner demons-his obsession with honour and the 
preservation of his public image, as well as his guilt over the immoral acts he has 
committed in the service of preserving these things. When Falkland's sensibility is 
projected outward, it results not in acts of benevolence or kindness, but in quite the 
opposite-in dishonest acts of persecution against a young man his inferior in social rank 
and power. Falkland's "inverted" sensibility is thus a liability, rather than an asset, to his 
well-being, and the world is rendered a worse, rather than better, place because of it. 
Just as we can read Falkland's destructive love of chivalry as prefiguring St. 
Leon's similar embrace of fatal chivalric ideals, Falkland's brand of inverted sensibility 
resurfaces in Godwin's portrait of Fleetwood-the "New Man of Feeling," as that novel's 
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subtitle characterizes him. Like Falkland, Fleetwood is governed by a perverted form of 
sensibility: unlike Harley, the "old" man of feeling, whose sensibility results in 
benevolent compassion and acts of charity and kindness, Fleetwood-in his role as this 
new, perverse man of feeling-is marked by a sensibility at odds with compassion and 
benevolence. Fleetwood's specific form of "inverted" sensibility will be examined in 
greater depth in Chapter 3. 
In Caleb Williams, therefore, Godwin creates two characters whose childhood 
reading and experiences combine to create a form of mis-education which proves fatal to 
their own personal development and, especially in the case of Falkland, to their potential 
for benevolent action. If Godwin was concerned in the Enquirer with detailing the 
salutary educational conditions necessary for the personal happiness which leads to 
virtuous enlightenment and universal benevolence, in the earlier Caleb Williams, he 
seemed preoccupied with what could potentially go wrong in the educational and moral 
development of the young mind. This preoccupation, moreover, also marks Godwin's 
next three novels, as all three of his fictional "heroes"-St. Leon, Fleetwood, and 
Mandeville-similarly experience a distinct form of mis-education that manifests itself in 
later crises of identity and masculine authority. 
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In the Circle of the Hearth: St. Leon's Domestic Threats to Masculine Identity 
As Godwin records in his diary, he began his second novel, St. Leon: A Tale of the 
Sixteenth Century, on December 31, 1797, in the immediate wake of Wollstonecraft's 
death and his subsequent composition of the Memoirs. In his preface to the original 
edition, published on December 2,1799, Godwin voiced his hopes that the novel's 
"boldness and irregularity of [] design" would be excused by the "impressive and 
interesting" combination of "human feelings and passions with incredible situations" (51-
52). St Leon is, indeed, bold in conception and sweeping in design: the tale follows the 
forced "travels" of Reginald de St. Leon, a sixteenth-century French aristocrat who, 
having been given the alchemical gifts of the Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae 
from a mysterious stranger, is persecuted from one European state or kingdom to another 
and ultimately driven into a resigned isolation.1 Godwin's gamble, however, seemed to 
pay off, for the novel proved quite successful. The author would live to witness four 
English editions published in his lifetime, as well as Irish and American issues and 
French and German translations (Tysdahl 184, n. 15). 
Moreover, despite numerous reviews which censured parts of the novel as 
irreligious, St. Leon won some significant critical praise: The Dublin Magazine and Irish 
Monthly Register appreciated the novel's "variety of interesting matter" and declared it 
the "work of a man of genius and learning" (Graham 161); even Godwin's old nemesis, 
the Antijacobin Review, praised a number of "good symptoms" in the tale, conceding that 
the "evil it contains is little" (Graham 157-58). According to William Maginn, one of the 
story's biggest fans was apparently Lord Byron, who, in response to Godwin's declaration 
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that writing another novel would "kill" him, reportedly replied, '"and what matter [...] 
we should have another "St Leon"'" (qtd. in Clemit, Introduction vii). If the highest form 
of flattery is indeed imitation, then the popularity of the tale is perhaps best signaled by a 
satirical homage to the novel published one year later in 1800-Edward Dubois's St. 
Godwin: A Tale of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries by Count 
Reginald de St. Leon. In Dubois's text, St. Leon is replaced by a profligate Godwin, who 
experiences three centuries of hyperbolic adventures before settling in England and 
writing PoliticalJustice (Brewer, Introduction 35-36).2 
St. Leon closely aligns with the Bildungsroman: the text traces the physical, 
psychological, and moral development of the protagonist from childhood into middle age. 
In accordance with the characteristics of the Bildungsroman, and in keeping with Caleb 
Williams and his later novels, Godwin highlights the central role that "education" plays in 
the development of his protagonist. In Volume 1 of PoliticalJustice, Godwin had argued 
that "the characters of men are determined in all their most essential circumstances by 
education" (45), and we see this argument illustrated in St. Leon, where the hero's 
"education," like the educations of so many of Godwin's protagonists, is deeply flawed, 
planting the seeds for his later personal failures in life. Indeed, we find in the figure of St. 
Leon, as we found in Falkland, a man whose obsessive devotion to personal reputation 
initiates a tragic series of events that culminate in his complete alienation. 
St. Leon, like Falkland, finds himself dangerously absorbed in the cultivation and 
protection of his public image, an image organized around a noble identity defined by the 
ideologies of chivalry and honour and sustained through wealth and aristocratic power. 
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Raised in an environment that emphasized these public codes of identity, St. Leon fails to 
achieve a defined sense of self independent of the social codes around him. Instead of 
cultivating an independence of character, St. Leon's childhood instead produces a young 
man with a "passion for splendour and distinction" (56) that can only be satiated through 
active participation in the formalized social codes of the aristocratic tradition. Unable to 
consolidate a clear sense of his own identity independent of the codes and narratives 
underpinning his social position as aristocratic knight, St. Leon is driven to seek out 
public validation as the only way to achieve any sense of his own value or worth, any 
sense of selfhood. As we shall see, his weak hold on his identity comes to be the 
instigating factor in his future tragedies: it leads to his embrace of gambling and his 
subsequent fall from aristocratic prosperity, his increasing alienation from his family, and 
the ultimate loss of his identity in both a literal and symbolic sense. 
"The Theatre of Glory" 
Whereas Caleb Williams derived its suspense through a relatively focused plot 
organized around one man's relentless pursuit of another, St. Leon is a sprawling 
narrative covering over fifty years of the protagonist's life as he wanders across Europe in 
the midst of the political, religious, and cultural turmoil brought about by the 
Reformation. Critics have long recognized that St. Leon, like Caleb Williams before it, 
stands in some measure as a fictionalized allegory of the philosophical tenets outlined in 
PoliticalJustice. Indeed, at times, Godwin is quite explicit about the topicality of the 
novel's narrative to political events in his own time, as when St. Leon, while detained in 
the prisons of the Spanish Inquisition, anachronistically connects the religious persecution 
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he is currently experiencing to the contemporary persecution of radicals in 1790s 
England: "human affairs, like the waves of the ocean, are merely in a state of ebb and 
flow," philosophizes St. Leon. "Men shall learn over again to persecute each other for 
conscience sake; other anabaptists or levellers shall furnish pretexts for new persecutions; 
other inquisitors shall arise in the most enlightened tracts of Europe" (334). 
Although this passage stands as the only explicit reference in the text to Godwin's 
own age, the entire narrative is often read allegorically as a novelistic depiction of the 
larger societal injustice and human prejudice which Godwin saw as impeding progress 
and rational development. The novel's allegory, as Pamela Clemit argues, is even more 
specifically interpreted as a coded critique of a post-jacobin English society that hunts 
and persecutes radicals who seek to disseminate political views and social knowledge. In 
Clemit's opinion, 
Godwin's distinctive mode of historical fiction [in St. Leon] is best 
understood as an extension of the narrative model developed in Caleb 
Williams. Godwin exploits the increased range of historical narrative for a 
figurative rendering of contemporary concerns, expanding his earlier blend 
of confessional narrative and symbolic Gothic themes to include a 
sweeping survey of European history that bears directly on the situation of 
beleaguered radicals in the mid 1790s. {Godwinian Novel 88) 
Gregory Maertz joins George Woodcock in positioning St. Leon as an allegorical 
figure for Godwin as the "beleaguered" rationalist philosopher, and his magna opera-the 
Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae-as symbols for the progressive knowledge 
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encoded in the philosophy ofPoliticalJustice. "The philosophical novelist is, like St. 
Leon, a reluctant sorcerer," argues Maertz. "As agents of inexplicable powers the radical 
thinker and the alchemist suffer persecution-the latter because he cannot explain to 
anyone's satisfaction how he suddenly becomes rich; the former because in Political 
Justice he challenges the arbitrary power of government with the divine authority of 
reason" (220). For Woodcock, St. Leon's troubles-most notably, his domestic tragedies 
and the social and political persecution he experiences-represent Godwin the 
philosopher's own experience of trying to help a stubbornly ignorant and ungrateful 
humanity. In Woodcock's interpretation of the text, the gold which the Philosopher's 
Stone yields St. Leon symbolizes wisdom and, more importantly, the opportunity to use 
that wisdom to improve the lot of humanity: St. Leon thus "conveys the teaching that a 
man who gains power through wisdom and seeks to use it for the general good must 
expect to forego the comforts of ordinary life, the benefits of domestic affection, even the 
support of friendship. Every hand will be against him, and men will understand and hate 
the good he seeks to bestow on them" ("Notes" 691). This scenario, argues Woodcock, 
echoes "Godwin's own experience as a result of telling men how they can become happy 
and free" ("Notes" 691). 
However, while St. Leon may in some respects evoke the potential of Godwin's 
rationalist philosophy, in other respects, the text critiques his earlier celebration of 
rationalism as the panacea for all of humanity's ills. As David Collings has argued, 
Godwin was quite often "his own most searching and perceptive critic" (848), and St. 
Leon stands as a text in which he re-examines some of the central tenets of his philosophy 
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as outlined in Political Justice. Indeed, as Collings demonstrates, Godwin in fact 
deconstructs in St. Leon the very Utopian possibilities he had attached in Political Justice 
to an "immutable reason" detached from all social constraints or political contexts. As 
Collings argues, Godwin's theory of an "immutable reason" independent of historical or 
cultural constraints is ultimately realized in the figure of St. Leon with his "impossible 
knowledge," that is, his possession of the Philosopher's Stone-which frees him from not 
only poverty, but the constraints of all economic activity-and the elixir vitae, which 
liberates him from the most fundamental constraint experienced by humanity-death (863-
71). However, St. Leon's possession of these "impossible" secrets, this incredible 
knowledge which should theoretically lead to the most perfect human existence 
imaginable, fails to yield utopia, and instead only produces tragedy for both himself and 
his family. "The promise of total abundance leads to wholesale destruction," asserts 
Collings (865). 
Indeed, at points in the novel, Godwin has his characters voice sentiments clearly 
out of step with the argument, put forth in Political Justice, that humanity is potentially 
"perfectible." For example, when the enlightened marchese Filosanto-"a man universally 
admired for subtlety of reasoning" (285)-witnesses the destruction of St. Leon's Pisan 
residence at the hands of an angry mob driven by superstitious frenzy, he is overwhelmed 
by a "transport of misanthropy" against a humanity incapable of transcending ignorance: 
"He saw that there was a principle in the human mind destined to be eternally at war with 
improvement and science" (293). St. Leon ultimately offers up a much more pessimistic 
78 
vision of humanity's potential to achieve perfectibility through the acquisition of 
knowledge. 
In addition to its sprawling narrative structure and complex engagement with the 
philosophical themes of Political Justice, St. Leon is also marked by tremendous generic 
diversity. As Maertz has demonstrated in his study of the novel's "generic fusion," the 
text incorporates elements of political allegory, travel writing, and psychological realism, 
as well as qualities of the Bildungsroman, the romance, and the gothic and historical 
novels. The gothic, in particular, has seemed to many critics and readers a particularly 
odd choice of genre for the philosopher who continued to advocate the power of 
enlightened thinking to dispel the enslaving effects of superstitious beliefs aind practice. 
B.J. Tysdahl, for example, argues that the gothic for Godwin was a "hazardous" choice 
(90), in that the genre, with its supernatural trappings and often conservative affirmation 
of the dominant social and economic codes of society, was a "danger to something quite 
fundamental to the intellectual system of the calm, rational radical" (82).3 Tysdahl joins 
Wallace Austin Flanders, however, in emphasizing the financial and literary benefits 
associated with the gothic as a genre in the late eighteenth century, a period in which the 
popularity of novelists like Ann Radcliffe and Matthew Lewis revealed the extent of the 
reading public's hunger for novels which married the sentimental with the supernatural. 
St. Leon, argues Tysdahl, could thus be read as Godwin's "deliberate attempt to win a 
prize in the Gothic race which promised such substantial rewards" (81). Indeed, 
Woodcock remarks that the £400 St. Leon earned Godwin rescued him from "immediate 
financial disaster" (Biographical Study 160).4 
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However, despite the prevalence of supernatural imagery and subject matter in the 
novel, Godwin primarily uses the gothic in St. Leon as a hook upon which to hang his 
larger arguments regarding the importance of shared human experience founded on 
meaningful social connections. For Flanders, Godwin employs gothic tropes and 
conventions to put forth a moral condemnation of St. Leon's acceptance of supernatural 
powers, an acceptance which forever cuts him off from the community of humanity. This 
moral condemnation, argues Flanders, is Godwin's primary motivation in making use of 
the gothic for his tale. For both Flanders and Mona Scheuermann, St. Leon's greatest 
failure as a moral being lies in his acceptance of "secrets" which forever alienate him 
from family and society. Indeed, as Scheuermann notes, "it is repeatedly observed [in the 
novel] that the gifts of the stranger are destructive not because they are immoral but 
because they set a man apart from his fellows" (Novels of William Godwin 153). 
Flanders, moreover, foregrounds how St. Leon's social and familial alienation contributes 
to his tragic history: "Every step St. Leon takes toward freeing himself from the common 
hazards and necessities of human life takes away as well a portion of the potential 
happiness resulting from his common humanity and leaves him more unnatural and 
miserable" (538). 
Significantly, St. Leon's childhood, a childhood spent in seclusion with his 
widowed mother, foreshadows in a way his later social isolation. For Godwin, the social 
and educative experiences of childhood played an essential role in shaping future 
character, and in all of his novels much narrative space is devoted to lengthy descriptions 
of the formative years of his protagonists. In Political Justice, Godwin had argued that 
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character is a product of external social influences, that the forces of society-history, 
politics, culture, and education-operate on the young mind to shape temperament, 
intellectual aptitude, and morality. "The actions and dispositions of mankind," asserts 
Godwin, "are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of any original 
determination that they bring into the world" (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 26). Thus, 
education, in the broadest sense of what one learns about the world and how one learns it, 
was for Godwin one of the primary influences in the development of moral character. 
"The characters of men," asserted Godwin, "are determined in all their most essential 
circumstances by education. By education in this place I would be understood to convey 
the most comprehensive sense that can possibly be annexed to that word, including every 
incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" 
(Vol. 1 ofPoliticalJustice 45). 
Raised by his mother on the paternal estate situated on the banks of the Garonne, 
St. Leon receives a "mis-education" defined by a social isolation not unlike that 
experienced by two of Godwin's later male protagonists, Fleetwood and Mandeville. 
However, unlike Fleetwood and Mandeville, whose childhood isolation results from the 
inclinations of distant and melancholy paternal figures, St. Leon is kept from society by a 
strong-willed mother intensely involved in the education of her young son. Indeed, the 
shaping force of young St. Leon's mis-education is undoubtedly his mother, who, in her 
overt manipulation of his emotional, psychological, and physical development, is 
suggestive of the phallic mother who usurps the literal and symbolic authority of the 
Father. From the later vantage point from which he is writing his memoirs, St. Leon 
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remembers his mother as a "woman of rather a masculine understanding" (55), a woman 
heavily invested in the historical narratives of the traditional class structure and the social 
power and authority of the family's aristocratic lineage. She was "full of the prejudices 
of nobility and magnificence," writes St. Leon (55). "Her whole soul was in a manner 
concentrated in the ambition to render me the worthy successor of the counts de St. Leon" 
(55). Literature, for Falkland, was the source of his early love of honour and fame, the 
"heroic poets of Italy" serving as the means through which he "imbibed the love of 
chivalry and romance" (67). For St. Leon, however, the source is much more immediate 
and forceful, residing in the overwhelming ambitions of his mother. 
Of course, as a woman, St. Leon's mother is circumscribed by a patriarchal 
ideology that only allows her to achieve familial and social honour by cultivating it in a 
male relative, namely her son. St. Leon thus becomes, for his mother, the recipient of all 
her hopes and ambitions. "Inflamed with the greatness of [the family's] ancestors," she 
"indefatigably sought to kindle in [her son's] bosom a similar flame" (55). The result of 
this passionate embrace of "greatness" is a woman who lives vicariously through her 
son's achievements and future expectations. As St. Leon tells his reader, "my mother 
loved me to the very utmost limits perhaps of human affection. I was her darling and her 
pride, her waking study, and her nightly dream" (55). As he rightly suspects, however, 
his mother's love affair with the chivalric displays of honour associated with her 
aristocratic heritage compromises her ability to forge a truly nurturing and loving 
relationship with her son. "My mother," laments St. Leon, "loved my honour and my 
fame more than she loved my person" (56). 
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It is St. Leon's potential honour and fame, however, that his mother most loves, 
and she guides her son's educative processes in such a way as to maximize his future 
ambitions. In order to foster her son's desire for social prestige and glory, St. Leon's 
mother keeps the family in the "most sequestered retirement" (56), delaying her son's 
entrance into public life out of a calculating desire to increase his lust for social 
recognition. St. Leon briefly encounters the glories of chivalry and sociality in 1520, 
when, at the impressionable age of 15, he witnesses the celebrated meeting between 
Francis I of France and Henry VIII of England at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. After 
allowing her son this brief indulgence in courtly life, however, St. Leon's mother ensures 
that his desire for social renown is further inflamed by deliberately denying him that 
which he most craves-entrance into public life. As St. Leon recalls, 
she did not wish for the present that my eye should be satiated with public 
scenes, or that the public should grow too familiarly acquainted with my 
person. She rightly judged that my passion for the theatre of glory would 
grow more impetuous, by being withheld for some time from the 
gratifications for which it panted. (58) 
This strategy works: St. Leon, from this point on, is consumed with a restless 
desire for public distinction, for scenes of glory "acted in the midst of a vast amphitheatre 
of spectators" (57). Moreover, his brief encounter with chivalric glory helps to cultivate 
the seed of reverie that has taken shallow root in his mind. "I had before formed some 
conceptions of the career of honour from the books I had read," recalls St. Leon, "but my 
reveries were impotent and little, compared with what I had now seen [....] I never shut 
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my eyes without viewing in imagination the combats of knights and the train of ladies" 
(59). Like Falkland, who had "drunk so deeply of the fountain of chivalry" that notions 
of honour and fame became the sole sustenance of his being (67), St. Leon indulges in 
romantic visions which become the foundation for his personal identity. From this early 
age, St. Leon's sense of self takes its cue from the social codes and narratives of 
aristocratic identity, such codes and narratives ultimately becoming the only reference 
point by which St. Leon is able to measure himself. 
The parting farewell of St. Leon's mother, given on her deathbed to her eighteen-
year-old son, is thus ironic and speaks to the way in which she is blinded to the 
consequences of her manipulative guidance of her son's aristocratic ambition. She 
remains confident that the nature of her son's education has been successful in fostering 
an appreciation of social rank within a larger independence of character. As she tells St. 
Leon, 
'You must now, my son, stand by yourself, and be the arbitrator of your 
own actions [....] You have been taught to know your rank in society, 
and to respect yourself. You have been instructed in every thing that 
might most effectually forward you in the career of glory [....] When I 
am gone, you will be compelled more vividly to feel that singleness and 
self-dependence which are the source of all virtue.' (59-60) 
The deathbed speech of St. Leon's mother contains numerous sentiments not easily 
reconciled with one another. Although St. Leon has been "taught to know [his] rank in 
society," and therefore theoretically already knows "every thing that might most 
effectually forward [him] in the career of glory," he must nevertheless rely on a 
"singleness and self-dependence" in life, an independence of character thatwhich seems 
to lie outside of social class and chivalric ideology. Madame de St. Leon seems blind to 
the fact that her educative emphasis on social rank, combined with the various 
manipulations she has engaged in to further her son's desire for social acclaim, has 
actually robbed her son of any sense of "singleness and self-dependence" he might have 
otherwise developed. Far from being able to "stand by [him] self' and "serve as the 
arbitrator of [his] own actions," the youthful St. Leon is entirely dependent on the social 
framework of the courtly tradition for any sense of identity. Instead of cultivating an 
independence of character, the sequestered nature of St. Leon's childhood instead 
produces a young man with a "passion for splendour and distinction" (56) that can only 
be satiated through active participation in the formalized social codes of the aristocratic 
tradition. 
There is a striking irony, however, in the fact that St. Leon's desire for social 
recognition precludes him from engaging in truly meaningful social relationships, 
relationships that go beyond the ritualized conventions of class and social status. As St. 
Leon relates to the reader, his youthful imagination revolved around "fairy fields of 
visionary greatness" that rendered him "more than indifferent to the major part of the 
objects around [him]" (56). Upon the death of Madame de St. Leon, we witness the 
extent to which St. Leon's commitment to "visionary greatness" is bound up with a 
developing sense of manhood that demands the suppression of familial love. Early on 
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for St. Leon grief over the loss of familial and domestic ties is cast as emasculating and 
detrimental to the cultivation of masculine character. After his mother's death, St. Leon 
is visited by his uncle, the Marquis de Villeroy, who constructs his grief over his dead 
mother as an '"effeminacy of sorrow'" that must be '"throw[n] off" in order for St. Leon 
to '"prove [him]self a true soldier of the standard of France'" (61). As a young man 
whose ambitious thirst for glory has rendered him "indifferent" to the real value of 
interpersonal relationships, St. Leon is quick to respond to the Marquis on these terms, 
declaring himself eager to join in the French military resistance arming against Charles V, 
King of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor. Disavowing his grief for his dead mother, 
he thus "shook off the inglorious softness of [] melancholy, and was all activity and 
animation" (62), his endeavours eventually leading him to Italy and the ill-fated siege of 
Pavia. 
Defeat at Pavia, however-a defeat that, in St. Leon's view, delivered a "deadly 
wound to the reign of chivalry" (74)-robs him of this clearly articulated purpose. He 
consequently gravitates to Paris, where a young and newly disenfranchised French 
aristocracy assuages its blighted ambitions through various forms of profligacy, one of the 
most notable being gambling, which, in St. Leon's words, "drew multitudes into its 
destructive vortex" (75). "The nobility of France," recalls St. Leon, "exchanged the 
activity of the field for the indulgences of the table: that concentrated spirit which had 
sought to expand itself upon the widest stage, now found vent in the exhibition of 
individual expense" (75). As St. Leon suggests, the aristocratic value system that 
privileged recklessness on the battlefield implicitly sanctions the risky behaviour 
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associated with gambling. Indeed, Justine Crump, in a particularly provocative recent 
reading of the novel, argues that the nobility's embrace of gambling in the Renaissance 
can be read as a specific strategy used to consolidate an aristocratic identity threatened by 
certain cultural and economic shifts in Europe. As Crump contends, the representation of 
gambling in St. Leon speaks to the larger cultural and economic shift away from the value 
systems of an older aristocratic order towards those of a commercial and capitalist ethos 
associated with the emerging bourgeois classes, for whom money was valuable capital in 
and of itself, something not to be squandered in an ostentatious display of chivalry or 
social class. Faced with such threats to its existence, the chivalric order to which St. 
Leon so clearly belongs thus embraces gambling as a highly symbolic act. It is in 
gaming-with its associations of risk, heightened emotion, and expendable wealth-that a 
fledgling nobility struggles to assert an aristocratic identity structured around, in Crump's 
terms, a "willingness to confront risk with equanimity" (397).5 
Even before St. Leon, Godwin had made a number of reflections on the nature of 
gambling and on the moral character of debtors. "Gaming," argued Godwin in the 1797 
Enquirer, "accustoms [a man] to the worst habits of mind, induces him to seek, and to 
rejoice in, the misfortunes of others" (270). Gambling is thus antithetical to the 
philanthropism which should inform the conduct of the rational man committed to the 
principles of justice and universal benevolence. Moreover, the "conduct" of the gambler, 
whose behaviour so often results in a "continual accumulation of debt," is destructive to 
his own moral character and psychological state {Enquirer 170). The debtor is "drive[n] 
[] to the perpetual practice of subterfuges" and experiences "an ever gnawing anxiety that 
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poisons all his pleasures," argues Godwin (Enquirer 170). "He is altogether a stranger to 
that genuine lightness of heart, which characterizes the man at ease, and the man of 
virtue. Care has placed her brand conspicuous on his brow. He is subject to occasional 
paroxysms of anguish which no luxuries or splendour can compensate" (Enquirer 170). 
These remarks form a compelling description of St. Leon's descent into ignominy and 
deception, and foreshadow the mental despair and personal alienation that indirectly 
result from his love of fame and social distinction. 
St. Leon's attitude towards gambling is marked by a deep ambivalence. On one 
hand, he fears the dangers inherent in a habit that "drew multitudes into its destructive 
vortex" (75). The dangers-as St. Leon recognizes, and as Godwin had emphasized in the 
Enquirer-are not just financial, but also moral: there is something ignoble-"base and 
sordid" (76)-about a habit that leads a man to "rob[], perhaps, his brother, his friend, the 
partner of his bosom" (77). Writing from the vantage point of middle age, St. Leon is of 
course better able to appreciate the "bitter anguish" brought on by his gaming (77). As a 
young man, however, his anxieties about the habit are decidedly overwhelmed by his 
"restless desire [for] distinction" in a vice which he ultimately constructs as reflective of 
aristocratic notions about money and risk (76). 
St. Leon certainly sees gambling as quite compatible with the ideological 
assumptions underpinning aristocratic identity. To be a man of rank entails having a 
laissez-faire attitude towards money in general and one's own wealth in particular. "The 
possession of some degree of wealth I regarded, indeed, as indispensable to a man who 
would fill a lofty and respectable character in the world," writes St. Leon. "But, in the 
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picture I drew of this man in my mind, I considered wealth as an accident, the attendant 
on his birth, to be dispensed with dignity, not to be adverted to with minuteness of 
attention" (76-77). St. Leon is thus able to reconcile aristocratic honour with his passion 
for gaming, but, ironically, his desire for distinction amongst his peers only serves to 
further drive his profligacy and exacerbates his fall from honour: "The whole tendency of 
my education had been to inspire me with a proud and restless desire of distinction; and I 
was not content to play a second part in the career of my vices, as I should not have been 
content to play a second part in the genuine theatre of honour and fame" (76). 
For St. Leon, then, the moral distinction between vice and virtue is subsumed 
within his larger, all-consuming desire for public recognition. He thus "plays his part" in 
his own "theatre of glory"-gambling-in such a way as to outstrip the recklessness of his 
peers. "In all that was thoughtlessly spirited and gaily profligate," recalls St. Leon, "I led 
the way to my compeers, and was constantly held up by them as an example" (76). St. 
Leon's gains and losses on the gaming table appear less important than the social eclat he 
receives from the "compeers" who marvel at his extravagance and easy assumption of 
extreme risk. The destructive need for social acclaim thus drives his compulsive 
gambling: just as St. Leon had been "in the foremost rank"-both literally and 
figuratively-at the siege of Pavia (64), he also leads the way in profligacy during his 
youthful years in Paris. 
Significantly, St. Leon is quick to point out that his "sordid and inglorious passion 
for gaming" (75), while financially deleterious to his estate, did not compromise his 
public image or "good name": 
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My expenses of all kinds, during this period of self-desertion, drained my 
resources, but did not tarnish my good name. My excesses were regarded 
by some as ornamental and becoming, but by all were admitted as venial. 
The laurels I had won in the field of military honour were not obscured by 
my subsequent conduct. I was universally ranked among the most 
promising and honourable of the young noblemen of France. (80) 
Writing from a later vantage point, and reflecting on his youth, St. Leon posits that "a 
very young man rather takes the tone of his passions from those about him, than forms 
one that is properly his own" (78). As St. Leon's history unfolds, we see the extent to 
which this statement foreshadows the tragedy of his life: unable to cultivate a clear sense 
of his own identity independent of the social codes and narratives underpinning his social 
position as an aristocratic knight, St. Leon is driven to seek out public validation from his 
peers as the only way to consolidate any sense of his own value or worth, any sense of 
selfhood. Robbed, by the forces of history and politics, of the one clear avenue by which 
he could validate and shape his developing manhood-military triumph-he turns instead to 
the act of gaming, finding in gambling an alternative way to achieve the social 
recognition and acclaim he so desperately craves. Although the "theatre of glory" has 
shifted to the gaming table from the battlefield, identity and honour for St. Leon still 
remain very much the function of public display and social performance. It is only upon 
meeting Marguerite Louise Isabeau de Damville, the future "partner of [his] life" (80) and 
the "unhappy partner of [his] fortunes" (112), that St. Leon encounters the possible 
satisfactions found within the private spaces of the domestic realm. 
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"The Unhappy Partner of My Fortunes" 
Godwin wrote St. Leon in the wake of Wollstonecraft's sudden death in 
childbirth, and critics have long recognized the traces of Mary's influence on the text. 
This is most obvious in the character of Marguerite, St. Leon's long-suffering wife, 
whom Woodcock identifies as "the first of a series of fictional portraits" of 
Wollstonecraft ("Notes" 691). Similarly, Clemit regards St. Leon as Godwin's attempt to 
fictionally rework the austere rationalism of PoliticalJustice into a philosophy for living 
that could accommodate Wollstonecraft's emphasis on the value of love and the domestic 
affections {Godwinian Novel 73-74). In its review of the novel, the Antijacobin Review 
was "delighted to find the social and domestic virtues placed in their proper rank" 
(Graham 158) and speculated that the author "would not be sorry to have an opportunity 
of retracting many of the opinions advanced in his former works" (Graham 157). 
Indeed, in the Preface to the original 1799 edition of the novel, Godwin goes on 
guard against those readers of his "graver productions" who might "accuse [him] of 
inconsistency; the affections and charities of private life being every where in this 
publication a topic of the warmest eulogium, while in the Enquiry concerning Political 
Justice they seemed to be treated with no great degree of indulgence and favour" (52). To 
these potential charges of inconsistency, Godwin declares that St. Leon stands as a 
refinement of his earlier political philosophy which, while consistent with its original 
fundamental principles, now recognizes the central place of love and personal affections 
in the evolution of moral and rational character. "I apprehend domestic and private 
affections inseparable from the nature of man," writes Godwin in his 1799 Preface, "and 
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from what may be styled the culture of the heart, and am fully persuaded that they are not 
incompatible with a profound and active sense of justice in the mind of him that cherishes 
them" (52).6 
In St. Leon, sensibility and the domestic affections are repeatedly celebrated and 
set in contrast to the detached rationalism for which Godwin had advocated in Political 
Justice. When St. Leon is reunited with his son, Charles, after an estrangement of fifteen 
years, he marvels at the strength of "natural affection," which "winds itself in so many 
folds about the heart, and is the parent of so complicated, so various and exquisite 
emotions, that he who should attempt to divest himself of it, will find that he is divesting 
himself of all that is most to be coveted in existence" (413). Likewise, when St. Leon 
reflects on the death of his faithful dog, Charon, he justifies his grief on the basis that 
emotional response functions independently of the processes of reason. "A morose and 
fastidious reader perhaps will ask me why I lay so great a stress upon so petty and 
insignificant an incident as the death of a dog," writes St. Leon, but "feeling does not stay 
to calculate with weights and a balance the importance and magnitude of every object that 
excites it; it flows impetuously from the heart, without consulting the cooler responses of 
the understanding" (280). 
Indeed, William D. Brewer points out that affect shapes the very conditions of St. 
Leon's composition: at numerous points in the text, St. Leon acknowledges the disruptive 
influence of painful memories on the physical act of writing, and such "melodramatic 
gestures," Brewer argues, foreground the "subjectivity of St. Leon's narrative," a 
narrative which is a "record of feelings [...] as well as events" (Introduction 25). As a 
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"record of feelings," St. Leon clearly stands as a testament to Godwin's initiation into 
Wollstonecraft's "culture of the heart." As Elton Edward Smith and Esther Greenwell 
Smith describe it, St. Leon 
marks a long step forward in Godwin's recognition of the importance of 
emotion as a motive for conduct and as a basis of relationship. The novel 
expresses his hard-won conviction that the experience of family affection 
is essential to the complete development of the individual personality, and 
can, in its turn, act as a stepping stone toward universal benevolence. 
(91-92) 
When St. Leon meets the nineteen-year-old Marguerite, he is certainly in need of 
the moral reformation which she provides. Having been for "two years in habits of life 
and a mode of expense extremely injurious to [his] patrimony," St. Leon is only delivered 
from the "ruinous consequences of [his] own folly" through his introduction and 
subsequent marriage to Marguerite (80). Indeed, Marguerite seems to function in the text 
primarily as a vehicle for her husband's moral and financial reformation. Although 
beautiful as well as artistically and intellectually accomplished, she is most notably 
constructed as a paragon of moral virtue whose most significant gift is the ameliorative 
effect she has on her husband's profligate ways. "Amidst the singular assemblage of her 
intellectual accomplishments," writes St. Leon, "there was nothing by which she was so 
much distinguished, as the uncommon prudence of her judgments, and the unalterable 
amiableness of her manners" (81). 
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Like Fleetwood, the protagonist of Godwin's next novel, St. Leon develops an 
appreciation of his future wife's virtuous superiority to the other women with whom he 
has been romantically and sexually involved. As he tells the reader, 
I was like one, who, after his eyes had grown imperceptibly dim till at 
length every object appeared indistinct and of a gloomy general hue, has 
his sight instantaneously restored, and beholds the fabric of the universe in 
its genuine clearness, brilliancy, and truth [....] I could not endure the 
comparison between the showy, unsubstantial attractions of the women I 
had hitherto frequented, and the charms of the adorable Marguerite. The 
purity of her mind seemed to give a celestial brilliance and softness to the 
beauties of her person. (82) 
Also, like Fleetwood, St. Leon is introduced to his wife via the bond of friendship he 
forges with her father, the Marquis de Damville, a man who, like Fleetwood's father-in-
law Macneil, was "one of the most benevolent and enlightened of mankind" (81). And, 
just as Macneil does with Fleetwood, the Marquis bestows his daughter in marriage 
almost as a commodity meant for the moral reformation of his future son-in-law. 
Macneil encourages Fleetwood's courtship of his daughter, Mary, out of an 
expressed belief that marriage to an amiable, uncorrupted young woman will cure 
Fleetwood's misanthropy. Likewise, the Marquis is willing to '"bestow"' his daughter on 
St. Leon-to '"commit[] her happiness to the risk'" (84)-in a bid to renovate the younger 
man's profligate behaviour-to cure his passion for the vices of public, courtly life in 
general and for gaming in particular. '"She is a treasure, the equal of which perhaps the 
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world does not hold,'" the Marquis tells St. Leon of Marguerite: 
'In understanding, accomplishments, and virtue, I firmly believe no 
woman living can compare with her. In possessing her, you will be 
blessed beyond the lot of princes [....] Her portion will redeem the injury 
which your patrimony has suffered from your excesses [....] I cannot 
believe that, with such a deposit intrusted to you, you will consent to bring 
her to misery and ruin.' (84) 
Regarding St. Leon as a '"man in the high road to ruin'" (82), and '"determined 
on [his] reform'" (83), the Marquis '"bestows"' his daughter on St. Leon for the purpose 
of alleviating his financial distress through Marguerite's dowry. More importantly, 
however, he offers her as the ideal exemplar of virtuous sentiment and behaviour which 
will act as the regulator of St. Leon's own moral conduct. In one significant sense, then, 
it is Marguerite-and not the Philosopher's Stone or the elixir vitae-who functions as St. 
Leon's first "gift." Like the two others he will receive later in life, this gift is conferred 
upon him by an elderly man who only bestows his present after extracting a promise from 
the recipient. Marguerite is thus given to St. Leon on one '"condition"': '"break off your 
present modes of life,'" the Marquis tells St. Leon, and '"separate yourself from your 
connections'" (84). In essence, what the Marquis requires of St. Leon amounts to a 
divorce of the self for the young aristocrat, for it is only through his "connections"-the 
social conventions coded into his relationships with his peers-that he assumes any sense 
of selfhood at all. 
Initially, St. Leon experiences great salutary benefits from marriage and rural 
retirement. Indeed, he constructs the pleasures of domestic affection as the one panacea 
for all of life's inevitable disappointments and tribulations, lavishing praise on the joys of 
private life: "To judge from my own experience in this situation," writes St. Leon of his 
marriage with Marguerite, "I should say that nature has atoned for all the disasters and 
miseries she so copiously and incessantly pours upon her sons, by this one gift, the 
transcendent enjoyment and nameless delights which, wherever the heart is pure and the 
soul is refined, wait on the attachment of two persons of opposite sexes" (85). Residing 
at St. Leon's paternal estate, the couple lives in relative retirement, enjoying literary 
pursuits, outdoor activities, and occasional travel. St. Leon constructs a picture of 
marital complementarity that develops out of both solitude and shared experience. Of 
their marital bliss, he recalls that 
ours was a sober and dignified happiness, and its very sobriety served to 
give it additional voluptuousness. We had each our separate pursuits, 
whether for the cultivation of our minds, or the promotion of our mutual 
interests. Separation gave us respectability in each other's eyes, while it 
prepared us to enter with fresh ardour into society and conversation.7 (85) 
However, despite the personal satisfactions he experiences in the retirement and 
tranquility of the domestic realm, St. Leon still yearns for the social validation afforded 
by public life. Domestic enjoyments, as delightfully satisfying as they are for St. Leon on 
one level, are not enough to grant a complete sense of fulfillment in himself as a person 
or as a man of rank. Thus, he still yearns for the public recognition and acclaim of his 
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peers, an acclaim and recognition which he can only achieve within the social spaces of 
urban courtly life. While Marguerite has "all the simplicity of genuine taste" (88), 
"deriving] her happiness from the tone of her own mind, and [standing] in no need of the 
gaping admiration and stupid wonder of others to make her feel herself happy" (88), St. 
Leon's personal fulfillment and very sense of identity rely on the codes of social 
exchange in the public "theatre" of life. As he laments to his reader, "I retained the 
original vice of my mind. The gestures of worship and the voice of applause were 
necessary to me. I did not suffice to myself. I was not satisfied with the tranquil and 
inglorious fruition of genuine pleasures, forgetting the vain and anxious tumult of the 
world, and forgotten by those who figured on its theatre" (88). 
While the "theatre" of public life may be "vain and anxious," St. Leon is still 
destructively drawn to it, despite his better intentions and the measure of happiness he 
experiences in rural retirement with Marguerite. Still drawn to the "theatre of glory," and 
still in desperate need of the "gestures of worship and the voice of applause" that validate 
his own sense of self-worth and consolidate his own sense of selfhood, St. Leon is 
tormented by his inability to "suffice to [himjself." Clearly gesturing to his wife's 
implicit function as his moral regulator, St. Leon laments that not even Marguerite, 
despite her superiority of sentiment in these matters, was able to "root[] out this disease 
of [his] mind" (88). Indeed, as Crump has argued, the sequestered and secluded nature of 
the domestic realm actually exacerbates St. Leon's desire for public life by withholding 
opportunities for the social recognition he so desperately craves: "In rural retirement [St. 
Leon] is debarred from participation in the economy of symbolic exchange with his peers 
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in which his concepts of prestige have currency as real value [....] The domestic, 
individualizing world of [] marriage threatens St. Leon's sense of self because it isolates 
him from that social continuum in which he had an assigned and an assured place" (399). 
Initially, St. Leon is able to satiate his desire for public recognition through 
ostentatious displays of wealth that signify the superiority and power of his social 
position. He maintains a large retinue of servants and surrounds himself with all the 
accoutrements of luxury (88). St. Leon's tenuous hold on his social ambition, however, is 
broken when at the age of 32 he travels to Paris with his nine-year-old son, Charles, for 
the express purpose of settling him into university. St. Leon's commitment to domestic 
seclusion had been reinforced four years earlier when, upon visiting his father-in-law on 
his deathbed in Paris, he had been warned yet again by the Marquis against being '"drawn 
aside by ambition'" or '"dazzled by the glitter of idle pomp and decoration'" (93). '"Live 
in the midst of your family,"' the Marquis admonished on the occasion, and '"cultivate 
domestic affection'" (93). Struck by these "last advices" of his father-in-law, St. Leon 
had then "small inclination to enter into any species of society" and promptly left Paris 
immediately following the Marquis's decease (93). Without the spectre of the Marquis, 
however-and without the guiding judgment of Marguerite, who, feeling a "repugnance" 
to life in the metropolis, had declined to accompany him (92)-St. Leon quickly surrenders 
to the same corrupting vices of courtly life that had seduced him years prior. 
Having lived for the past ten years a life of "contemplation and letters" (94), St. 
Leon is awestruck by the activity and energy of urban life and its myriad opportunities for 
ostentatious social interaction. Recalls St. Leon, "I was like a man who had suffered long 
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calamity in a famished vessel or a town besieged, and is immediately after introduced into 
the midst of luxury, to a table loaded with the most costly dainties" (94). Seduced by the 
charms of urban life-the "dainties" of social intercourse that had so long been denied him 
in his domestic married life-St. Leon is quickly drawn back into the "destructive vortex" 
of the gaming table. Significantly, his fevered embrace of gambling only increases upon 
his realization that success at the gaming table will allow him to sustain an extravagant 
lifestyle that had long ago outstripped his financial means to support it. St. Leon's 
behaviour at this point in the text is no doubt informed by the irrationality that 
characterizes all addictive behaviour. His reflections, however, also display a keen 
awareness of the fundamental role ostentatious displays of social rank play in his sense of 
identity and self worth, and of his inability to continue such displays without some 
fortification of his finances. As Scheuermann aptly recognizes, "part of St. Leon's need 
for wealth stems from his self-image as an aristocrat; he feels that without his material 
resources he would not receive the public gestures of acknowledgment which are so 
necessary to him" (Novels of William Godwin 146). After a significant win at the gaming 
table, St. Leon surrenders to his "fatal and irresistible" need for social extravagance (95), 
and decides upon gambling as the only way to finance the pomp and glitter of a public 
lifestyle that is so central to his very identity (97-98). 
St. Leon's gambling relapse corresponds with an increasing alienation from his 
family, as he withdraws from the affections of his son, Charles, and from open 
communication with Marguerite. When Marguerite unexpectedly arrives in Paris, St. 
Leon is forced to choose between a night of gambling and an evening spent in domestic 
99 
tranquillity with his family. It is significant that Marguerite's presence serves not to 
dampen her husband's passion for gambling, but rather to inflame it. As St. Leon tells 
the reader, "instead of being weaned, by the presence of this admirable woman, from my 
passion for gaming, it became stronger than ever" (107). Indeed, while about to embrace 
his wife, and upon the entrance of his son into the room, St. Leon betrays the extent of his 
alienation from the domestic order which he seems to perceive as both threatening and 
stifling: "The arms of my wife, that were about to embrace me, suddenly became to me a 
nest of scorpions," laments St. Leon. "I could as soon have rested and enjoyed myself 
upon the top of Vesuvius, when it flamed" (107). 
It is difficult to determine the exact reason for St. Leon's hostile response in this 
scene, why he so violently repudiates the charms of domestic life he claims so much to 
value. While he is no doubt largely motivated by the impulses of addiction at this point, 
his response is also suggestive of a latent discontent with a domesticity he finds stifling 
and which denies him access to the public "theatre of glory" he so craves. Thus, 
Marguerite's arms become a "nest of scorpions" that threatens to trap, immobilize, and 
ultimately destroy him. As perceived by St. Leon, gambling is the vehicle by which he 
will be able to sustain the extravagance of a public life organized around the social 
signifiers of courtly culture and aristocratic identity. Marguerite's presence in Paris thus 
becomes an impediment both to St. Leon's gambling activities and to his larger goal of 
sustaining this public image. Marguerite (and the domesticity she so powerfully 
represents) threatens St. Leon's consolidation of his public identity, and he thus comes to 
regard her embraces as a kind of symbolic death-a "nest of scorpions," or a burning 
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volcano, which he must escape. Indeed, in a metaphor foreshadowing a later episode in 
his tragic history, St. Leon is relieved when he is finally able to withdraw himself from 
Marguerite's presence and "escape[] the inquisition of her eye" (109). 
St. Leon's fall from aristocratic prosperity is swift, as he loses his entire fortune in 
a twenty-four-hour gambling spree and subsequently descends into a debilitating 
depression. Reduced to beggary, Marguerite orchestrates the family's retirement into 
"virtuous obscurity"-in this case, a humble cottage in rural Switzerland (112). 
Marguerite gracefully accepts the family's loss of fortune and status, to the point where 
she indulges in a Wordsworthian language of celebration regarding the moral and 
spiritual benefits of a humble rustic life. For Marguerite, rural retirement, divorced from 
the "artificial tastes, and idle and visionary pursuits" of sophisticated urban or courtly life, 
is more closely aligned with the "genuine principles of [human] nature" (123), and she 
entreats St. Leon to take solace in domestic affections and in the moral benefits of their 
reduced station in life.8 
St. Leon, however, feels too acutely the debasement of his impoverished state, and 
he struggles to reconcile himself to his lowly station. His loss of fortune and rank strikes 
at the very foundations upon which his sense of identity and selfhood rests, and he thus 
recognizes the gravity of his "fall": "I had been formed, by every accident of my life, to 
the love of splendour," he declares. "High heroic feats, and not the tranquillity of rural 
retirement [... ] had been the food of my imagination, ever since the faculty of 
imagination was unfolded in my mind" (120). As St. Leon remarks later in his narrative, 
he had been "brought up from [] infancy in the opinion that fame was the first of all 
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Godwin, however, constructs Marguerite's emotional response to their sudden 
impoverishment as symptomatic of her greater strength of character, and her virtuous 
superiority in this instance throws into relief St. Leon's personal weaknesses. In the 
Enquirer, Godwin had cautioned against an excessive reliance on luxury, arguing that 
care should be taken in the education of the young not to encourage an adverse 
dependence on certain "gratifications" in life. "The man of true courage," contends 
Godwin, "is he who, when duty and public good demand it, can chearfully dispense with 
innumerable gratifications. The coward is he who, wedded to particular indulgences and 
a certain mode of life, is not able so much as to think with equanimity of the being 
deprived of them" (Enquirer 248). "Genuine virtue," such as that displayed by 
Marguerite, 
teaches us to look upon events, not absolutely with indifference, but at 
least with tranquillity. It instructs us to enjoy the benefits which we have, 
and prepares us for what is to follow. It smiles upon us in the midst of 
poverty and adverse circumstances. It enables us to collect and combine 
the comforts which a just observer may extract from the most untoward 
situation, and to be content. (Enquirer 249) 
Marguerite-whose emotional response is surely emblematic of the "genuine virtue" 
which allows one to experience tranquillity in the face of misfortune-is juxtaposed with 
the "cowardly" St. Leon and his unhealthy reliance on "indulgence" and a "certain mode 
of life," a reliance that is in itself suggestive of a weak sense of personal autonomy. 
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St. Leon's "bitterness of soul" (125) is only interrupted by a storm that destroys 
his Swiss cottage and devastates the region of Switzerland in which he and his family 
were residing. Forced off their land by Swiss authorities, St. Leon and his family travel to 
Constance, Germany. Although initially cheated of the money from the sale of their 
humble Swiss estate, the family, after a brief but severe spell of poverty, eventually settles 
in another cottage on Lake Constance. Although his family's misfortunes in the wake of 
the storm initially engender in St. Leon an appreciation for the consolations of domestic 
affection, he finds himself unable to sustain a more positive outlook on his situation in 
life. As he recalls, "the virtue I had so recently adopted was a strenuous effort. I rather 
resolved to be happy, than could strictly be said to be happy [....] [V]anity and 
ostentation were habits wrought into my soul, and might be said to form part of its 
essence" (135). St. Leon's need for wealth and fame still consumes him, and he comes to 
regard his attempts at finding happiness in his humble existence as contrary to the natural 
state of his soul. 
Despite St. Leon's latent dissatisfaction with his state in life, he does manage to 
achieve a measure of "peace and tranquillity" while residing for six years with his family 
in the cottage on Lake Constance (155). However, this six-year moratorium on 
discontent comes to an abrupt end with the arrival of the stranger bearing the magna 
opera of the Philosopher's Stone and the elixir vitae. Calling himself Francesco 
Zampieri, the stranger arrives at St. Leon's cottage in late summer, and his 
presence-coupled with the seductive gifts he offers-reignites in St. Leon his repressed 
desire for wealth and "fame." Moreover, the arrival of the stranger serves to reveal the 
105 
responds to St. Leon's initial refusal with "ineffable contempt": 
'Feeble and effeminate mortal! You are neither a knight nor a Frenchman! 
Or rather, having been both, you have forgotten in inglorious obscurity 
every thing worthy of either! Was ever gallant action achieved by him who 
was incapable of separating himself from a woman? [....] In vain might 
honour, worth, and immortal renown proffer their favours to him who has 
made himself the basest of all sublunary things-the puppet of a woman, 
the plaything of her pleasure, wasting an inglorious life in the 
gratifications of her wishes and the performance of her commands!' (157) 
Zampieri attacks St. Leon on multiple levels: lacking the reckless valour needed for 
'"gallant action,'" he is marked as a failure relative to the aristocratic codes of behaviour 
governing the courtly tradition of sixteenth-century France. Furthermore, by aligning 
himself so completely with Marguerite that she becomes "a part of [him]self," St. Leon 
has allowed himself to be subsumed by a domestic order that should only 
complement-but never overwhelm-him. The inevitable result, argues the stranger, of a 
man unable to '"separat[e] himself from a woman'" is a '"puppet,"' a "'plajrthing'" 
emasculated by the feminine sphere. Such a man can never achieve greatness, and is 
instead destined to live out life in '"inglorious obscurity.'" Zampieri is unequivocal in 
his attack on St. Leon's manhood, but he also appeals to the younger man's social vanity 
by holding out a hope of "redemption" for himself and for his children, who become, in 
both Zampieri's and St. Leon's eyes, not much more than future representations of St. 
Leon's image. As the stranger tells St. Leon, '"you are degraded from the rank you once 
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held among mankind; your children are destined to live in the inglorious condition of 
peasants. This day you might have redeemed all your misfortunes, and raised yourself to 
a station more illustrious than that to which you were born'" (158). 
It is this last speech of the stranger that perhaps plays the central role in seducing 
St. Leon into accepting Zampieri's offer, for St. Leon's masculine identity-and, indeed, 
his very sense of self-is inextricably bound up with the outward signifiers of wealth and 
social rank. Being able to transcend the '"inglorious obscurity'" of his lowly station, and 
once again assume an elevated public image, would indeed be a kind of "redemption" for 
St. Leon, as he has experienced his fall from aristocratic prosperity as a "degradation" of 
not only his body, but also his spirit. St. Leon immediately senses the relevance of the 
stranger's words to his own character. "The stranger touched upon the first and foremost 
passions of my soul," he writes, "passions the operation of which had long been 
suspended, but which were by no means extinguished in my bosom" (157). 
St. Leon rightly recognizes that the appeal of the stranger's offer rests in his own 
addiction to "fame" and the "theatre of glory," an addiction cultivated in adolescence 
through the lessons taught by his mother, and nurtured by an adulthood spent conforming 
to the social codes of chivalric culture: "The youthful passions of my soul, which my 
early years had written there in characters so deep, were by no means effaced. I could not 
contemplate the splendour of rank with an impartial eye. I could not think of the 
alternative of distinction or obscurity for my children with indifference" (160). 
St. Leon's conception of his character is strikingly suggestive of the image of the 
palimpsest, which, although it may be inscribed many times over, never loses the "marks" 
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of its original script. Indeed, the early lessons of St. Leon's childhood had instilled in 
him a deep desire for "fame"-public glory and social acclaim-and these "youthful 
passions" had made such an indelible impression on his "soul" (were "written there in 
characters so deep") that they became the fundamental foundations in the construction of 
his selfhood, to the extent that, without "fame," he was nothing-he ceased to exist in any 
meaningful way. His years with Marguerite, years in which she had attempted to instill in 
her husband an appreciation of domestic retirement removed from the public eye, might 
have tempered or even "suspended" these "foremost passions," but they in no way 
"effaced" them. Marguerite's lessons were simply "written over" those primary lessons 
of his childhood, which serve as the original and most fundamental text of St. Leon's 
existence. 
The stranger is a skilled reader of that text, easily manipulating the "first and 
foremost passions of [St. Leon's] soul." Indeed, it is Zampieri's acute perception of that 
text-those "first and foremost passions"-that allows him to bring St. Leon under his 
sway. A dependence on wealth and luxury, for Godwin, was not only the sign of a weak 
and "cowardly" character; it also threatened a man's autonomy. "The weakness which 
too many are subject to in regard to the goods of fortune," argued Godwin in the 
Enquirer, "puts them to a certain degree in every man's power" (249). A man 
"inordinately sensible to the presence or absence of the accommodations and luxuries of 
life" is easily enslaved by another: "This man is not his own master [....] He is truly a 
slave. Any man, possessing the command of a certain portion of the goods of life, may 
order him this way or that at his pleasure" {Enquirer 249). 
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With his unlimited "command" of the "goods of life"-money and 
longevity-Zampieri is ideally poised to act as St. Leon's "master," subjugating him to 
forbidden knowledge and alienating secrets. It is therefore ironic that St. Leon ultimately 
comes to appreciate the stranger's offer as the means through which he can reestablish not 
only his social rank, but also his personal autonomy and masculine authority. "Shall I 
shut upon myself the gate of knowledge and information?" he asks himself, pondering the 
stranger's offer of disclosure and echoing the very language used to attack him and his 
masculinity. "Is it not the part of a feeble and effeminate mind to refuse instruction, 
because he is not at liberty to communicate that instruction to another-to a wife?" (159). 
The stranger's gift thus becomes a sort of moral "instruction," a "gate of knowledge" 
through which St. Leon must courageously pass in order to redeem himself and his family 
from their fallen state. Like Caleb Williams, St. Leon is motivated by an urgent need to 
gain access to forbidden knowledge, knowledge which carries within it the threat of his 
own destruction. 
In succumbing to the stranger's manipulation, St. Leon thus betrays his deep sense 
of shame at his perceived emasculation. "The figure I made in my own eyes was mean; I 
was impatient of my degradation; I believed that I had shown myself uxorious and 
effeminate, at a time that must have roused in me the spirit of a man, if there had been a 
spark of manly spirit latent in my breast" (166). In St. Leon's eyes, he has lost his 
masculine authority, that "spark of manly spirit" so essential to the chivalric tradition. 
While poverty and obscurity have unmanned him by robbing him of the great signifiers of 
wealth and rank that formed the foundation for his conception of masculine identity, 
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domestic retirement has similarly emasculated him by denying him the separate sphere of 
interaction necessary for successful manhood. St. Leon, so immersed in the private 
sphere that it has become the "whole of [his] existence," perceives his gendered identity 
as under threat. He justifies his anxiety by clinging to the ideology of separate spheres 
that will come to characterize later nineteenth-century conceptions of gender.9 Reflecting 
on the "singular and unprecedented confidence" he shares with Marguerite (166), St. 
Leon laments that • 
other men have their secrets: nor do they find their domestic tranquillity 
broken by that circumstance. The merchant does not call his wife into 
consultation upon his ventures; the statesman does not unfold to her his 
policy and his projects; the warrior does not take her advice upon the plan 
of his campaign; the poet does not concert with her his flights and his 
episodes. To other men the domestic scene is the relaxation of their cares; 
when they enter it, they dismiss the business of the day, and call another 
cause. I only have concentrated in it the whole of my existence. By this 
means I have extinguished in myself the true energy of the human 
character. A man can never be respectable in the eyes of the world or in 
his own, except so far as he stands by himself and is truly independent. He 
may have friends; he may have domestic connections; but he must not in 
these connections lose his individuality. Nothing truly great was ever 
achieved, that was not executed or planned in solitary seclusion. (166-67) 
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In St. Leon's conception of this notion of separate spheres, a man should maintain 
a healthy distance between his public activities and his private enjoyments, moving in and 
out of the domestic "scene" easily, often, and at will. Within this model of interaction, 
masculine autonomy is never threatened, never jeopardized by the domestic sphere. The 
circumstances of St. Leon's fall from prosperity, however, have produced in his eyes an 
unnatural order of things, a perverse living arrangement in which an unbroken domestic 
"tranquillity" of six years has denied him any opportunities for masculine self-expression 
in the public sphere. With no money and no social connections to fortify his relationship 
with public life, St. Leon has only his interactions with Marguerite and his children with 
which to define himself, and the result, in his eyes, is that the "whole of [his] existence" 
has become "concentrated" in the domestic order. St. Leon may yearn to "stand[] by 
himself and be "truly independent," but there is a definite irony to these desires. On her 
deathbed, St. Leon's mother had stressed the importance of "singleness and self-
dependence" with no apparent awareness of how her idealization of social rank conflicted 
with true independence of thought or character (60). St. Leon laments his loss of 
individuality while being similarly blind to the fact that his desperate need for wealth and 
"fame" have always precluded him from achieving any true measure of independence. 
The stranger's gift ultimately offers St. Leon much more than simple immortality 
and unlimited wealth. The Philosopher's Stone will of course give St. Leon the financial 
resources to re-establish his "fame"-in the form of allowing him to reassume his 
"rightful" rank in society-and this fame will no doubt allow St. Leon to recuperate his 
sense of self within the courtly tradition he so values. St. Leon's identity, however, as we 
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have witnessed, is largely informed by his sense of masculine authority, and it is precisely 
this authority which he so desperately desires to regain. This is evidenced by the 
stranger's keen tactics of manipulation in identifying and attacking St. Leon's biggest 
point of weakness-his latent sense of degradation and emasculation. The greatest "gift" 
of the stranger, therefore, may not be the Philosopher's Stone or the elixir vitae at all, but 
the very "condition" upon which these two "gifts" are bequeathed-that is, the code of 
silence that St. Leon must maintain between himself and his wife regarding all that the 
stranger shares with him. As St. Leon correctly suspects, the stranger's gift and its 
accompanying "condition" will divorce him from the "singular and unprecedented" trust 
he shares with Marguerite. Paradoxically, however, it seems that it is just this kind of 
divorce that he so craves; only by removing himself from the confines of a domestic bond 
that he feels has subsumed his "true energy" can he reassert his masculine autonomy and 
achieve greatness. Accepting the underlying condition of the stranger's gift gives St. 
Leon a very tangible and convenient vehicle through which to effect a "divorce" from 
Marguerite that is both symbolic and material. 
St. Leon's feelings of emasculation are perhaps aggravated by Marguerite's 
assumption of characteristics and behaviours conventionally associated with the 
masculine. When first introduced to the reader, Marguerite is the picture of stereotypical 
femininity: she is mild in disposition and gentle and delicate in frame, with an "extreme 
juvenility of form" and a step that is "airy and light" (81). Despite her obvious feminine 
qualities, however, even at this early point, Marguerite displays a "strength of body and 
vigour of mind" that is reflected in her "bold" intellect and "firm" carriage (81). This 
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strength of character comes to reveal itself in St. Leon's narrative, as Marguerite's 
responses to misfortune are increasingly masculinized. Indeed, upon the loss of the 
family fortune, Marguerite assumes, in addition to her maternal role, the typically 
masculine position of head and protector of the family. "She determined for the present 
to be both a father and a mother to her children" (115), and she later serves as an essential 
"steward" to St. Leon when he is emotionally incapacitated to the point of being unable to 
manage his own estate (122). 
Moreover, Marguerite's masculinization in the text occurs as a function of her 
husband's feminization. When St. Leon is cheated of the money from the sale of his 
Swiss cottage, and forced to earn a subsistence living as a manual labourer, he feels 
himself unmanned by his inability to withstand his misfortune: "My heart died within 
me," he recalls. "I did not return after the fatigues of the day [...] to a night of repose. I 
became a very woman when I looked forward, and endeavoured to picture to myself the 
future situation of my family. I watered my pillow with my tears" (142). Significantly, 
during these moments of emotional excess, it is Marguerite who must apply the guiding 
hand of comfort. "[She] would sometimes overhear me; and with the gentlest suggestions 
of her admirable mind would endeavour to soothe my thoughts to peace" (142). 
St. Leon's misfortunes have thus placed him in a series of domestic arrangements 
that have compromised his sense of masculine authority. He therefore constructs his 
acceptance of the stranger's gift as a testament of his own masculine autonomy in the face 
of a domestic existence he now perceives as emasculating and as a threat to his self-
actualization. After his sudden entrance into a new-found wealth that is never adequately 
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explained to Marguerite or his children, St. Leon embarks on a tour of German cities with 
his beloved son, Charles, but he quickly suffers an estrangement with Charles after he 
refuses to disclose the nature and cause of his sudden wealth. Significantly, St. Leon's 
sense of masculine identity, reinvigorated by his willingness to deny Marguerite entrance 
into the realm of his alchemical secrets, is further consolidated by what he now perceives 
as his strength in maintaining the stranger's confidence, regardless of the personal costs 
to himself or his family. St. Leon's sense of masculine autonomy thus becomes a 
perverse, and ultimately tragic, function of his willingness to withstand the misfortunes 
brought on by the Philosopher's Stone. As he reflects after his break with Charles, 
I held it to be base and cowardly to surrender gifts so invaluable, upon so 
insufficient an experiment [....] I had but just entered the vast field that 
was opened to me. It was of the nature of all great undertakings to be 
attended with difficulties and obstacles in the commencement, to present a 
face calculated to discourage the man that is infirm of purpose. But it 
became my descent, my character and pretensions, to show myself serene 
in the midst of storms. (219) 
Note how St. Leon casts his stubborn refusal to relinquish use of the Philosopher's Stone 
as indicative of a manliness perfectly in tune with the chivalric ideals of reckless bravery 
and perseverance. Using language evocative of the battlefield, St. Leon perceives himself 
as a determined warrior entering into the "vast field" of an "experiment" that will prove 
his authority, once and for all. Only by remaining committed to his "experiment"-and 
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therefore loyal to the stranger and his gifts-can St. Leon validate his identity as both an 
aristocrat and a man. 
Charles's material departure from the family mirrors St. Leon's symbolic break 
with the familial ties and domestic affections that had so long enveloped him. Indeed, 
immediately after accepting the stranger's disclosure, St. Leon had begun to sense the 
extent to which his "experiment" had "introduced a permanent difference and separation 
between [him] and [his] family" (194). This "separation" is most extreme with 
Marguerite: "we no longer lived together as we had done," remarks St. Leon. "There was 
no more opening of the heart between us, no more infantine guilelessness and sincerity, 
no more of that unapprehensive exposure of every thought of the soul" (201). After 
Charles's departure, St. Leon attempts to integrate, once again, into the folds of the 
domestic order, most notably by placing himself back under the moral control of 
Marguerite. '"I am come to you,'" he cries, upon first seeing her after his German tour, 
"'a repenting prodigal. Take me and mould me at your pleasure! [....] I resign myself 
into your hands! [....] Be my director; do with me as you please!'" (223-24). Although 
he is careful to guard his alchemical secrets, St. Leon nevertheless declares to Marguerite 
that, '"in all things else,'" she may "govern [him] despotically!'" (224). His attempts at 
re-entering the domestic order, however, are ultimately unsuccessful: St. Leon is now, in 
Marguerite's eyes, marked as an outsider to the family, a shadowy presence whose very 
unknowability threatens the domestic order. As St. Leon later comes to realize, 
Marguerite "regarded [him] as ambiguous, mysterious, and impenetrable, qualities from 
which the frankness of her nature spontaneously revolted" (257). 
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"An Equivocal Character" 
After St. Leon returns to Constance, he is detained on suspicion of murdering the 
stranger and only escapes prison by bribing a money-hungry jailor. From this point on in 
the text, St. Leon's adventures come to illustrate what is perhaps the ultimate paradox of 
his tragic history: the very wealth which should have theoretically affirmed his public 
image and consolidated his troubled sense of identity actually causes him to lose both of 
these things. As we have seen, St. Leon was driven, from childhood, by ambition, a thirst 
for "fame" and the "theatre of glory" that could only be satisfied in the public spaces of 
social life. It is this tragic flaw that alienates him from what should have been a life of 
unadulterated domestic affection with Marguerite. Moreover, it is this flaw that 
motivates him to accept the gifts offered by the stranger, despite (or because of) the fact 
that his acceptance will forever divorce him from the domestic order he should cherish 
above all else. In this sense, St. Leon chooses "fame" and public life over domestic and 
familial ties in a bid to both consolidate his weak sense of identity and demonstrate his 
masculine autonomy. However, this choice paradoxically initiates what is perhaps the 
most overt and compelling narrative of lost identity in the text-the literal erasure of St. 
Leon's name. 
St. Leon begins his experiment with the belief that it will allow him to resume his 
rightful "place" in chivalric courtly life. As Kate Ferguson Ellis has pointed out, St. Leon 
is a "firm believer in the transformative power of money" (162), and we witness how his 
faith in the power of gold structures his visions of the future. Immediately upon receiving 
the gift of the Philosopher's Stone, St. Leon begins to actively plot his return to the life of 
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honour and privilege he had lost seven years earlier. He fantasizes about returning to his 
"native soil," repurchasing the "property of [his] ancestors," and witnessing the members 
of his family rise to positions of eminence within the French court (190-91). His 
daughters will marry into the highest ranks of France's nobility, thus solidifying the 
position of the St. Leon name within the French aristocracy (191). In much the same way 
as his mother had done with him, St. Leon reserves his greatest hopes for his son, 
Charles, who in St. Leon's fantasies will "burst with sudden splendour upon his 
countrymen, and prove in the field his noble blood and generous strain" (191). St. Leon's 
visions ultimately run to the hyperbolic, as he begins to imagine himself as the financial 
saviour of his "adored country" in its time of need (189), "replenish[ing] with [his] 
treasures the empty coffers of France" (191). In St. Leon's fantasies of self-actualization, 
"the exile should return from his seven years' banishment in triumph and splendour" 
(190). 
The reality of St. Leon's experience, however, is that he is unable to achieve any 
kind of meaningful reintegration into society due to the aura of suspicion and mystery that 
immediately begins to haunt him upon his acceptance of the Philosopher's Stone. St. 
Leon's trouble in Constance stems from his inability, when questioned by the authorities, 
to give a '"clear and satisfactory account'" of both his wealth and of his relationship with 
the mysterious stranger (235). St. Leon initially seems to recognize the necessity of 
maintaining some measure of public transparency regarding his sudden wealth, as 
evidenced by the fact that he attempts to justify to his family his sudden prosperity as the 
result of a legacy left to him by the stranger. As St. Leon states at the time, "I was 
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compelled to account for appearances" (194). This notion of "accounting" for, or 
providing an "account" of, circumstances regarding his sudden acquisition of wealth 
continually resurfaces in St. Leon's narrative, as he becomes increasingly unable to offer 
the sort of "account" that might dispel some of the ignoble mystery that surrounds him 
and which prevents him from honourably reintegrating into society. 
The theme of forbidden knowledge, so prevalent in Caleb Williams, thus 
resurfaces in St. Leon. Unable to provide a full and transparent disclosure of all that he 
knows regarding both his and Falkland's histories-having only an "imperfect and 
mutilated story to tell" (411)-Caleb finds himself haunted by the equivocal nature of his 
existence. Like Caleb, St. Leon is ensnared within the confines of a dark secret, a story 
he cannot tell, and he experiences complete social alienation as he is driven from place to 
place by rumour and scandal. 
When St. Leon attempts to curry favour for himself and Charles from Gaspar de 
Coligny, a young French aristocrat residing at the Dresden court, he is forced to face the 
disheartening reality that his current circumstances could never yield an honourable 
explanation. '"At a loss to account'" for what he sees as this '"second revolution in [his] 
fortune,'" Coligny emphasizes to St. Leon the necessity of providing an honourable 
explanation for what seems to be inexplicable (204). '"You have not sufficiently 
considered the account we all owe to one another,'" Coligny tells St. Leon, '"and the 
clearness of proceeding we are obliged to maintain, not only to our own hearts, but in the 
face of the world'" (204). Unable to provide this '"clear account'" of his '"second 
revolution'" in fortune, St. Leon ultimately realizes that he is banished to an ignominious 
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existence, and that his name and public image-once his greatest boons in life-are now 
surrounded by mystery, speculation, and the taint of possible dishonour. Thus, the 
Philosopher's Stone, which was to act as the magical elixir for the regeneration of all 
aspects of his selfhood, ironically becomes the vehicle through which he loses even more 
of his social and personal identity. As St. Leon tells the reader, "I had rejoiced in the 
bequests of the stranger, because I regarded them as the means of restoring me to 
splendour, and replacing my children in the situation to which they were entitled by their 
birth. Was that which I had regarded as the instrument of their glory, to become the 
medium of their ignominy and disgrace?" (205). 
Indeed, it is this aura of ignoble mystery that haunts St. Leon's wandering 
footsteps for the remainder of his narrative, and becomes the greatest impediment to his 
successful reintegration into society. While St. Leon recognizes that wherever he travels 
he is a "stranger, one universally unknown" (370), it is the corrupt bashaw of Hungary 
who more aptly characterizes the enigmatic nature of St. Leon's position: as he tell St. 
Leon, '"you are a man of darkness, and every thing that relates to you is enveloped in 
mystery'" (378). For St. Leon, it ultimately becomes clear that, instead of achieving an 
honourable place in the "theatre of glory," he is banished to a life of ignominious 
obscurity: "Mystery was the great and unconquerable bane of my situation, and from the 
poisonous influence of mystery, the most regular system of government was not 
competent to protect me" (381). Just as Falkland ultimately comes to recognize himself 
as the "fool of fame" (215), and "reputation" as a false "idol" the worship of which has 
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destroyed him (171-72), St. Leon gradually comes to appreciate the destructive nature of 
his gifts and the tragic consequences of his passion for fame and public acclaim. 
After escaping prison in Constance, St. Leon settles himself and his family in 
Italy, just outside of Pisa. There, he lives an isolated and modest existence, but again his 
unfamiliarity to the local residents, coupled with his indiscreet participation in "chemistry 
and the operations of natural magic" (266), soon raises the suspicions of his superstitious 
Italian neighbours. After a mob kills his dog, destroys his home, and murders a loyal 
servant, St. Leon once again is forced to flee with his family, this time to Barcelona, 
where the long-suffering Marguerite-that "lovely victim of my indiscretions," as St. Leon 
characterizes her (264}-succumbs to illness. With Marguerite's death, St. Leon loses one 
of his last ties to the domestic order, and he immediately goes about divesting himself of 
his remaining familial connections-repurchasing his paternal estate in France and settling 
his daughters there under the guardianship of a female mentor, Mariana Chabot. 
What is perhaps most striking about this period in St. Leon's history, however, is 
that his removal to Italy initiates an overt loss of his public self, as measured by the 
family name he had so earnestly desired to preserve in all of its honour and glory. Indeed, 
while in Italy, St. Leon takes the name of "Monsieur Boismorand" (273), and this 
assumed identity is only the first of a long series of pseudonyms he uses to evade 
suspicion and escape into anonymity. After the death of Marguerite, he adopts the name 
and persona of a "monsieur Valmier, the guardian of the orphan heiresses of St Leon" 
(301). Ironically, contrary to his fantasies, it is as Monsieur Valmier-and not as 
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himself-that St. Leon repurchases his paternal property on the banks of the Garonne, and 
it is as Valmier that he makes the domestic arrangements with Madame Chabot. 
After his release from the prison of the Spanish Inquisition, St. Leon travels to 
Hungary, where he adopts yet another identity as "sieur de Chatillon" (366), the wealthy, 
young (for he has by this point in the novel ingested the elixir vitae and returned to a 
youthful age in appearance), and mysterious benefactor of the Hungarian people. Again, 
as with his fantasy regarding the repurchasing of his paternal estate, it is tragically ironic 
that St. Leon's dream of serving as a financial saviour to a country in need (a fantasy he 
expressed regarding France) is only finally fulfilled by assuming an identity other than his 
own. Moreover, after his release from Bethlem Gabor's prison, and upon his reunion 
with his estranged son Charles, St. Leon veils his true identity (as well as the false one he 
had assumed upon his entrance into Hungary) under yet another pseudonym-"Henry 
D'Aubigny," a young Frenchmen unjustly imprisoned by Gabor (414). In this respect, St. 
Leon is like Caleb, who is also forced to "submit to the otherwise unmanly expedient of 
passing by a different name" (410-11), and who similarly disguises his identity through a 
number of alternative personas. 
The text does not draw the reader's attention to this process of identity loss. 
Indeed, we are only told of these various name changes through oddly passive 
constructions delivered in an offhand manner: "Monsieur Boismorand, such was the 
name I had assumed upon my entrance into Italy," St. Leon tells the reader (273); after 
Marguerite's death, he writes of how he "passed [himjself for monsieur Valmier" while 
resettling his daughters under the care of Madame Chabot (301). Likewise, after his 
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initial entrance into Hungary, the sieur de Chatillon "was the name [he] at this time 
assumed" (366). Despite the awkwardly passive manner in which these shifts in identity 
are revealed to the reader, they are highly significant, for they speak to the ultimate 
paradox of St. Leon's experience with the Philosopher's Stone: that which should have 
reconsolidated St. Leon's sense of identity and public image, in the form of fortifying his 
financial situation and allowing him to reassume his elevated rank in society, actually 
causes him to lose both of these things-in this case, in the most obvious form of his 
family name. In this sense, St. Leon does not just lose his family and his moral bearings 
through his supernatural "experiment." He quite literally loses a fundamental element of 
his selfhood-his identity as symbolized by his aristocratic name. St. Leon does not 
meditate on this loss. Indeed, he seems to regard such name changes as a necessary 
reality of his woeful situation. But, for a man so committed to the preservation of his 
family honour and so driven to cultivate his public image and "fame"-both for himself 
and for his progeny-such sacrifices of external identity must have been acutely felt. 
In addition to adopting various pseudonyms along his travels, St. Leon, after his 
escape from the Spanish Inquisitors and their planned Auto da Fe, visits his daughters 
incognito by assuming the costume and habits of a traveling Armenian merchant. Like 
Caleb, whose disguises also involve the adoption of "othered" identities (in Caleb's case, 
those of a Jew and an Irish beggar), St. Leon assumes the position of a cultural outsider in 
his first significant human encounter after his escape. That St. Leon makes this visit 
disguised as an Eastern "other" speaks to his complete alienation both from the domestic 
order which his daughters inhabit and from the social and political structures of western 
Europe. When first settling his daughters on his estate in France, St. Leon had 
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emphasized to them that their parting was a final one and that "they should speak and 
think of [him] as dead" (303). It is during this visit, however, that St. Leon fulfills his 
earlier injunction and quite literally "writes" the narrative of his own death. 
In his role as Armenian merchant-and "friend" of the "late" St. Leon-he informs 
his daughters of their father's death two years prior. St. Leon's tale serves a pragmatic 
function in allowing him to clear up unfavorable rumours regarding the family patriarch 
and honourably bestow on his daughters his entire estate. On another level, however, his 
narrative also enables him to indulge his vanity by witnessing the effects which the news 
of his demise produces on his two daughters. Indeed, St. Leon goes even further than 
simply narrating the details of his own death. He manipulates his daughter Louisa's 
sensibilities by recounting the intimate details of her childhood experiences in such a way 
as to produce heightened emotional response. He describes his actions to the reader: 
From time to time I reminded her of particulars that it was scarcely 
possible any one but her father should know; I conjured up past scenes; I 
made all the revolutions of her youth pass successively in review before 
her; I touched all the pulses of her soul. Sometimes she was fixed in mute 
astonishment at the exactness of my information, and was ready to do me 
homage as some aerial genius, who condescended to clothe himself in this 
earthly figure; at other times astonishment was swallowed up in feeling, 
her soul dissolved in tenderness, and she appeared ready to faint into my 
arms. (357) 
"Urged by an irresistible impulse to practise [...] upon the feelings of her virtuous mind" 
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(356), St. Leon shapes his daughter's affections in a display that gratifies his vanity. Just 
as he is a conjurer of the alchemical arts, St. Leon becomes in this scene a magician of the 
past, an "aerial genius" "conjur[ing] up past scenes" in order to witness the effect on his 
daughter's sensibilities. In this way, St. Leon is able to satisfy a vain need to witness his 
daughter's grief for a father she believes is dead, and this manipulation of emotion 
proves, at least initially, to be quite fulfilling: "It is scarcely possible to depict the 
pleasurable sensations I drew from these intercourses [....] I felt sometimes as if I could 
have wasted ages in this sort of gratification" (357). 
St. Leon's game, however, is a dangerous one, and vanity, initially appeased, soon 
grows dissatisfied as the passage of time tempers his daughters' emotional responses. As 
he confesses to the reader, "it happens to few men to witness the manner in which the 
story of their own deaths is received. If it did, I believe we all of us have enough of 
vanity and personal feeling, however sincere a grief might show itself in the demeanour 
of survivors, to find it falling short of our appetites and demand" (359). Although his 
daughters grieve him with an appropriate measure of "decorum and sensibility," St. Leon 
nevertheless finds it an "unpleasing reflection [...] thus to have occasion to gauge their 
love, and to say, This is the exact measure of their affection" (359). St. Leon's 
disappointed vanity perhaps speaks to his anxiety over the larger implications of his 
"death," in that this symbolic demise represents the actual demise of his social 
identity-his ambitions, fame, and public self. In this sense, his "death" functions as 
another symbol of the literal demise of his public identity, as he sacrifices not just his 
name in this case, but his very earthly existence. 
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St. Leon's "death" in this scene can thus be read as the culminating act in the 
"social death" which he has been experiencing since his acceptance of the stranger's gifts. 
As numerous critics of the novel have pointed out, St. Leon's immortality alienates him 
from the most fundamental experience of humanity-death-and this alienation renders him 
unable to forge and sustain meaningful connections with friends and family, This leads to 
a kind of "social death," as Collings puts it (863). Like both Caleb and Fleetwood, St. 
Leon yearns for the comforts of friendship (367), but he repeatedly finds that his 
forbidden knowledge precludes him from enjoying the benefits of meaningful sociality. 
After his estrangement from the Denison family, Caleb ponders the extent of his 
alienation from society-"how completely I was cut off from the whole human species" 
(408). "Solitude, separation, banishment! These are words often in the mouths of human 
beings," laments Caleb. "But few men except myself have felt the full latitude of their 
meaning" (408). It becomes clear that Godwin intended to portray in St. Leon one of 
those "few men" who experiences the "full latitude" of total social alienation. Moreover, 
while St. Leon's "social death" produces acute feelings of despair and loneliness, it also 
jeopardizes the very foundations of his sense of self. Organized around the social 
narratives of wealth, rank, and public "fame," St. Leon's very selfhood is profoundly 
threatened by the sort of "social death" he experiences. Whereas he had dreamed in his 
youth of playing a starring role in the "theatre of glory," he is now relegated to the 
position of "mere spectator of the busy scenes that passed around [him]" (304). 
While visiting his mother's tomb, just prior to his final meeting with his 
daughters, St. Leon is overcome by the gravity of his failures in the light of his mother's 
deathbed command to cultivate public honour and glory: 
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Why, oh why, as it had been with my great forefathers, was it not a 
moment of exultation to me, when I thus feelingly saluted the shade of a 
parent! He that exults in such an hour, must feel that he has illustrated his 
birth, and honoured his progenitors. I had done nothing of this: I was an 
exile on the face of the earth, had acquired no trophies, and accumulated 
no fame. I had none to honour, none even to know me; I had no family, I 
had no friend! These bitter recollections started up in array before me, and 
cut me to the heart. The spirit of my mother frowned upon her son; and I 
returned along the path by which I came, disgraced and disconsolate. 
(351) 
As an exile, with no "trophies" or "fame," and having proven himself an unworthy 
successor to his ancestors' glory and aristocratic heritage, St. Leon is completely without 
the reference points around which he had always organized his sense of identity. Without 
these signifiers of the Symbolic Order-name, rank, "fame," a publicly recognized place in 
society-St. Leon experiences a literal "Lack"-an emptiness of the self that increasingly 
renders him a spectral figure. His emptiness, however, had always formed a latent part of 
his existence, as his weak sense of self had left him unable from his earliest youth to 
cultivate any clear sense of his identity independent of the codes underpinning his social 
position as aristocratic knight. 
Indeed, when later reflecting on his first encounters with the stranger, St. Leon 
represents his younger self as a hollow figure in need of new life. When the stranger 
tempted me with his "gifts," writes St. Leon, it was as if "he breathed into me the restless 
sentiment of ambition" (335). Although one can surely argue that the stranger merely 
stoked a fire that was always smoldering beneath the surface of St. Leon's humble 
domesticity, the metaphor of animation is striking, for it speaks to the way in which the 
stranger grants an empty St. Leon new life, a new earthly existence founded on the 
possibilities of wealth and fame. The image of the stranger as giver of new life becomes 
increasingly complicated as St. Leon's tragic story unfolds and his new-found identity is 
gradually subsumed within the narratives of the stranger's history. St. Leon despairs that 
his tragic experiences increasingly seem to evoke those of the stranger. Indeed, the 
"dark" and "ambiguous" nature of his existence already mirrors the shroud of mystery 
which enveloped Zampieri. St. Leon ultimately comes to regard himself as a sort of 
"double" for the stranger, his own identity and sense of self completely subsumed within 
the stranger's previous existence: "I understood continually more and more of the 
mysterious and unuttered history, of the stranger who died in the summer-house of the 
lake of Constance," laments St. Leon. "I found that I was only acting over again what he 
had experienced before me" (335). Rather than allowing him to refine his sense of 
individual worth through public honour and social acclaim, the "gifts" of the stranger 
instead relegate him to a base communal existence of shared suffering. 
The image of St. Leon as double to the stranger prefigures the more significant 
narrative of the doppelgdnger which unfolds in the last chapters of St. Leon's history. In 
the final pages of the text, St. Leon writes of his unlikely reunion with his long-estranged 
son, Charles, a reunion which reinvigorates him with a new mission in life. Released 
from yet another period of lengthy confinement at the hands of a cruel tormenter who 
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misunderstands his true nature and motives, St. Leon resolves to adopt a new self-
effacing role as the "unknown benefactor" of his son (413): "I instantly resolved to devote 
myself to [Charles's] service, and to place all my enjoyment in the contemplation of his 
happiness, and the secret consciousness of promoting it" (413). St. Leon sees his new 
resolution as completely selfless relative to his earlier fantasy of self-aggrandizement as 
the "saviour" of Hungary. "Here I pursued no delusive meteor of fame," argues St. Leon. 
"The very essence of my project lay in its obscurity" (415). It is significant that for St. 
Leon such "obscurity" now seems to come quite easily, as if the taint of "mystery" 
enveloping him has erased any semblance of genuine identity. As he laments, "I 
considered my own existence as blasted; and I could therefore find nothing better than to 
forget myself in my son" (413). 
Although St. Leon regards his self-effacement as an entirely selfless act-"I would 
forget and trample upon every personal concern, and be the victim and the sacrifice, if 
need were, of the happiness of my child" (413)-the language surrounding his declarations 
suggests a more complicated personal investment in his resolution to act as the "unknown 
benefactor" to his son. He seems to regard himself as an inevitable cipher in this 
resolution-vowing to "forget" his own identity in that of Charles, and constructing his 
own selfhood as the potential "sacrifice" to his son's-but he cannot of course remain a 
vacuum: he must replace his "sacrificed" self with something else, and that something 
else quickly becomes the identity of his son. Tellingly, St. Leon decides to "lay aside the 
name of Chatillon," and assume the new persona of Henry D'Aubigny, even before he is 
apprised of Charles's animosity towards Chatillon, the "rich stranger of Buda" (413). 
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Such an act suggests a deliberate attempt at self-fashioning purely for the sake of creating 
a new identity. Moreover, even as he takes on the external persona of D'Aubigny, St. 
Leon is vowing to "forget [him]self in [his] son," a turn of phrase which suggests a larger 
process of immersing himself in the identity and subjectivity of Charles. Indeed, in the 
final chapters of his narrative, St. Leon becomes, in both a literal and a symbolic sense, 
Charles's double, his doppelgdnger, a role which allows the embattled and world-weary 
alchemist to live vicariously through his son and which furnishes him with the 
opportunity for moral redemption. 
The image of the doppelgdnger immediately emerges in the text after St. Leon's 
reunion with Charles. After he is taken into the folds of his son's military encampment, 
St. Leon is given clothes "from the stock of [his] son," and the clothes, coupled with the 
uncanny similarity of their physical features, causes many in the camp to comment on the 
"striking resemblance" between Charles and the new arrival (414). As St. Leon himself 
tells the reader, "the coincidence of our features was so great, that, had we passed through 
a strange place in each other's company, I should infallibly have been regarded as his 
younger brother" (414). After "Henry D'Aubigny" represents himself as a young knight 
on a quest to rid Hungary of the Turks, Charles declares that a "powerful sympathy" 
unites them, in that they are both Frenchmen and "soldier[s] of fortune" (414). '"Our 
fortunes [] have been in a considerable degree similar,'" observes Charles (416). The 
similarity of their situations, combined with the "fraternal resemblance" noticed by even 
the most "inattentive spectator" (416), produces a powerful bond of communion between 
the two. "We were in a manner inseparable," effuses St. Leon (416). 
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Although St. Leon is seen in the light of a younger "brother" to Charles, in reality, 
their relationship is more paternal than fraternal, Charles-the son-acting as the father-
figure to the younger and more "vulnerable" D'Aubigny: Acting as his '"better genius'" 
and '"Mentor"' (416), Charles offers St. Leon both guidance and protection, "initiat[ing] 
[him] in the science of war" and "plac[ing] [him] immediately by his side" when facing 
potential danger (416). Such a paternal bond reverses the biological patterns of their 
relationship, so that Charles assumes the mantle of his father's role while St. Leon adopts 
the identity of Charles. (One may recall that it was one of St. Leon's earliest fantasies, 
immediately after acquiring the Philosopher's Stone, to act as the "instructor of 
[Charles's] youth, and his pattern in feats of war" (191).) In a passage of striking irony, 
Charles laments his existence as an isolated "exile," completely oblivious to the fact that 
his experience and lament so strongly mirror the reality of his father's fate: '"I am alone 
in the world. I have no father, no mother, and no brethren. I am an exile from my own 
country, and cut off for ever from those of my own lineage and blood,'" he cries to St. 
Leon (417). 
If St. Leon is like the son in this relationship, he is also very much the father, as 
evidenced by the intertextual similarities between St. Leon and Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein. In particular, the chase sequence described at the end of St. Leon's 
narrative prefigures the well-known pursuit of the Creature by Dr. Frankenstein in his 
daughter's novel. In that classic gothic tale, published nineteen years after St. Leon, 
Frankenstein pursues his Creature across the arctic landscape, intent on destroying the 
"filthy daemon to whom [he] had given life" (103). As the "creator and source" of a 
"new species" (82), Frankenstein is the generative force responsible for the existence of 
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the Creature, and he thus assumes, in many critical readings of the novel, a parental (both 
maternal and paternal) role in relation to his monstrous "son." 
Moreover, in addition to acting as Frankenstein's progeny, the Creature also 
functions as the Doctor's doppelgdnger, a motif that harks back to Godwin's exploration 
of this theme in St. Leon. Like Frankenstein, who resolves to "trace the steps" of his 
elusive "son" and "double" by "follow[ing] the windings of the Rhone" (224-25), St. 
Leon hunts his son Charles, "pursu[ing] his steps" as his chase is similarly structured 
"along the course" of a major river, the Danube (440). Likewise, while Frankenstein 
"ever followed in [the Creature's] track" (225), St. Leon is "continually in [the] track" of 
Charles, but is unable to "overtake" him (440). As the tormented (and tormenting) 
doppelgdnger of Charles, St. Leon frantically pursues the son who functions as both a 
father to him and as his uncanny double. As the tortured, hunted wanderer, Charles again 
mirrors the position of his father, who has been hounded from state to state and who has 
never attained peace since his "exile" began. 
'"You haunt my steps,'" Charles accuses St. Leon when he is finally reunited with 
his hated rival at the end of the novel (445), and this statement aptly evokes the spectral 
nature of St. Leon's position in his own text. The doppelgdnger motif which unfolds in 
the final chapters of the text symbolizes St. Leon's desire to "lose" himself-his own 
identity and subjective experience-in his son. "I cannot describe how my soul yearned 
towards this my only son," he declares to the reader upon being reunited with Charles 
(412), and the rest of his history details the attempts of a father "eager to dive into [the] 
soul" of his son (438). Of course, St. Leon's tragic history has made him all too aware of 
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the possibility of "forgetting" oneself in the identity, or "soul," of another. In the final 
pages of his story, he laments that his experiences have forced him to become an 
"equivocal character, assuming different names, and wandering over the world with 
different pretences" (447). None of these names, however, or these pretences, yield St. 
Leon what he most craves-fame, honour, and both public and moral approbation. Indeed, 
his "equivocal" character has granted him nothing but dishonour, infamy, and 
persecution. 
It is therefore ironic that the "equivocal" nature of his existence proves to be both 
his tragic flaw and his saving grace. St. Leon's "equivocal" character is rooted in a 
childhood mis-education emphasizing the "public" at the expense of the private self, and 
his consequent need for public validation renders him particularly vulnerable to the 
seductive allure of the Philosopher's Stone. However, in an ironic reversal, St. Leon's 
weak sense of identity is perhaps precisely what allows him to "lose" himself in his 
son-to "dive into his soul" and achieve a sort of moral redemption by living vicariously 
through Charles's honourable public image, his moral rectitude, and his domestic 
happiness. 
Through Charles, St. Leon is thus able to construct a new "self'-a more 
honourable and noble self, one who succeeds where St. Leon has failed. It is thus quite 
fitting that the text ends with a salute to the "hero" of the tale-Charles, who in St. Leon's 
estimation is "as near the climax of dignity and virtue as the frailty of our nature will 
admit" (449). While St. Leon seemingly consoles himself with the fact that he is the 
"hero's father" (449), this consolation perhaps functions as nothing more than a red 
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herring: his symbolic communion with Charles has granted him both moral redemption 
and-more significantly-the chance to reinscribe himself back into his own history as the 
true "hero" of his tale. 
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Forming Her to His Mind: Fleetwood's Authorship of Consumption 
In Caleb Williams, Caleb reflects on his authorial project as a form of masochism. 
After recounting a number of his initial misfortunes, the young man admits that 
consolation, through pain, was a primary object in choosing to record his history. "One 
of the motives which induced me to the penning of this narrative was to console myself in 
my insupportable distress," writes Caleb. "I derive a melancholy pleasure from dwelling 
upon the circumstances which imperceptibly paved the way to my ruin" (200). 
Godwin revisits this trope in his 1805 novel, Fleetwood: or, The New Man of 
Feeling. There are a number of moments in that text when Casimir Fleetwood, the 
narrator and autobiographical subject of the narrative, constructs his authorship as a 
masochistic act. "The proper topic of the narrative I am writing is the record of my 
errors," he asserts at the opening of his memoir, and, "to write it, is the act of my 
penitence and humiliation" (59). Later, after narrating a particularly painful section 
detailing the sexual debaucheries of younger days spent at the Parisian court, he contrasts 
the catharsis often achieved by writing with the pain engendered by his own composition: 
There are some kinds of writing in which the mind willingly engages, in 
which, while we hold the pen in our hand, we seem to unburden the 
sentiments of our soul, and our habitual feelings cause us to pour out on 
the paper a prompt and unstudied eloquence. Here, on the contrary, I have 
held myself to my task with difficulty, and often with my utmost effort I 
have scarcely written down a page a day on the ungrateful subject. 
(115-16) 
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Fleetwood's masochistic conception of his authorship is representative of the novel's 
larger discursive concern with pain and the image of the feeling body. Steven Bruhm, for 
example, in one of the few critical readings of the text, has explored the novel's anxious 
concern with the epistemological reliability of guilt that inscribes (or, in terms of the 
thematic development of the novel's plot, fails to inscribe) itself on the feeling body 
through torture. Indeed, a certain theme of sadism also pervades the text, in that 
Fleetwood's position as masochistic writer is also inextricably bound up with the sadistic 
tendencies of his authorship, his narration of his life story. 
Most early reviews of Godwin's novel highlighted the rather vexing nature of a 
narrative in which the misanthropic narrator seems mired in self-absorbed introspection 
which does not, strictly speaking, further the development of the plot. As Sir Walter 
Scott complained in an 1805 review of the novel, it is only in the third volume that 
"something of a regular story commences," the preceding two volumes consisting of little 
more than "laboured extravagance of sentiment [...] attached to [] ordinary occurrences" 
(Graham 259). Although autobiography, by definition, is preoccupied with the narration 
of the self, Fleetwood's memoirs seem to display an almost pathological self-absorption. 
In his subtitle to the novel, Godwin calls Fleetwood the "New Man of Feeling," and 
sensibility, as we will see, is central to the narcissism that comes to inform his character. 
Rousseau may have regarded the solitude and isolation of country life as fundamental to 
the development of Emile as the ideal "natural" man, but Godwin seems to offer in this 
novel a cautionary tale depicting the dangers of excessive solitude in youth. 
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Indeed, social isolation is the foundation for Fleetwood's childhood "mis-
education." Secluded from society, and denied the harmonizing benefits of interactions 
with peers, Fleetwood experiences a perversion of the sensibility that so strongly marks 
his character. In chapter one, we saw how Falkland's dangerous brand of inverted 
sensibility led to a moral degeneration in his character that destroyed his potential for 
benevolence. In Fleetwood, we encounter an even more dramatic pattern of inverted 
sensibility, as the protagonist's emotional sensitivity is perverted into a form of feeling at 
odds with the philanthropic vision of sensibility described by Godwin in the Enquirer. 
As we will see, Fleetwood's sensibility ultimately manifests itself in a particular kind of 
self-absorption that alienates him from society and turns him into a misanthrope. 
In particular, this chapter charts how Fleetwood's earliest constructions of 
identity, and the masculine sense of self these constructions helped to consolidate, arose 
out of a destructive authorial impulse that ultimately channelled his larger misanthropic 
tendencies into a more focussed misogyny. Fleetwood's obsessive self-narration-his 
neurotic focus on the development and operation of his own mind and the process of his 
own identity construction-renders everything and everyone in his narrative subordinate to 
the demands of his own subjectivity. As we will soon see, a displacement occurs in 
Fleetwood's psychological development, whereby his youthful imaginative colonization 
of a feminized natural world initiates larger patterns of consumption and control in his 
adult relationships with women. Fleetwood's construction of himself as masochistic 
author, therefore, is ironically appropriate, for the metaphor is both the expression of the 
sadistic tendencies informing the text and a description of the means by which this sadism 
is enacted. 
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"Castles in the Air" 
As the novel's subtitle indicates, Fleetwood is the "New Man of Feeling," an 
appellation that signals Godwin's reliance on, as well as his significant departures from, 
popular eighteenth-century cultural and literary conventions of sensibility. In their 
introduction to the Broadview edition of the novel, Gary Handwerk and A. A. Markley 
describe the text as a "new experiment in fiction" (9), and most critics of the novel, both 
contemporary and modern, have similarly emphasized the anomalous nature of the 
narrative, specifically its radical reformulation of the sentimental tradition. In 1805, the 
Critical Review claimed to be "at a loss to conceive why a man, who turns misanthrope 
from disappointment, who is most savage in jealousy without caring to ascertain the 
cause of it, can be called the New Man of Feeling, unless in absolute contradistinction to 
the old" (Graham 257). Similarly, Scott, in reviewing the novel for the Edinburgh 
Review, rejected Godwin's positioning of his hero as a man of sentiment, asserting that "a 
man who is transported with rage, with despair, with anger, and all the furious impulses 
of passion, upon the most common occurrences of life, is not a man of sentiment, but a 
madman" (Graham 259). "Far from sympathizing with his feelings," argues Scott, "we 
are only surprised at his having the liberty of indulging them beyond the precincts of 
Bedlam" (Graham 259). 
For B.J. Tysdahl, the novel's originality lies in this radical rejection of the 
conventional association between sensibility and philanthropy. As Tysdahl points out, 
the traditional eighteenth-century novel of sensibility assumed the benevolent nature of 
humanity and put forth a psychological model in which the cultivation of heightened 
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emotional response fosters increased moral virtue and philanthropic feeling in a suffering 
protagonist (100-06). Sensibility was thus constructed as a process which would make 
one a better person, but, as we see in Fleetwood, this theoretical yoking of emotional 
sensitivity with moral sentiment and behaviour is directly challenged. Indeed, in 
Fleetwood we encounter a man whose heightened emotional awareness renders him a 
self-proclaimed misanthropist ill-suited for both domestic and public life. 
Godwin's depiction of Fleetwood's childhood is influenced by the Rousseauvian 
celebration of country life as the ideal space for the development of "natural" man. In 
Emile, Rousseau praises the salutary benefits of rural life by highlighting the degenerate 
effects of urban existence. Man's physical health, argues the philosopher, suffers from 
the unsanitary conditions of the city, and his moral and spiritual development are 
similarly threatened by the overcrowding and corruption inherent in this urban space: 
Men are not made to be crowded together in ant-hills, but scattered over 
the earth to till it. The more they are massed together, the more corrupt 
they become. Disease and vice are the sure results of over-crowded cities. 
Of all creatures man is least fitted to live in herds. Huddled together like 
sheep, men would very soon die. Man's breath is fatal to his fellows. This 
is literally as well as figuratively true. {Emile 26) 
"Men are devoured by our towns," Rousseau continues. "In a few generations the race 
dies out or becomes degenerate; it needs renewal, and it is always renewed from the 
country" {Emile 26). 
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While rural space functions as an antidote to the"foul air of [] crowded cities" 
(Emile 26), it is preferable that natural man should never need this antidote at all, that he 
should, from the outset, be raised and educated far from the corrupting influences of the 
city. In the country, the child can be isolated from the enslaving effects of social 
institutions, and can be taught complete independence and self-sufficiency. He will be 
"educated for himself alone," asserts Rousseau (Emile 9), and will "live[] for himself as 
a complete "unit," a self-sustaining "whole" (Emile 7). Rousseau's emphasis on the 
complete self-sufficiency of natural man implies a certain estrangement from society and 
peers. Of course, Emile is not completely isolated: he has a tutor who plays the dual roles 
of teacher and friend, and his education is structured around a series of encounters with 
other individuals, like the gardener (Emile 62-63) and the conjuror (Emile 135-38). In 
reality, however, Emile's "friendship" with the tutor is not the experience of genuine 
social interaction with a true peer, but a scripted series of highly structured pedagogical 
exchanges, and his few encounters with other individuals are similarly controlled by the 
tutor. As Rousseau himself admits, the rough and simple nature of a village environment 
is ideal for the education of natural man, as the tutor "will have much more control over 
the things he wishes to show the child" (Emile 59). In Rousseau's educational model, 
therefore, the student is socially isolated through geography as well as pedagogy: the 
geographic seclusion of country life allows the tutor to control his student's interactions 
to the point that unmediated social exchange becomes all but impossible. 
For Godwin, the lessons learned from early, regular, and unscripted social 
exchanges with peers are central to the development of morality and virtue. As he argued 
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in the Enquirer, virtue and benevolent behaviour are the direct results of a developed 
sensibility that allows one to sympathize with another's emotional responses and alleviate 
his or her suffering through "the practice of minute attentions" (Enquirer 334). It is thus 
imperative that children, from a young age, be exposed to a wide range of social 
interactions with their peers in order to stimulate the development of the feelings. "The 
social affections are the chief awakeners of man," he argues in the Enquirer (56-57), 
declaring a preference for public education over private on the basis that "there can be 
little true society, where the disparity of disposition is so great as between a boy and his 
preceptor" (Enquirer 58). 
Children who are raised in isolation-or, alternatively, children who interact almost 
exclusively with a Rousseauvian tutor-are therefore denied opportunities to forge the peer 
relationships necessary for successful socialization. "There is no motive more powerful 
in its operations upon the human mind, than that which originates in sympathy," declares 
Godwin. 
A child must labour under peculiar disadvantages, who is turned loose 
among a multitude of other children, and left to make his way as he can, 
with no one strongly to interest himself about his joys or his sorrows, and 
no one eminently concerned as to whether he makes any improvement or 
not. In this unanimating situation, alone in the midst of a crowd, there is 
great danger that he should become sullen and selfish. Knowing nothing 
of his species, but from the austerity of discipline or the shock of 
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contention, he must be expected to acquire a desperate sort of firmness and 
inflexibility. (Enquirer 56) 
This description evokes the situation of Fleetwood, who enters Oxford a "sullen 
and selfish" youth after sixteen years of social and geographic isolation. As I argued in 
chapter one, Godwin was quite uneasy with certain aspects of Rousseau's pedagogical 
model, and we find in Fleetwood an example of his resistance. For Rousseau, childhood 
isolation was fundamental to the development of natural man. In this novel, however, 
Godwin offers a story that foregrounds the central role early socialization plays in the 
development of the virtuous and benevolent subject. Raised in the rugged seclusion of 
North Wales, Fleetwood has no peers and few social connections, and he enters Oxford 
with no real experience of fellowship. His father is very loving, "tender and indulgent" 
(53), but ultimately unavailable to his son on any deep emotional level. Existing in a 
perpetual state of grief for Fleetwood's dead mother, and "enamoured of solitude," his 
father passes "whole days and nights in study and contemplation" (53). In this respect, he 
is like Audley Mandeville, the paternal figure in Godwin's next novel, who also 
withdraws socially and emotionally after experiencing the death of the woman he loves. 
Fleetwood takes after his father in being a "lover of the sublime and romantic 
features of nature" (53), and his immersion in these scenes cultivates an emotional 
energy, an intellectual and psychological "wildness" (53), that signals his heightened 
capacity for emotional response. Fleetwood's sensibility is perverted, however, by the 
isolation of his childhood. As I argued in chapter one, Godwin firmly places sensibility 
within a social context. In Godwin's terms, sensibility is best understood as an 
interactive relationship between the feeling subject and society-an emotional response 
activated by exposure to another's feelings, a response which then manifests itself in 
outward extensions of philanthropic behaviour (Enquirer 326-36). Sensibility, therefore, 
is only healthy for the subject (and beneficial for society) as long as it functions within 
this milieu of interpersonal exchange; sensibility without this element of social 
reciprocity devolves into a perverted form of feeling. With no companions save an 
emotionally absent father, a dog, and a tutor for whom he feels little affection and no 
respect, Fleetwood cannot engage in the reciprocity needed to properly shape his 
developing sensibility. The proper pattern of sensibility is therefore reversed: 
Fleetwood's acute feeling is channeled inwards and feeds his "intellectual luxuries" (59). 
In Fleetwood, sensibility renders the feeling subject negligent, rather than 
solicitous, of others, and turns him into a misanthrope with little potential for 
benevolence. In the opening pages of the novel, Fleetwood acknowledges that his self-
absorption may lead the reader to deem him "insensible to the miseries of man" (59). On 
the contrary, argues Fleetwood, "nothing was squalid, loathsome, and disgusting in my 
eyes, where it was possible for me to useful" (59). Indeed, he dwells in great length on 
his "beneficence and charities" (59). "I never shrank from the presence of calamity," he 
declares. "From the liberal allowance with which my father supplied me, I relieved its 
wants" (59). He insists that "the generous sympathy which animated [his] charitable 
deeds was pure" (60). "In every act of benevolence," argues Fleetwood, "it was the love 
of another, and not of myself, that prompted my deed" (60). "I experienced a 
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disinterested joy in human relief and human happiness, independently of the question 
whether I had been concerned in producing it," he writes (60). 
These sentiments are undercut, however, through the very language in which 
Fleetwood disavows his self-interest. There is a "very subtle and complicated association 
in human feelings," he admits (60). The prospect of his own "gratification" may not 
initially motivate him to perform philanthropic acts, but the later recollection of those acts 
certainly gratifies his vanity: "When the season of retrospect arrived, I exulted in my own 
benevolence, from the divine consciousness that, while I had been most busily engaged in 
the task, my own gratification was forgotten" (60). Moreover, he recognizes that these 
later "exultations" shaped his future behaviour: "There is no doubt [] that the honourable 
character I exhibited on these occasions prompted me the more joyfully to seek their 
repetition. Humanity and self-complacency were distinct causes of my beneficence; but 
the latter was not less powerful than the former in nourishing it into a habit" (60). 
Although he refers to it as an "execrable doctrine," he nevertheless acknowledges the 
principle that "our best actions are only more subtle methods by which self-love seeks its 
gratification" (60). 
This principle of self-love informs Fleetwood's dramatic rescue of William, the 
shepherd boy who almost drowns trying to save a lamb that had fallen off a mountain 
ridge into the river. While self-interest does not ostensibly influence Fleetwood's 
behaviour during the scene of the rescue, it takes centre stage immediately after. The 
peasants are "tumultuous in their expressions of gratitude, " Fleetwood tells the reader 
(63), which motivates him to regard himself as their "patron and a preserver" (64). 
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Indeed, the happiness of the peasant family delights him not for its own sake, but for its 
effect on his vanity: "When I observed the degree of content which prevailed among 
them, when I witnessed the effusions of their honest esteem and affection, my heart 
whispered me, "This would not have existed but for me!'" (64). We see here Fleetwood's 
self-absorbed preoccupation with his own self-image. His heightened emotional response 
may drive him to perform courageous or benevolent acts, but these acts are only valued 
for their ability to sustain Fleetwood's narcissism. 
In her examination of the novel, Mona Scheuermann considers the causal 
relationship between sensibility, misanthropy, and Fleetwood's formative years. Like a 
number of other critics, Scheuermann contends that Fleetwood offers a portrait of a man 
irrevocably flawed by a childhood spent in excessive solitude, a childhood that "lacked a 
pattern of adequate social intercourse" ("Study of Mind" 19). As a result of this social 
deprivation, argues Scheuermann, Fleetwood is mired in a narcissistic self-absorption that 
renders him literally unable to make "a total human connection with anyone" ("Study of 
Mind" 20). Fleetwood's misanthropy, however, stems not so much from an inability to 
make interpersonal connections with the social world around him; rather, it is the precise 
nature of the connections that he must, inevitably, forge with his social environment that 
produces such conflict and dissatisfaction with humanity. More precisely, it is 
Fleetwood's initial response to a physically absent, yet all too real, social world, coupled 
with his imaginative consumption of a natural environment all too present in its 
overpowering sublimity, that formulates his primal connection with society and humanity. 
In the first chapter of the novel, Fleetwood meditates in great detail on the natural 
beauty and sublime scenery of the childhood home he shares with his aged father in 
Merionethshire, North Wales. This extended description significantly associates the 
sublimity of Merionethshire with creative freedom and increased sensibility. As 
Fleetwood recalls, 
I had few companions. The very situation which gave us a full enjoyment 
of the beauties of nature, inevitably narrowed both the extent and variety 
of our intercourse with our own species. My earliest years were spent 
among mountains and precipices, amidst the roaring of the ocean and the 
dashing of waterfalls. A constant familiarity with these objects gave a 
wildness to my ideas, and an uncommon seriousness to my temper. (53) 
The rugged beauty of North Wales cultivates a similar mental "wildness" in young 
Fleetwood, as well as a keen awareness of the imaginative inspiration offered by the 
"grand and savage objects around [him]" (55). Fleetwood's sensitivity to the world of 
nature evokes the poetic philosophy of William Wordsworth, and a number of critics 
have pointed to Wordsworth's influence on the man who was once a great influence on 
Wordsworth. 
For Gary Kelly, Fleetwood's Wordsworthian undertones situate the novel within 
the larger framework of Romantic ideology, and demonstrate Godwin's "transition to 
Romanticism" from his earlier jacobinism (English Jacobin Novel 240). Tysdahl goes 
even further in foregrounding the extent of the poet's influence on the text, arguing that 
the first chapters of Fleetwood read like a "prose imitation of Wordsworth" (117). 
Indeed, like Fleetwood, the Wordsworthian Poet is a "New Man of Feeling": "All good 
poetry," argued Wordsworth in his 1802 Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, "is the 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings," and good poetry-"to which any value can be 
attached"-can only be produced by a man "possessed of more than usual organic 
sensibility" (358). Good poetry, for Wordsworth, is thus the product of a unique 
sensibility coupled with the process of reflection-the Poet must have "thought long and 
deeply" about his emotional responses (358). "Our continued influxes of feeling are 
modified and directed by our thoughts," argues Wordsworth, "which are indeed the 
representation of all our past feelings" (358). 
With his acute emotional sensitivity and unique capacity for feeling, Fleetwood is 
very much this Wordsworthian Man of Feeling. Like Wordsworth's Poet, Fleetwood's 
imagination is both inspired by, and structured around, his interactions with the natural 
world, a paradigm that situates the novel within a discursive framework associating 
Romanticism with nature. As Anne K. Mellor has argued, however, the representation of 
nature in what she calls "canonical" Romantic texts (those major poetic works by the 
"Big Six"-William Blake, Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lord Byron, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, and John Keats) "masks a sexual politics" that is both misogynist and 
self-serving: 
Nature is usually gendered feminine by these six Romantic poets who 
adopt the traditional cultural metaphors of Mother Earth, Dame Nature, 
Lady Bountiful. But by identifying nature as the external objective world 
which the self-conscious subject must penetrate, possess and interpret 
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[...] these poets often go further than previous poets in denying to Nature 
her own authority. (21) 
By feminizing nature, canonical Romanticism thus constructs a model of subjectivity 
organized around the binary opposition of I and Other, where the male subject can only 
assert his power at the expense of a female Other so often troped as Nature. This 
paradigm, argues Mellor, forms the basis of an ideological discourse she calls "masculine 
Romanticism." As we shall see later, Fleetwood, as a Wordsworthian Man of Feeling, is 
implicated in a discourse of "masculine Romanticism" that strives to control, possess, and 
appropriate feminine nature. 
Although Fleetwood will eventually construct himself as the master of his natural 
surroundings, his appreciation of the Welsh scenery around his childhood home is 
initially troubled by the psychological anxieties that aesthetic theory associates with the 
sublime. As Edmund Burke theorized in his 1757 treatise, A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, one's experience of the sublime is, 
by necessity, bound up with the sensations of "pain" and "danger" and "operates in a 
manner analogous to terror" (58): "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of 
pain and danger; that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about 
terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; 
that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling" 
(58). Furthermore, this "terror" is a direct result of the fear that is engendered when one 
encounters the unfamiliar and the unknown, the "obscure": "To make any thing very 
terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any 
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danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes" 
(Philosophical Enquiry 99). Implicit in Burke's theorization of the sublime is the 
potential threat to the self aroused when one encounters such terror-inspiring sublimity. 
Such scenes "excite the ideas of pain and danger," and we consequently fear for our 
safety in the midst of such natural spaces. 
For Burke, this threat of self-annihilation is defused by the subject's eventual 
appreciation of the sublime as the ultimate manifestation of divine power. For Immanuel 
Kant, the fear of the sublime is also defused, but not through recognizing the existence of 
the deity responsible for such scenes, as in the Burkean sublime. Rather, Kant places the 
sublime in a subordinate position to the perceiving subject, who possesses the power to 
intellectually transcend the sublime scenes of nature. For Kant, the power of the sublime 
is ultimately located in the "forces of the soul": 
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piled 
up the vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all 
their violence of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track 
[...] and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in 
comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all 
the more attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, because 
they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover 
within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to 
measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature. (91) 
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The "immeasurableness of nature" may throw into relief "our own limitation" in 
comparison, but, through the intellectual act of reflecting on nature in all its sublimity, we 
discover "in our rational faculty" the potential greatness of our own minds, a greatness 
that gives us a "pre-eminence over nature even in its immeasurability" (Kant 91-92). 
Nature is thus subordinate to the powers of the rational mind: "In this way," argues Kant, 
"external nature is not aesthetically judged as sublime in so far as it arouses fear, but 
rather because it summons our power [...] to regard its might [...] as exercising over us 
and our personality no such rude dominion that we should bow down before it" (92). 
Nature is therefore deemed sublime "merely because it elevates the imagination to 
a presentation of those cases in which the mind can come to feel the sublimity of its own 
vocation even over nature" (Kant 92). In Kant's formulation of the sublime, the subject is 
thus transcendent over the natural world. The sublime scenes of nature function only to 
throw into relief the greater sublimity of the human mind, a sublimity which is reflected 
in the intellectual processes of the rational man who engages in thoughtful consideration 
of the scenes around him. As we shall see, the Kantian sublime-with its emphasis on the 
subject's intellectual mastery of the external world-forms the basis of Fleetwood's 
specific engagements with nature. 
Empowered by the sublimity of his childhood scenes, as well as anxiously aware 
of the overpowering grandeur of such scenes that threatens to extinguish the viewer's 
sense of existential significance, Fleetwood strives to exert a dominance over the scenery 
surrounding his North Wales home. He seeks to absorb such scenery in its entirety and 
endeavours to see even beyond its scope-in short, he tries to overcome the terror brought 
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on by the Burkean notion of the obscure sublime: "There was no neighbouring summit 
that I did not ascend, anxious to see what mountains, valleys, rivers, and cities were 
placed beyond," Fleetwood declares (54). Fleetwood differs from his aged father, who is 
also a "lover of nature" (54), but one who passively witnesses it from a respectful 
distance and within established boundaries: his father, Fleetwood tells the reader, 
typically "mounted his horse for a tranquil excursion, and kept along the road which was 
sedulously formed for the use of travellers" (54-55). In contrast, Fleetwood engages with 
the natural world much more actively. In fact, Fleetwood's encounters with nature take 
on the tone of aggressive colonization evocative of male sexual violence enacted on a 
passive and virginal female environment: he "descended the most frightful declivities, 
and often penetrated into recesses which had perhaps never before felt the presence of a 
human creature" (55). 
Fleetwood's developing sense of manhood is staged against, and simultaneously 
cultivated by, the background of nature, but he juxtaposes his aggressive exploits with his 
passive appreciation of his sublime surroundings: "Every thing, however, was not 
exertion in the rambles I describe. I loitered by the side of the river, and drank in at 
leisure the beauties that surrounded me" (55). Fleetwood constructs his pleasure in 
passive terms-he "loitered" and enjoyed nature "at leisure"-but such passivity is undercut 
by the consumptive metaphor he employs-he "drank in [...] the beauties that 
surrounded" him. Again, Fleetwood's language of consumption evokes the 
Wordsworthian Man of Feeling, who also experiences nature as something to be 
consumed, an object to be incorporated within his own subjectivity. Indeed, 
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Wordsworth's "spots of time" are envisioned in the Five-Book Prelude of 1804 as 
moments which provide "nourishment" for the Poet's later imaginative acts: 
There are in our existence spots of time 
Which with distinct pre-eminence retain 
A fructifying virtue, whence, depressed 
By trivial occupations and the round 
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
(Especially the imaginative power) 
Are nourished and invisibly repaired. (5. 280-86) 
Likewise, in the later Thirteen-Book Prelude of 1806-07, Wordsworth continues this 
construction of the Poet as a man "feeding" on the "outward face" of nature: 
A meditation rose in me that night 
Upon the lonely Mountain when the scene 
Had pass'd away, and it appear'd to me 
The perfect image of a mighty Mind, 
Of one that feeds upon infinity. (13.66-70) 
Mellor has pointed out that Wordsworth, in his role as a "masculine" Romanticist, 
ultimately "replaces (feminine) nature with the productions of the (masculine) 
imagination" (20). The "mighty Mind" of the Man of Feeling, in other words, "feeds" 
upon the sublime offerings of Nature to the point that they are incorporated within the 
151 
very subjectivity of the Poet. The "domination" of a female nature, a domination 
manifested in the "awful and sublime," is thus defused and appropriated by the "mighty 
Mind" of the masculine subject who recasts nature's sublimity as only the "Counterpart" 
of the "glorious faculty" of his own "higher mind[]" (Prelude [1806-07] 13.76-90). 
Fleetwood develops his own consumptive metaphors, describing how his 
complete consumption of nature's external scenes allowed him to internalize such scenes 
to the point that he becomes insensible to them: 
I acquired a habit of being absent in mind from the scene which was 
before my senses. I devoured at first with greedy appetite the objects 
which presented themselves; but by perseverance they faded on my eye 
and my ear, and I sunk into a sweet insensibility to the impressions of 
external nature. The state thus produced was sometimes that which we 
perhaps most exactly understand by the term reverie, when the mind has 
neither action nor distinct ideas, but is swallowed up in a living death, 
which, at the same time that it is indolent and inert, is not destitute of a 
certain voluptuousness. (56) 
While Fleetwood is initially quite stimulated by the natural scenes around him, 
"devour[ing]" them with a "greedy appetite," his hunger is eventually satiated, and he 
becomes "insensible" to an "external nature" which has been drained of its usefulness. 
Fleetwood uses the oxymoron "living death" to describe the paradox of his psychological 
position: his sensual awareness of the external scenes of nature is dead, his mind having 
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consumed all that it needs of this outward stimuli to sustain its "reverie," but this 
"reverie" is very much alive in its "certain voluptuousness." 
"At other seasons," Fleetwood tells the reader, the "certain voluptuousness" of 
this "reverie" gives way to something "more busy" and "definite" (56), that is, a 
propensity for narrative, an inclination towards the creative act that results in a visionary 
authorship of his own fate and identity. "I was engaged in imaginary scenes, constructed 
visionary plans, and found all nature subservient to my command. I had a wife or 
children, was the occupier of palaces, or the ruler of nations" (56). (Note, also, how the 
domestic and quotidian in Fleetwood's "imaginary scenes"-the "wife or children" he 
obtains-fall easily into the same imaginative space as larger and more recognizably 
despotic forms of worldly power. These youthful fantasies foreshadow the gravity of 
Fleetwood's later domestic tyranny.) This imaginative narration, this construction of 
"visionary plans," gives Fleetwood an inflated sense of his own importance in the world. 
More significantly, however, Fleetwood comes away from these reveries with an illusory 
perception of authorial control over the narrative course of his life.1 
One might argue that this sense of authorial control existed for Fleetwood solely 
within the mind of the imagination and did not therefore influence the way in which he 
engaged with the reality of his actual life. After all, he characterizes his youthful 
imaginative indulgence as nothing more than the "idle and frivolous task of constructing 
castles in the air" (56). The more reflective Fleetwood, however, describes this task as 
one which was "frequently indulged" and which planted the seeds of his later 
misanthropy. "The tendency," he argues, 
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of this species of dreaming, when frequently indulged, is to inspire a 
certain propensity to despotism, and to render him who admits it impatient 
of opposition, and prepared to feel every cross accident, as a usurpation 
upon his rights, and a blot upon his greatness. This effect of my early 
habits I fully experienced, and it determined the colour of my riper years. 
(56) 
As Fleetwood describes it, "this species of dreaming" involves engaging with the natural 
world in all of its sublime grandeur and systematically consuming, "drinking in"or 
"devouring," the external scenes of nature so as to contain the sublime and render it, in 
Burkean terms, less "obscure." This consumption of nature manifests itself in a 
conscious withdrawal from the "scene which was before [his] senses" (56), a process 
whereby the scenes of nature are not only interiorized by Fleetwood, but also become 
dispensable and unnecessary to his "reverie." In this sense, the oxymoron "living 
death"-which Fleetwood employs to describe the paradox of his mind while 
contemplating nature-applies just as well to the natural scenes which bring about this 
conflicting state in young Fleetwood. As Fleetwood asserts, nature is always there, alive, 
"before [his] senses" (56); indeed, it is only "by perseverance" that he can will it to 
"fade" on his "eye" and "ear" (56). But his insensibility to those natural scenes around 
him renders them dead to him, and this metaphorical "death" of nature is, significantly, 
necessary for Fleetwood's imaginative "reverie." 
Fleetwood does not explicitly associate this indulgence in "reverie" with the 
narrative myth-making-the construction of "castles in the air"-that occurs "at other 
seasons." However, the close association of both psychological processes suggests an 
interdependent relationship between the consumption of natural space and Fleetwood's 
subsequent narrative indulgence. For the adult Fleetwood, such narrative indulgence 
cultivated "a propensity to despotism" in his young self that left him unable to weather 
the inevitable conflicts and disappointments that inform social and domestic life. 
However, we can see how this "propensity" first takes its root in a consumptive 
relationship with the natural world which then manifests itself in Fleetwood's despotic 
construction of "castles in the air." 
In Fleetwood's perception, his colonization of nature is complete: contained 
through psychological internalization, the potentially unruly elements of the natural 
sublime (unruly, as Burke would argue, in their "obscurity" or unknowability) are 
brought under Fleetwood's controlling hand, which then writes its own narratives on the 
sensory impressions provided him. In his narrative visions, Fleetwood had gloried in the 
fact that he "found all nature subservient to [his] command" (56), and this sense of 
subservience ultimately also applies to Fleetwood's conception of the very real world of 
nature around him. Indeed, it is precisely his sense of nature's submissive "voice" that 
contributes to his appreciation of its worth. Within nature, he declares, "life is every 
where," and the "solitary wanderer" experiences the breath of the cattle and the speech of 
the clouds, winds, and streams (54). But that "speech," however, is "dumb," the 
"eloquence" of nature "unobtrusive," and the "gentle" and "kindly violence" of the 
natural world can only subdue the willing (54). 
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It is thus significant that Fleetwood places "cities" at the very end of the list of 
entities he visually absorbs when scaling a "neighbouring summit" (54), for it speaks to 
the distinct contrast between his conception of nature and his emotional response to urban 
space, society, and social life: 
I gazed upon the populous haunts of men as objects that pleasingly 
diversified my landscape; but without the desire to behold them in nearer 
view. I had a presentiment that the crowded streets and the noisy mart 
contained larger materials for constituting my pain than pleasure. The 
jarring sensations of men, their loud contentions, their gross pursuits, their 
crafty delusions, their boisterous mirth, were objects which, even in idea, 
my mind shrunk from with horror. (54) 
Burke had theorized that "absolute and entire solitude, that is, the total and perpetual 
exclusion from all society, is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived" 
(Philosophical Enquiry 68), but Fleetwood reverses this contention and equates pain with 
the world of sociality. He shrinks from any direct experience with social space, 
experience that would require him to engage with the carnivalesque nature of human 
interaction-its unpredictability, mutability, and deception. Where the natural world is 
"subservient to [his] command," the social world, as Fleetwood seems all too aware, will 
not extend the same favour. Instead, the city, which comes to symbolize the society and 
sociality from which Fleetwood is gratefully excluded at this point in his life, is the site of 
overwhelming sensory impressions and stimuli that refuse to be contained or internalized 
into submission. 
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Given this anxious response to social space, we can see how Fleetwood's 
misanthropy thus stems from an early realization that he will not be able to exert the same 
autonomous control over the social world of human interaction as he ostensibly does over 
the natural environment he deems so passively receptive to his desires. Through nature, 
Fleetwood is able to shape his own subjectivity and indulge in an inflated sense of his 
worth and importance as a human being. Nature provides him with the raw materials to 
consolidate a sense of his own masculine identity in a context of almost complete 
isolation from his peers. Society-the "populous haunts of men" which horrify Fleetwood 
with their noise, deception, and insistent desires contrary to his own-threatens both his 
inflated ego and ultimately his very sense of self. 
Indeed, his apostrophe against the city is immediately followed by a simile that 
emphasizes Fleetwood's frailty in the face of conflict: "I was a spoiled child. I had been 
little used to contradiction, and felt like a tender flower of the garden, which the blast of 
the east wind nips, and impresses with the tokens of a sure decay" (54). Significantly, 
urban space, contemplated from afar, affords Fleetwood a mild pleasure, perhaps because 
the imaginative vision of the "noisy mart" throws into relief his perceived control of his 
natural surroundings. The juxtaposition of urban life with nature is significant, for it 
foreshadows the impending moment when Fleetwood will be compelled to enter into 
social space. Upon entering Oxford, Fleetwood is, at sixteen years of age, forced to 
engage with a social world that is not, like nature, "subservient to [his] command." 
Fleetwood must confront a world that exists outside of his autonomous control, a world 
informed by a capricious unpredictability. He initially seems lost in a world that refuses 
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to offer itself up for easy consumption and narrative inscription. However, as we will 
soon see, Fleetwood's response to sociality is not to submit to the realities of this social 
world but, rather, to impose similar strategies of narrative control on the interpersonal 
connections he must inevitably forge. 
"The Theatre of Life" 
From the outset, Fleetwood's entrance into social space at Oxford signals his loss 
of agency. Although he "felt no strong propensity" to university, he "submitted to it" as a 
thing against which "it would be useless to object" (65). As Fleetwood rightly realizes, 
university life represents the impending encroachment of outside social forces on the 
relatively self-contained and self-directed nature of his childhood world. In North Wales, 
he had "lived in an ideal world of [his] own creation;" but this world had only been 
achieved by actively cultivating an identity as "solitary savage" and "shunning" a social 
world perceived as incapable of affording any kind of imaginative satisfaction (70). 
Indeed, Fleetwood employs a familiar Romantic analogy to describe the psychological 
tenor of a mind solely in tune with the forces of nature: "The strings of my mind, so to 
express it, were tuned to too delicate and sensitive a pitch: it was an Eolian harp, upon 
which the winds of heaven might 'discourse excellent music'; but the touch of a human 
hand could draw from it nothing but discord and dissonance" (70). 
As we have witnessed, however, this salubrious union of mind and nature was in 
reality more evocative of a colonizing relationship in which the young Fleetwood 
consumes the sublime scenes around him as the raw materials upon which he can 
narratively inscribe his own desires. Accordingly, once he is ensconced within university 
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life at Oxford, it is precisely these sublime images of a youthfully fertile and feminized 
nature he misses most-the "grand, the romantic, the pregnant, the surprising, and the 
stupendous, as they display themselves in North Wales" (70). In contrast, the natural 
scenery of Oxfordshire, personified by Fleetwood as an image of feminine senility-a 
"toothless and palsied beldame" (70)-inspires only contempt in young Fleetwood for its 
failure to offer up similar imaginative possibilities for shaping his inner visions of 
identity. Furthermore, Fleetwood's ego suffers from the intrusion of autonomous beings 
into his carefully manipulated and protected world: the "gownmen"-with their erratic 
elbows, speech, and laughter-threaten both the tranquillity and the very stability of 
Fleetwood's mind (71). "The cherished visions of my former years were broken and 
scattered in a thousand fragments," laments Fleetwood in an image that conveys a keen 
sense of shattered subjectivity (71). 
Faced with the destruction of an identity built upon "cherished visions" that were 
now, in the face of society and its intrusions, "scattered in a thousand fragments," 
Fleetwood "surrenders" to the social discourse and codes of the "gownmen" (71). He 
characterizes his response in passive terms, but his strategy of "surrender" functions as an 
active process of clinical and conscious observation. Like a scientist or anthropologist 
surveying the behaviour of creatures unknown to him, Fleetwood adopts a pose of 
studious contemplation towards the behaviour of his university peers: 
I was prompted to observe these animals, so different from any that had 
been before presented to my view, to study their motives, their 
propensities, and their tempers, the passions of their souls, and the 
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occupations of their intellect. To do this effectually, it was necessary that I 
should become familiar with many, and intimate with a few. I entered 
myself an associate of their midnight orgies, and selected one young 
person for a friend, who kindly undertook my introduction into the world. 
(72) 
Note how Fleetwood dehumanizes his fellow students as "animals," constructing them as 
subservient objects "presented to [his] view" and offered up for his scientific observation 
and ultimate consumption. Ironically, Fleetwood soon finds upon extensive observation 
that his "new associates were of the same species as [himself]" (72), a realization that 
significantly underscores his lack of awareness, at least initially, regarding the 
interdependent nature of observation and emulation. He confesses surprise at "how soon 
[he] became like to the persons [he] had so lately wondered at and despised" (72), but his 
subsequent remarks reveal the way in which he has consciously entered into, internalized, 
and then performed the behavioural codes structuring social interaction at Oxford. "I hid 
the qualms and apprehensiveness of my nature under a 'swashing and a martial outside'" 
(73). 
In his youth, Fleetwood had defused the threatening potential of the natural 
scenery around him through a process of internalization and ultimate consumption. At 
Oxford, he structures his social interactions around a similar consumptive model: through 
clinical observation and then through a performative emulation, he internalizes the 
behavioural codes of his social peers. Fleetwood is thus able to defuse his social 
anxiety-the "qualms and apprehensiveness" engendered through social interaction-by 
160 
consciously absorbing those around him and putting into service the performative 
narratives structuring his social interactions with others. It is especially significant that 
Fleetwood describes the nature of his social performativity at Oxford through a reference 
to Shakespeare's As You Like It, for the "swashing and a martial outside" with which 
Fleetwood cloaks himself speaks to the way in which such performativity offers up rich 
opportunities for the narrative self-fashioning of identity. Fleetwood's youthful 
consumption of nature proved fertile ground for the visionary myth-making that would 
both consolidate his identity and plant the seeds of his future misanthropy. Likewise, his 
consumptive approach to social life-where the performative narratives underpinning 
social intercourse are available for conscious manipulation-allows him to author his own 
vision of identity-to piece together the "thousand fragments" of an ego shattered by the 
intrusion of social forces beyond his control. 
Fleetwood's education in these matters continues once he leaves Oxford and 
embarks on his first "real world" experiences while on the Parisian leg of his Grand Tour. 
His observations on the Paris court are underpinned by a series of theatrical metaphors 
that emphasize the inherent performance of identity in a community predicated on 
inconstancy and the mutability of desire. Upon arriving in Paris, Fleetwood connects 
with an old acquaintance from Oxford, Sir Charles Gleed, who is remembered by 
Fleetwood as both a social and intellectual failure. Noting that Sir Charles Gleed "was 
received upon a very different footing at Paris, from what he had been at Oxford" (95), 
Fleetwood asserts that the very artifice of polite society seems to provide both the 
opportunity and the means by which a dullard like Gleed assumes an "artificial character" 
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and "plays his part upon the theatre of life" (95). In Paris, Gleed "performed the part of 
an elegant" (95), and his performance of this role in the "theatre" of the Parisian court 
admits of no discrepancy between the assumed role of elegant and his prior, more 
"authentic," position as failed wit. Indeed, as Fleetwood tells his readers, Gleed was 
"generally admitted as a man of breeding, amusement, and fashion. No one laughed at, 
and almost every one courted him" (95). 
Fleetwood's commentary on Gleed's improved social fortunes attests to his 
growing perception of how public identity and internal subjectivity are contingent on a 
proper manipulation of one's social world. Gleed is so successful in his role of elegant, 
plays that part so well-"to the great satisfaction of the spectators" (95)-precisely because 
the successful performance of that role has invested him with the inner confidence 
necessary for the performance. Social life in Paris provides one with various 
narratives-perhaps "scripts," if one wants to pursue the theatrical metaphor-that must be 
first recognized and then mastered; properly mastered, these narratives will then allow 
one to craft a public persona specific to one's desires and needs, a persona that will 
consequently impose an order and structure on the incoherence of internal experience. 
Parisian society thus lends itself particularly well to the sort of authorial mapping 
of the external world that Fleetwood has come to rely on since his introduction to social 
life at Oxford. In Paris, Fleetwood encounters a society structured around the 
conventional roles associated with the debauchery of court life, and his time in the capital 
thus provides him with rich opportunities for the precise sort of self-fashioning that had 
informed his imaginative life since childhood. Moreover, the very codified nature of 
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these social narratives-their explicit expression in easily recognizable 
stereotypes-provides Fleetwood with the illusion of easy mastery over a mutable and 
unpredictable social environment. He thus determines, almost casually, to adopt the 
licentious and fashionable role of "un homme a bonnes fortunes''' (100). Fleetwood 
significantly connects his inclination towards this sort of social performance with his 
earlier Oxford tendencies to "model" himself in accordance with the external pressures of 
peer approval: "driven from a sort of necessity to live upon the applauses of others" (99) 
and adopt an "artificial personage, formed after a wretched and contemptible model" (73), 
he "carried" the "habit" from Oxford into Parisian life. 
Fleetwood's Parisian performance seems to differ from his earlier Oxford one, 
however, in the sense of personal empowerment it seems to engender. Unlike the latter 
performance, which stemmed from apprehension and fear of "ridicule" (73), and was the 
result of "necessity" rather than choice, Fleetwood's adoption of the un homme a bonnes 
fortunes role is informed by an agency that speaks to a greater sense of confidence in how 
one may master the social world around him: "I soon made my choice, and determined 
that I also would be un homme a bonnes fortunes" (100). Indeed, Fleetwood's 
meditation on the improved social fortunes of Sir Charles Gleed attests to the potentially 
generative way in which even a dullard like Gleed, within a Parisian context, can 
successfully negotiate narratives of identity. 
In choosing to become un homme a bonnes fortunes-and in consciously 
structuring his social intercourse through the conventions of this subject 
position-Fleetwood thus participates in one of numerous narratives on offer for 
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consumption. For Fleetwood, this narrative seems to carry within it the promise of 
ultimate authorial control over his social experience; it will return him to that prelapsarian 
"world of [his] own creation" (29) where he found "all nature subservient to [his] 
command" (19). The imaginative consumption of Fleetwood's youth had been blighted 
by a university experience that initiated him into the realities of an external world beyond 
the reach of his imaginative desire. In Paris, however, we see Fleetwood attempting to 
tame his social environment in much the same way as he had consumed the natural 
scenery of his boyhood home. Through the conscious performance of identity, and the 
necessary manipulations of social experience that such performance requires, Fleetwood 
enjoys the illusion of authorial control over his life. Such control is always an illusion, 
however, and underestimates the autonomous nature of personal relationships that resist 
our attempts to shape them according to our narrative expectations or desires. 
Nevertheless, for Fleetwood, the possibility of asserting the same sort of authorial agency 
over his adult existence as he had over the "cherished visions" of his youth proves too 
tempting to resist. He subsequently embarks on a performance of identity that requires 
him to overpower the autonomy of the characters who people his chosen narratives. 
We see this most compellingly in Fleetwood's relationships with the two women 
he encounters during his pursuit of the un homme a bonnes fortunes role. Elton Edward 
Smith and Esther Greenwell Smith have commented on the narrative "oddity" of these 
two affairs, in that they are recounted by Fleetwood "without employing a single word of 
dialogue" (102). As we will see, however, this omission is symptomatic of Fleetwood's 
larger effacement of the voice and autonomy of his female love object. Significantly, 
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Fleetwood's chosen persona is fundamentally structured around the staging of desire 
between the sexes, and such a choice strikingly underscores the specifically misogynistic 
tenor of Fleetwood's misanthropic consumption of those around him.2 Handwerk and 
Markley have rightly recognized that "it is particularly toward women that Fleetwood 
directs the venom that he feels for human frailties" (Introduction to Fleetwood 21)? 
We can, moreover, read these "human frailties" in more precise terms-as 
women's refusal of passive inscription within Fleetwood's narrative self-fashioning. The 
clearest example of this occurs with Fleetwood's first Parisian mistress, the Marchioness, 
a beautiful yet cruelly manipulative woman, who was, as Fleetwood terms her, a "finished 
coquette" (100). Fleetwood begins his description of the Marchioness by highlighting her 
capricious control over her seemingly endless succession of lovers. While such a 
characterization of his chosen love object suggests an independence of character not 
easily tamed, Fleetwood initially portrays their relationship in terms strongly suggestive 
of his ultimate control over her body and mind. 
In colonizing the natural landscape of his youth-in "descending] the most 
frightful declivities, and often penetrating] into recesses which had perhaps never before 
felt the presence of a human creature" (55)-Fleetwood had couched his "conquest" of 
nature in decidedly sexualized language. In the description he gives of his first sexual 
encounter with the Marchioness, he similarly yokes the bucolic scenes of nature to images 
of sexual possession. "I might delineate," writes Fleetwood, "the ravishing sweetness of 
the weather on the day which first gave me possession of her person, the delightful 
excursion we made on the water, the elegantly furnished cottage that received us" (101). 
165 
Fleetwood cuts his narrative delineation of this scene short on the grounds of modesty: he 
"write[s] no book that shall tend to nourish the pruriency of the debauched, or that shall 
excite one painful emotion, one instant of debate, in the bosom of the virtuous and the 
chaste" (102). Despite its brevity, however, the scene nevertheless displays Fleetwood's 
authorial scripting of a narrative that relies upon the pliant submission of the woman who 
offers up "possession of her person" on both a sexual and literary level. 
The defining characteristic of the Marchioness, however, is the "customary 
wildness" of her inconstant behaviour and affection (103). As such, the submissive 
posture she occasionally assumes (if one credits Fleetwood's scripting of such scenes) 
only serves to foreground her adept manipulation of the ritualized narratives underpinning 
desire and seduction within the Parisian court. Indeed, the Marchioness asserts an 
unpredictable autonomy even as she seemingly fulfills Fleetwood's desires: as Fleetwood 
laments, she "tormented me with her flights and uncertainty, both before and after the 
completing my wishes. In the first of these periods I thought myself ten times at the 
summit of my desires, when again I was, in the most unexpected manner, baffled and 
thrown back by her caprices and frolics" (102). Paradoxically, the emotional turbulence 
engendered by the Marchioness's inconstancy only serves to bind him more strongly to 
her in an almost manic attempt to possess her in body and mind. It is, in particular, a 
psychological colonization of the Marchioness which he seems to desire most, for he 
laments that her mind, which "greatly resembled in its constitution the sleek and slippery 
form of the eel" (102), continually evades his attempts to contain it. "It was never at rest, 
and, when I thought I possessed it most securely, it escaped me with the rapidity of 
lightning. No strength could detain it; no stratagem could hold it; no sobriety and 
seriousness of expostulation could fix it to any consistency of system" (102-03). 
Fleetwood's first romantic entanglement is thus structured around his failure to 
consume a love object that insistently eludes his control. Moreover, it is precisely the 
futility of this pursuit that feeds Fleetwood's obsessive quest to possess the Marchioness. 
As he admits, 
one thing that contributed, perhaps more than all the rest, to make this 
woman of so much importance to me, was the perpetual occupation she 
afforded to my thoughts. Abroad or at home, in company or alone, she for 
ever engaged my attention, and kept my soul in a tumult, sometimes, 
though rarely, of pleasure, frequently of apprehension, alarm, jealousy, 
displeasure, and condemnation. (105). 
Significantly, the Marchioness's value for Fleetwood lies primarily in the stimulus she 
provides for his intellectual processes-she is "food" for the mind, so to speaik. In this 
sense, his emotional connection with the Marchioness echoes his childhood relationship 
with nature in that excessive emotional response is productive of an intellectual fertility 
predicated on the consumptive internalization of that which inspires his sensibility. But, 
where nature had lain "subservient" to his intellectual demands, the Marchioness, as the 
"sleek and glossy coated eel" (110), denies Fleetwood a sense of physical ownership over 
her body (as evident in her infidelity) and, perhaps more frustratingly for Fleetwood, 
knowledge and control over the psychological workings of her mind. Quite simply, the 
Marchioness is better at the game of performance than Fleetwood, subtly manipulating 
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him through a continuous series of affected and stylized exchanges that underscore the 
utter failure of Fleetwood's desperate attempts to colonize her mind and shape her desires 
and behaviour. 
From the Marchioness, Fleetwood moves easily into another adulterous 
relationship that logically seeks to address the failures of the first. Responding to 
heartache as "people of fashion in Paris were accustomed to do" (110), he substitutes one 
mistress for another. "Led by a sentiment to which [he] was unconscious" (110), he 
selects the Countess de B-, a choice solely made on his perception of her emotional 
transparency. In contrast to the Marchioness, the Countess 
appeared to be wholly destitute of art [....] Her heart shone in her visage 
[....] Hers was 'the sleepy eye, that spoke the melting soul.' Her cheek 
was full, her skin transparent; the least thought of pleasure or of passion 
suffused her countenance with a blush. The Countess had no atom of the 
restlessness of her rival; a sort of voluptuous indolence continually 
attended her. (110) 
The cold sterility of the Marchioness's stylized affections gives way, in this second 
mistress, to an overabundance of feeling and emotion that satiates Fleetwood's sensual 
and intellectual hunger. In the Countess, there is much for Fleetwood to feast on: the very 
language with which he describes her-the fullness of her cheek, the suffusion of her face 
with the blush of overflowing emotion, the lazy state of her body and mind-speaks to an 
overwhelming sense of voluptuous sensibility that operates without any active restraint on 
her part. Indeed, the tenor of the Countess's mind is completely given over to the forces 
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of emotion, and such languid sensibility is divorced from the more "masculine" 
intellectual capacities. In Fleetwood's eyes, "she appeared born only to feel; to reflect, to 
consider, to anticipate, to receive and concoct the elements of instruction, were offices in 
which she seemed incapable to exist" (110). She "resign[ed] herself wholly to her 
feelings" (110), and her intellect, perhaps consequently, "was of narrow dimensions" 
(111). 
The Countess thus embodies the stereotypical vision of feminine sensibility in the 
extreme, and Fleetwood recognizes that 
according to the ideas many men entertain of the fair sex, it was 
impossible for any one, in the particulars above described, to be more 
exactly qualified for a mistress or a wife, than this fascinating woman. 
There was no danger that she should become the rival of her lover in any 
man-like pursuits, or that with troublesome curiosity she should intrude 
herself into his occupations of learning, of gain, or of ambition. (112) 
Fleetwood is careful to distance himself from such misogynistic preferences ("many men" 
entertain such notions of women, but not necessarily he). However, it is clear that he is 
explicitly drawn to the Countess's emotional availability and implicitly applauds the 
intellectual "indolence" that fosters her transparency of feeling and open demonstrations 
of affection and loyalty. As he asserts, "it was impossible for a tenderer mistress to exist; 
she gave herself up to her lover, and treated him as if he were father, mother, fortune, 
reputation, and life to her, in one. She placed no restraint on herself" (110-11). 
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The Marchioness had seemingly promised Fleetwood "possession of her person," 
only to ultimately deny him such possession on sexual and psychological levels. The 
Countess, however, unlike her predecessor, offers up legitimate access to her inner 
emotional life, surrendering, "up to her lover," her body and mind. Her appeal, for a 
misogynist like Fleetwood so intent on the psychological consumption of the women in 
his life, rests in the transparent and pliant nature of her being. To the extent that the 
corporeal markers of the Countess's excessive sensibility inscribe themselves on her 
body, Fleetwood is able to "see" into the desires of her mind: her "melting soul" is 
simultaneously veiled and revealed through her "sleepy eye." 
In clarifying the intellectual weaknesses of the Countess, Fleetwood had voiced 
his misogyny through a well-worn conflation of femininity with a racist vision of the 
exoticized Eastern "other." Having "all the attributes that belong exclusively to the 
female sex," the Countess in Fleetwood's view "was rather an Asiatic sultana, in her rum 
of mind, than a native of our western world" (112). Such a metaphor, evoking, as it 
necessarily must, the structures of power associated with imperial domination, speaks 
vividly to the colonizing desires of Fleetwood's consumptive tendencies. 
The Countess's emotional availability carries within it the promise of ultimate 
possession. The perception of such possession facilitates on Fleetwood's part the 
processes of narrative inscription, whereby the Countess is "written upon" with the 
narratives of his own desires and identity. Fleetwood's characterization of the Countess 
as an Asiatic sultana is an example of such narrative inscription and a powerful metaphor 
for how the feminine colonized Other is rendered subservient to the dominating desires of 
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an imperial "master."4 Just as the colonizer will inscribe his own desires and narratives 
onto the colonized, we witness Fleetwood engaging in a similar process whereby the 
autonomous identity of the Countess is subsumed within his own construction of self. In 
describing the delicate emotional state of a youth that experienced no "contradiction," 
Fleetwood had compared himself to "a tender flower of the garden, which the blast of the 
east wind nips, and impresses with the tokens of a sure decay" (54). Later in his 
narrative, he significantly delineates the emotional vulnerability of the Countess through 
strikingly similar language: she "reminded her admirer of the most delicate flower of the 
parterre, which the first attack of a rude and chilling blast immediately withers" (111). 
While the Countess's emotions are transparent and her affections excessive, they 
are also, as Fleetwood eventually realizes, indiscriminate and inconstant. As Fleetwood 
admits, the "passion of the Countess was rather an abstract propensity, than the 
preference of an individual" (112). He finds the Countess's inconstancy especially 
frustrating, since her emotional availability had suggested a complete surrender to his 
authorial impulses. She "was so simple, so intelligible, it seemed as if nothing could 
happen with her that might not exactly be foreseen" (114). Faced with yet another 
mistress who escapes his control, Fleetwood dispenses with the Countess and any 
narrative value she may hold in his memoirs. He hints at "long and severe calamities" 
later suffered by the Countess (113), but, as she is no longer part of his story as an 
extension of his being and identity, he is quick to cut short any delineation of her future 
history. "This," he asserts, "does not belong to my history" (113). 
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"Form Her to Your Mind" 
Fleetwood flees Paris in the wake of his disappointing romantic entanglements 
and travels to Switzerland, where he is warmly received by his father's long-time friend, 
Monsieur Ruffigny, and informed of his father's recent death. The two travel to what is 
now Fleetwood's estate in Merionethshire. Fleetwood's narrative is then interrupted by a 
lengthy, ten-chapter interpolation in which Ruffigny details his own history and 
relationship to Fleetwood's family.5 Ruffigny's story brings the reader well into volume 
two of the novel, where Fleetwood and Ruffigny, after spending some months in 
Merionethshire, travel to London. While in London, the two quarrel over what Ruffigny 
feels is Fleetwood's return to the sexual immoralities that had informed his time in Paris, 
a quarrel that results in Fleetwood's redemptive vow to forever renounce the "vices of a 
libertine" (215). 
Although no longer a libertine, Fleetwood ultimately becomes, through further 
"education and travels," a "confirmed misanthropist" (215). The next five chapters of the 
novel detail the further development of Fleetwood's misanthropy in the ensuing stages of 
his life and its blighting effect on his personal happiness. We have seen how Fleetwood's 
compulsive need to map his own identity and desires on to the social world around him 
resulted in two compelling, yet failed, attempts to consume the autonomous subjectivity 
of the women in his life. Fleetwood had often described his internalization of external 
objects and people through the analogy of excessive consumption: as a child, he "drank 
in" and "devoured," "with greedy appetite," the sublime scenes of nature (55-56); as a 
young man in Paris, he envisioned his romantic and sexual relationships in terms of a 
172 
proprietary absorption of women's bodies and minds. Such language evokes a 
metaphoric sense of Fleetwood's misanthropy as a process of (un)successful "feeding" on 
the people and scenes around him. Indeed, this metaphor continually resurfaces in 
Fleetwood's delineation of the "education and travels" leading up to his middle age. 
Failing to find salutary "nourishment" for his misanthropy in a variety of endeavours, he 
constructs himself as a diseased invalid mired in "long fits of languor and depression" 
and desperately in need of "nourishment" (219). 
He joins a "club of authors," hoping to find in the "society of men of genius" the 
"food for thought" of intellectual stimulation (219). However, he finds the stimulation 
afforded by this club to be less than satisfying, declaring, "it might have answered to the 
confections which amuse the palate at the end of a feast, but it could never appease the 
appetite of him, who feels an uneasy and aching void within, and is in hot chase for the 
boon of content" (2230. Travel abroad similarly fails to fill the "uneasy and aching void 
within," as does his career as a Member of Parliament. (This latter endeavour, however, 
in which Fleetwood appealed to the "plain, coarse manners" of his constituents through 
affected imitations of their behaviour, speech, and humour (24), demonstrates that he had 
not lost his old awareness of the conscious self-creation of identity.) Indeed, denied the 
stimuli which might fill the "aching void within," lacking a love object that might feed 
the consumptive turn of his psyche, Fleetwood feels himself the victim of an "ennui 
which devoured [him]" (228). 
The "aching void within" could be filled, Fleetwood feels, by a "friend" who 
could prove that he does not "stand alone in the world" (229). "This must be a friend," 
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writes Fleetwood, "who is to me as another self, who joys in all my joys, and grieves in 
all my sorrows, not with a joy or grief that looks like compliment, not with a sympathy 
that changes into smiles when I am no longer present, though my head continues bent to 
the earth with anguish" (229-30). Fleetwood dismisses the potential sadism implicit in 
his demands for a friend who will suffer as he suffers, claiming that he takes no "pleasure 
in his distress, simply considered" (231). It is clear, however, that Fleetwood's 
conception of true friendship is predicated on the sadistic destruction of another 
creature's independent capacities for emotion and thought. Acting "as another self," this 
friend must, "by long habit," make Fleetwood "a part of himself," taking no pleasure or 
pain in activities or thoughts of which Fleetwood is not also a "partaker" (230). 
"Something of this sort," he asserts, "seemed essential to my happiness" (231). Indeed, it 
is only through the consumption of another's identity through its sympathetic diffusion 
into his own that Fleetwood is able to overcome the debilitating sense of being alone in 
the "active and crowded scene" of social life (232). 
Unable to find this "friend," however, Fleetwood spends more than twenty years 
in this debilitating state of ennui, which "grew upon [him] perpetually from year to year" 
(233). It is only with the entrance of the Macneil family-and, in particular, his future 
wife, Mary-into his life and narrative that Fleetwood finds any relief from this devouring 
ennui. It is significant that Fleetwood's initial desire to make the family's acquaintance 
stems from the narrative interest sparked in him by Mrs. Macneil's scandalous history, a 
history that reads like the plot of a quintessential gothic novel: a foreign villain-"old, 
deformed, avaricious, and profligate" (234), indeed a "repulsive baboon" (235)-seduces 
174 
and then holds captive a young, motherless heroine in a "dismantled and unwholesome" 
Italian castle; she is only rescued when a "true knight errant," a friend of the young 
woman's father, manages to "besiege" the castle and return her to the safe bosom of 
England and family (235).6 Mrs. Macneil's history is particularly amenable to the 
imposition of a gothic narrative model, so it should come as no surprise to the reader that 
Fleetwood, driven by his own compulsive need to script the lives of women, feels "an 
uncommon desire to visit the family" (237). 
From the outset, Fleetwood is driven by a selfish conviction of what the family 
can give him, rather than what his acquaintance may offer the family. In his letter of 
introduction to Macneil, he admits to being '"a very weak creature,'" with '"habits and 
temper'" no doubt in conflict with Macneil's own (241). Nevertheless, he feels justified 
in demanding that he not be refused '"the sight of a happy family!'" (242). '"I ask only 
for a transient and momentary pleasure,'" he writes Macneil. '"I ask only for something 
to stock my memory with-the recollection of which I may call up from time to time, and 
with the image of which I may gild my solitude!'" (242). Macneil and his family only 
matter to Fleetwood to the extent that they can provide him with the raw materials for his 
own psychological processes: they will become '"something to stock [his] memory 
with,'" the '"recollection"' that he may '"call up from time to time,'" perhaps when the 
overpowering ennui threatens to devour him. 
This becomes even more apparent when Fleetwood mentions Mary, his future 
wife and the youngest of Macneil's three daughters. An avid botanist, Mary provides 
Fleetwood with his "chief pleasure" in attending the family (247), and his physical 
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description of her strongly evokes his portrayal of the Countess de B-: 
Mary had a complexion which, in point of fairness and transparency, could 
not be excelled: her blood absolutely spoke in her cheeks; the soft white of 
her hands and neck looked as if they would have melted away beneath 
your touch; her eyes were so animated, and her whole physiognomy so 
sensitive, that it was scarcely possible to believe that a thought could pass 
in her heart, which might not be read in her face. (246) 
Fleetwood had appreciated the Countess for the "heart [that] shone in her visage," and for 
the "transparent" skin that revealed the "blush" of every "pleasure" or "passion" (110). 
Mary is similarly valued by Fleetwood for an emotional transparency that lays open to the 
gaze her every thought and feeling. Indeed, Mary seems so emotionally open and 
amenable to outside forces that Fleetwood almost doubts her material existence: "beneath 
your touch," he marvels, she might "melt[] away" (246). 
Initially drawn to the Macneils by the narrative richness of the family's history, 
Fleetwood later finds in Mary a potential conduit for his own self-creation, the elusive 
"friend" who will, at least in his own mind, sacrifice her autonomous existence and yield 
to his inscribing hand. It is quite ironic that Fleetwood, who is usually the one striving 
for narrative control over his life and the identities of those around him, submits so freely 
to Macneil's overt manipulation of his thoughts and feelings on marriage. Indeed, the 
friendship between the two men quickly organizes itself around Macneil's various 
performative manipulations. "In that vein of playful good-humour which he delighted to 
176 
indulge," Macneil easily assumes the mantle of a Catholic priest or a physician, urging 
Fleetwood towards a '"conversion"' or a '"cure"' (248). 
Accordingly, Fleetwood unburdens himself to Macneil, laying "before him the 
secret grief that preyed upon [his] heart" (247). In response to Fleetwood's confession of 
misanthropy, Macneil adopts the hypothetical role of author, '"composing a little novel or 
tale in illustration,'" in which Fleetwood, as his chosen protagonist, is shipwrecked, 
stranded on a desert island with only one miserable companion, and, as a result of these 
misfortunes, converted to philanthropy (249-50). The ease with which Macneil assumes 
this hypothetical authorial role regarding Fleetwood's history speaks to the very real way 
in which he actively re-shapes the younger man's opinions on marriage and orchestrates 
the future trajectory of his life. 
In advising Fleetwood on what type of woman would be most suitable as his 
bride, Macneil emphasizes the necessity of choosing one who will be easily "formed" by 
her husband: 
'If you marry, Fleetwood, choose a girl whom no disappointments have 
soured, and no misfortunes have bent to the earth [ . . . . ] If your habits are 
somewhat rooted and obstinate, take care that there is no responsive 
stiffness in her to jar and shock with. Let her be all pliancy, 
accommodation, and good humour. Form her to your mind; educate her 
yourself. By thus grafting a young shoot upon your venerable trunk, you 
will obtain, as it were, a new hold upon life. You will be another creature; 
new views, new desires, new thoughts, will rise within you [ . . . . ] you 
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will feel as alert as a boy, and as free and rapid in your conceptions as a 
stripling.' (254). 
The language and imagery here are almost parasitical. Fleetwood should choose a young 
woman '"whom no disappointments have soured"'-essentially, a woman with no history, 
no narrative past that might interfere with Fleetwood's imposition of his own authorial 
desires. He should '"form her to [his] mind,'" author her according to his needs, and she 
should be '"all pliancy,'" open to his every controlling manoeuver and inscriptive gesture. 
He is the '"rooted"' and '"venerable"' trunk, which will be given renewed life and 
energy-transformed into a '"stripling'"-through his consumption of her youth and 
vitality. Macneil's description of the ideal marriage partner strikingly evokes the 
imaginative processes of Fleetwood's youth, in which he satisfied his imaginative needs 
by devouring the autonomous scenes of nature. 
Indeed, Macneil's metaphor, and the advice couched within it, convinces 
Fleetwood precisely because it reinforces the consumptive tendencies of his disposition: 
he needs to shape his love object according to his own desires, he wants to '"form her to 
[his] mind'" and to the narratives he has chosen for her. It is therefore quite fitting that 
Fleetwood imposes on Mary the same figurative analogy used to script the subjectivity of 
both himself and the Countess de B-: Mary's "delight was in flowers," he remarks, "and 
she seemed like one of the beauties of her own parterre, soft, and smooth, and brilliant, 
and fragrant, and unsullied" (259). 
Fleetwood's attraction to the gothic exploitation of Mrs. Macneil's past 
foreshadows his later affinity for Mary as a distressed heroine in need of his protection. 
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After her entire family, en route to Italy, is killed in a shipwreck, Mary becomes a tragic 
figure to Fleetwood. His emotional response, however, is not limited to the pity and 
compassion her plight would naturally seem to inspire in a hopeful suitor and family 
friend. Instead, Fleetwood's attentions derive, at least in part, from a self-interested 
awareness of the pleasures afforded him through her distress. "Her desolate situation 
rendered her tenfold more interesting" to Fleetwood, and he "now felt, for the first time in 
[his] life, how delightful a task it is to console distress, when the sufferer is a woman, 
beautiful and young" (267). 
The sadism suggested by Fleetwood's emotional response to Mary's distress is 
further reinforced by his reaction to the financial ruin she suffers as a result of the 
shipwreck's destruction of the necessary legal documents needed to claim her inheritance. 
Had Mary entered into their marriage a "distinguished heiress," she would have been, 
Fleetwood admits, an "independent being" and, as such, would have "commanded from 
[him] a certain deference and homage" (275). As an heiress, Mary had a claim to a 
"certain submission" from Fleetwood (275), and this submission compromises his ability 
to construct a coherent and confident presentation of himself. In the presence of Mary as 
heiress, his "thoughts moved slow," and his "tongue was apt to falter" (275). As an 
impoverished orphan, however, a "mere pensionary on [his] bounty" (275), she sacrifices 
this claim to independence. 
Fleetwood is quick-even anxious-to declare that he "did not value her less" in her 
"pennyless" state (275), and this is quite true (for he actually values her more), but the 
value he ascribes to Mary stems not from any intrinsic qualities possessed by her as an 
independent being separate from him. Rather, she is valued for the emotional response 
she generates-the feelings of "pity," "tenderness," and "humanity" she arouses in him 
through her dejected, impoverished state (275)-and for the way this emotional response 
invests his mind with imaginative energy and strength: "When I visited her portionless, 
my mind moved freer; I breathed a thinner and more elastic atmosphere; my tongue 
assumed a tone of greater confidence; and, at the same time that I felt for her the deepest 
compassion and the most entire sympathy, my speech became more eloquent, and I 
caught myself talking with the condescension of a superior" (275-76). 
Fleetwood's perverted brand of sensibility contributes to the consolidation of his 
masculine authority, and his masculine authority-and the sense of self cultivated by this 
authority-increases as a direct function of Mary's despair and misfortune. He indulges in 
sympathetic consolation not so much to relieve Mary's anguish, as to satisfy his own 
narcissism. Indeed, as a heroine beset by tragedy (and not unlike her mother in this 
regard), Mary "became every hour more interesting" to him (277). She serves as the 
instrument for his own self-creation, providing him with suitable tragic narratives and 
inspiring the appropriate forms of emotional response. In a long speech to Fleetwood, 
Mary seems to display a subconscious awareness of the consumptive tendencies lurking 
within her future husband. While promising a respectful subservience to his greater years 
and wisdom, she nevertheless declares that he will have, in her, '"a wife, and not a 
passive machine,'" a woman who will not '"sink [her] being and individuality in [his]'" 
(281). The process of consumption, however, has already begun, and it is thus quite 
fitting that the speech ends with Mary's contemplation of her own death by drowning. 
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Fleetwood's burning need for a "friend, who is to me as another self" (229) is 
seemingly satisfied through his marriage to Mary. As we have seen, however, this 
fantasy of ideal companionship is predicated on a sadistic destruction of the autonomous 
existence of the friend who must be subsumed into Fleetwood's own subjective space and 
"formed" to his "mind." Indeed, the process of "forming" Mary to the needs and desires 
of his own mind begins soon after their marriage. Fleetwood spends their first evening as 
a married couple at Merionethshire regaling Mary with the "stories of [his] boyish 
exploits and sorrows" (291). Upon giving her a tour of the house the following day, he is 
overwhelmed with the need to tell her of the "ravishing associations" inspired by a 
particular closet (292). The first conflict of their marriage, in fact, results from Mary's 
appropriation of this closet for herself, an act which not only denies Fleetwood sole 
access to the closet in the future, but also-and perhaps more importantly-preempts his 
self-indulgent narration of past imaginative acts. 
One of the most compelling examples of Fleetwood's overt manipulation of 
Mary's subjectivity occurs during a mutual reading of John Fletcher's 1624 play, A Wife 
for a Month.1 Fleetwood proposes the reading, which he later calls an "experiment" 
(299), and, at least initially, he is quite pleased with the synchronicity of his and Mary's 
intellectual and emotional responses to the play: 
Mary seemed to enter strongly into the feelings of the poet; we admired 
equally the high and generous sentiments of the tragedy [....] She agreed 
with me that no poet of ancient or modern times, as far as her acquaintance 
with them extended, was able, like the writer before us, to paint with all 
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that body and retinue of circumstances which give life to a picture, a free, 
heroic, and gallant spirit. We especially commended his style [...]. 
(298-99; emphases added) 
Fleetwood, convinced of the superiority of his own intellectual tastes, is "delighted" that 
Mary's interpretations of the play so closely correspond to his own, and he seems to take 
an almost irrational satisfaction in the degree of similitude that almost erases the 
boundary between Self and Other and robs them of their respective voices: "We 
communicate with instantaneous flashes, in one glance of the eye, and have no need of 
words" (299). 
However, at a particularly intense point in the play-just as the male protagonist's 
confidence is at its peak8 (surely an allegory for Fleetwood's own righteous self-
assurance)-this similitude is shattered. Fleetwood and Mary are interrupted by a servant 
announcing the arrival of a young peasant boy with whom Mary had previously arranged 
a botanical excursion. In proposing the mutual reading, Fleetwood had consciously 
constructed an experiment whereby he would be able to shape his wife's emotional and 
intellectual responses, "forming" them to the tastes and sentiments of his own mind. The 
interruption-and, more importantly, Mary's enthusiastic response to an intellectual 
endeavour outside of Fleetwood's interests and direct control-destroys the illusion of her 
complete pliancy to his will. Significantly, the play, which had just been constructed by 
Fleetwood as the site of their psychological and emotional union, is now, as Mary tells 
Fleetwood, "'your beloved Fletcher'" (301; emphasis added). Moreover, it is fitting that 
Mary's act of autonomous self-assertion here-namely, her enthusiasm for 
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botany-involves something that Fleetwood cannot, or will not, share: despite receiving 
"with pleasure the early lessons of Mary in botany," he "could never shape [his] mind to 
the office of herborisation," it being "too pinched or minute an object for the tastes [he] 
had formed" (300-01). 
Mary's self-assertion threatens Fleetwood's sense of masculine authority, his 
perception of control over a passive and easily consumable love object. Despite his anger 
at Mary over her perceived disloyalty to him and his interests, he constructs a fantasy of 
reunion in which he promises to '"never have a taste, a pursuit, a gratification, but what is 
hers'" (302). He recoils at the emasculation suggested by this submissive pose, however, 
declaring that he '"cannot be content to be reduced to nothing'": '"I must have an 
existence, a pursuit, a system of my own; and not be a mere puppy, dangling at her heels, 
and taught to fetch and carry, as she gives the word'" (303). 
Fleetwood is of course blind to the irony behind these statements, in that the 
subordinate state he disavows for himself is precisely the one he hoped to impose on 
Mary. Indeed, oblivious to the reality of his "experiment" in reading, he even goes on to 
lecture the reader on the necessity of recognizing the distinct existence of husband and 
wife: "Human beings, who enter into the engagements of domestic life, should remember, 
that however man and wife may in interests and affections be one, yet no interests and 
affections can prevent them from being in many respects distinct" (303). Similarly, in 
insisting that Mary attend an assembly in Barmouth and dance with the "young and 
handsome Mr. Matthews" (307), a man anxiously regarded by Fleetwood as a potential 
rival, he appears to adopt a masochistic pose. "To witness this petty prostitution of my 
wife," he declares, "was a penance I enjoined myself, for having so undeservedly 
mortified her and insulted her" (307). The masochistic turn of Fleetwood's sentiments, 
however, soon reveals itself as a dominating act of surveillance and control, with 
Fleetwood watching over Mary "with the same sleepless anxiety with which a miser 
watches over his treasure" (310). 
The analogy used here is evocative of the way in which Mary is commodified in 
the process of being "formed" to Fleetwood's "mind." As a commodity, as the object 
available for Fleetwood's manipulation and consumption, Mary is in danger of being 
"used up," depleted. Indeed, the physical and mental deterioration of Mary shortly after 
her marriage is highly suggestive of a consumptive process that has depleted her vital 
resources. Two months into their marriage, Fleetwood perceives a "sensible change" in 
Mary's health and behaviour: "Her appetite left her; her nights were sleepless; she 
became languid and meagre" (318). Her "pallid countenance" might betray the odd 
smile, but it was the smile of a "winter's day, when the sun sends forth a sickly beam, 
amidst watery and congregated clouds" (318). What is most significant about Mary's 
degeneration, the symptoms of which connote a tubercular wasting away, is Fleetwood's 
reaction to it. He is convinced that his "unkindness" is to blame for Mary's illness (318), 
and "the more she fell away from the healthful sleekness of a beautiful woman, the more 
she appeared to [him] like an angel" (319). Fleetwood's appreciation of Mary seems to 
increase as a direct function of her weakening body, in much the same way as his regard 
for her had grown upon learning of her orphan status and financial impoverishment. In 
her dejected, languid state, Mary is easily contained by Fleetwood's controlling hand. 
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Ironically, however, her physical illness is also attended by a mental degeneration which 
threatens this containment. Her inexplicable manic shifts in mood are troubling enough 
to Fleetwood (320), but what truly disturbs him are the nocturnal "escapes" she makes 
from the house to converse with the spirits of her dead parents upon the seashore. These 
escapes-in which Mary "steals" from her marriage bed in the dead of night-can perhaps 
be read as physical acts of defiance against the consuming demands of her marriage. 
Realizing the gravity of the situation, Fleetwood plans a removal to Bath, which 
brings about a marked improvement in Mary's physical and psychological health. 
Fleetwood "detests" Bath (325), seeing it as the epitome of everything he cannot control, 
everything he had found threatening since childhood-the mutability and inconstancy of 
fashionable society. For Mary, however, a return to society and social life has a 
powerfully rejuvenating effect, to the point where Fleetwood is consumed by a "sickly 
apprehension" of her reawakened vitality (325). It is perhaps this "sickly" and vulnerable 
state that allows Fleetwood to be so easily manipulated by Gifford, one of two younger 
relatives whom he invites to Bath for an extended visit. Although Gifford's physical 
appearance evokes in Fleetwood a vague sense of uneasiness-"his general physiognomy," 
Fleetwood tells the reader, "conveyed the idea of something obscure and problematical, 
which [he] was at a loss to expound" (337)-Gifford quickly insinuates himself into 
Fleetwood's subjective space. "He talked like an oracle," Fleetwood remarks of Gifford, 
"and I soon learned to place a great dependence upon his judgment" (337). "I could not 
refrain from sometimes opening my soul to him on the most sacred of all subjects," he 
continues (342). 
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Indeed, it is remarkable how quickly Fleetwood is disempowered after first 
meeting Gifford, how easily Gifford is able to rob him of any sense of authority or control 
over his own life. Gifford ultimately assumes the controlling authorial hand in shaping 
events and, more importantly, the interpretations of those events to his own advantage. In 
direct contrast to the way in which Fleetwood has normally scripted and shaped the 
narratives of his own life-and the narratives of the lives of those around him-his 
relationship with Gifford renders him the passive recipient of an authorial scripting not 
his own. Indeed, Fleetwood experiences a disrupted sense of gender, in that he becomes 
mired in the gothic conventions that so attracted him to the female members of the 
Macneil family. He becomes, in a sense, the gothic heroine victimized by a foreign, 
"dark" villain who transgresses his domestic space and attempts to "possess [him] 
entirely" (338). 
After ingratiating himself into Fleetwood's home and confidence, Gifford stages a 
complex series of events and decisive interpretative moments that reveals the novel's 
indebtedness to Shakespeare's Othello on the levels of both theme and plot. Just as Iago 
slowly, but methodically, poisons Othello's mind against the innocent Desdemona over 
the course of several acts, Gifford, as "treacherous adviser" and confidant (341), 
systematically convinces Fleetwood of Mary's adulterous relationship with Kenrick, 
Fleetwood's other young relative and Gifford's own half-brother. Gifford's orchestration 
of the woman's warning near the Upper Rooms at Bath, his recounting of Mary and 
Kenrick's behaviour towards each other at a Bath assembly, and his conspicuous 
placement of the love letter and miniature of Kenrick meant for Louisa Scarborough in 
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Mary's dressing room-all of these machinations speak to the way in which he is able to 
author his own narrative of adultery and disloyalty, a narrative which he then imposes on 
Fleetwood as the "truth." 
Indeed, in recounting the "indiscretions" of Mary and Kenrick at the Bath 
assembly, Gifford (un?)wittingly foregrounds the deceptive power of narrative to forge 
new, and possibly false, versions of reality. After relating his "most artful tale" (351), he 
tells Fleetwood to 
'forget for ever the conversation of this evening! It ought never to have 
existed. You have obliged me to repeat trifles the most frivolous and 
contemptible. I have sacrificed every thing to the faithful performance of 
my task. Yet, in spite of all the pains I have taken to bring these trifles 
down to their true level, I can see that you misconstrue every thing. 
Things make so different a figure, when brought regularly together in a 
narrative, from what they made as they actually passed.' 
(351; emphasis added) 
Gifford's skill is in this precise kind of authorship, this keen ability to bring '"regularly 
together in a narrative'" of adultery events and behaviour that were innocent as '"they 
actually passed.'" And, just as Gifford's skilful authorship is proving successful in 
bringing about its desired aims, Fleetwood's own authorial powers, his ability to shape 
and control the narratives of his own identity and the identities of those around him, are at 
their weakest. Fleetwood falls prey to Gifford's manipulation of narrative and language, 
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his careful deployment of "half words" and "broken sentences" (371), and the 
imaginative sensibility that had proved so intellectually fruitful for Fleetwood as a child is 
now regarded as a deviance that manifests itself in a "sick imagination" that torments him 
in its manic speculations (348). 
Fleetwood is thus rendered helpless in the face of Gifford's superior authorial 
powers. He subsequently becomes the passive site for the inscription of Gifford's own 
lust for wealth and power. Upon witnessing a secret meeting between Maty and Kenrick 
(a meeting carefully orchestrated by Gifford), Fleetwood surrenders unequivocally to the 
younger man's controlling hand. Indeed, on the journey over to the Continent which 
Fleetwood immediately embarks upon after the final breach with his wife, he is almost 
infantilized in his complete physical and emotional dependency on Gifford: 
It is impossible for words to express any thing so wretched as the state of 
my mind during the whole of this journey [ . . . . ] Nothing could be more 
exemplary than the attention I received from Gifford during the whole of 
this period. He never left me; he never ceased from studying the means of 
restoring me; the meanest offices were not repulsive to his kindness and 
zeal. I am certain that, in this extremity, I owed the preservation of my life 
to his care. (382) 
Fleetwood is aware that his psychological breakdown, the "disorder" or "distemper" of 
his "mind" (383-84), has left him dangerously vulnerable, and he even seems, at certain 
points, anxiously aware of the ominous "ascendency" Gifford had claimed over him, an 
"ascendency" he could not seem to "easily shake off' (384). Nevertheless, Fleetwood is 
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so completely contained within Gifford's inscribing hand that he even allows the younger 
man to compose, in Fleetwood's own name, a letter directing his business agent to 
financially disown Mary. To this letter, Fleetwood simply "annexed" his signature (382), 
as if he were no longer a separate and independent being, but a colonized state only 
granted an identity through its relationship to a more significant colonizer. 
By this point, it is clear that Fleetwood has lost any definite sense of his own 
identity, something which speaks to the consumptive nature of his relationship with 
Gifford. As Fleetwood eventually realizes, Gifford had, from the outset of their 
acquaintance, intended to "possess [him] entirely" (338), and this goal could only be 
realized through a consumptive process similar to the one which had characterized 
Fleetwood's relationship with Mary. In this sense, Gifford's forging of Fleetwood's hand 
is simply a synecdoche for the larger displacement of identity that occurs between the two 
men. Indeed, Gifford wants quite literally to replace Fleetwood in the social order by 
assuming the mantle of the Fleetwood name and estate, and this desire necessitates not 
only the colonization of Fleetwood's mind, but the destruction of his very existence. The 
evocative imagery associated with consumption-as both a metaphorical process and a 
physical ailment that robs one of vital energy-returns to haunt Fleetwood's body, just as it 
had marked Mary's: "The distempered activity under which I [had] suffered, was now 
gone," laments Fleetwood. "I became jaundiced, body and soul. My blood loiteringly 
crept through palsied veins" (385). 
It is particularly significant that Gifford controls Fleetwood through the 
interception and destruction of his letters, for it foregrounds the central role that 
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authorship-or, more precisely, failed authorship-plays in Fleetwood's eventual physical 
and mental collapse, the ultimate crisis of self that he experiences. Fleetwood does 
indeed compose letters to Mary and Kenrick, but these are intercepted by Gifford, an act 
which not only keeps Fleetwood ignorant of Gifford's treachery but, perhaps more 
importantly, robs him of any narrative opportunity to shape the events unfolding in his 
life. Fleetwood, accustomed to exercising the authority and power of the author in 
scripting his own life, is now unable to exercise the same sort of authorial agency. While 
he is told by Gifford that his initial frenzied letters to Mary and Kenrick were never 
received (intercepted by Gifford with "apparent propriety" (384)), he is blind to the fact 
that his later letter to Mary, granting her an annuity of a thousand pounds, was similarly 
intercepted (400). Likewise, he is oblivious to the reality that letters from Mary, Kenrick, 
and Lord Scarborough are consistently kept from him (400). 
Scarborough, upon disclosing the true extent of Gifford's treachery, remarks to 
Fleetwood, '"you have been a close prisoner in the keeping of the villain, who was 
proceeding with rapid, yet deliberate steps, to thrust you out from the scene of the world, 
and to reap the inheritance of your estates'" (400-01; emphasis added). Indeed, Gifford's 
modus operandi largely revolves around this process of keeping Fleetwood '"from the 
scene of the world,'" robbing him of the means and opportunity for self-expression and 
communication. In doing so, Gifford keeps Fleetwood not so much from the '"scene of 
the world'" as from the scene of Fleetwood's own world, the scenes most central to his 
life-the dissolution of his marriage, the reality of his wife's distress, the birth of his child, 
the legal use of his name. 
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Fleetwood is rendered impotent in shaping the narratives of his own life. This is 
perhaps most compellingly observed in the adultery prosecution against Mary and 
Kenrick, legal proceedings in which Fleetwood assumes an oddly passive and awkward 
position, resigning the entire matter over to Gifford, who then (mis)informs Fleetwood of 
legal events as they unfold. Fleetwood's latent anxiety regarding the lack of agency and 
control over his life seems to register in the "furious impatience" (383) and "vehement 
emotion" (388) with which he receives any written communication. The literary 
inscriptions of others perhaps signify for Fleetwood their successful authorship, and may 
foreground his own loss of authorial power. 
The crisis of these authorial anxieties occurs with Fleetwood's orchestration of the 
"banquet" celebrating the anniversary of his marriage. In July, Fleetwood is alone in 
Florence, Italy (Gifford being in England), and it is here that he orchestrates an elaborate 
spectacle that functions on both a masochistic and sadistic level. "Resolved to solemnise 
a strange and frantic festival on [his] wedding-day," Fleetwood visits a "celebrated 
modeller in wax" and commissions the construction of life-size wax figures of both Mary 
and Kenrick-Mary from a miniature portrait in Fleetwood's possession and Kenrick from 
a magazine image of a "terrible and monstrous figure of a fiend" (386). He dresses both 
figures in the appropriate attire; constructs a stylized scene, complete with a barrel organ 
for musical entertainment, a cradle, and a chest of child-bed linen; and "caused a supper 
of cold meats to be prepared" (386-87). Fleetwood's construction of the scene is 
remarkable for its careful attention to detail, regardless of the expense incurred. As 
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Fleetwood remarks, "never had madness, in any age or country, so voluptuous a banquet" 
(387). 
Fleetwood is the literal "author" of this scene; it is generated from the imaginative 
energy (insanity) of his mind, and he scripts the tableau in much the same way as he 
would author a dramatic or literary scene-establishing the mood and controlling every 
detail of plot, setting, and character. Indeed, notice how even those details for which 
Fleetwood cannot claim sole creative responsibility are presented in such a way as to 
foreground his agency: "/ caused a supper of cold meats to be prepared" he writes, in an 
awkward mixture of the passive and active voices. Robbed of any real ability to script the 
scenes or narratives of his life, Fleetwood, in his latent frustration and rage over the 
emasculated and impotent position in which he finds himself, resorts to illusion, crafting, 
from the "ground up," a tableau completely within his narrative control. 
Significantly, he attempts to exert narrative power over precisely those people and 
events which he feels have robbed him of his authority. (He is at this point still ignorant 
of Gifford's villainy.) Mary, in particular, had seemed to promise Fleetwood, in her 
emotional transparency and malleable nature, a unique opportunity for exerting his 
narrative authority. Spurred on by Macneil, who encouraged his courtship of Mary by 
implying that she would serve well as the means for his self-rejuvenation, Fleetwood had 
seen in his future wife an easily consumable love object, a woman whose subjectivity 
could be "formed" and shaped in the service of his own self-construction. That Mary had 
failed him in this regard-her supposed infidelity the final proof that Fleetwood had been 
unable to contain her, just as he had been unable to contain his two Parisian mistresses-is 
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particularly traumatic for Fleetwood's sense of masculine authority and self. It is 
therefore not surprising that he directs his most explicit inscriptive manoeuvres towards 
Mary, putting "provisions on her plate" and "invit[ing] her to eat" (387). 
Art imitates life, however; even in this scripted and seemingly controlled scene, 
"Mary" does not stay bound to Fleetwood's narrative hand: 
I looked wildly, and with glassy eyes, all round the room; I gazed at the 
figure of Mary; I thought it was, and it was not, Mary [....] I saw her 
move-if I live, I saw it. She turned her eyes this way and that; she grinned 
and chattered at me. I looked from her to the other figure; that grinned and 
chattered too. Instantly a full and proper madness seized me; I grinned and 
chattered, in turn, to the figures before me. (387). 
Fleetwood's construction of an inanimate Mary had perhaps betrayed his subconscious 
desire for a similarly "inanimate" wife, a wife unable to resist his authorial inscriptions. 
In perceiving that his "Mary" had assumed an animation, a voice, he had not intended to 
grant her, Fleetwood experiences again, on a symbolic level, the trauma of failed 
authorship. This trauma brings about a madness that signifies not just an insanity of 
behaviour, but a clear break in the ego: "I no longer distinctly knew where I was, or could 
distinguish fiction from reality" (387). Fleetwood is no longer even certain of himself at 
the very basic level of existence: "I saw her move-if I live, I saw it" (387). Of course, he 
did not see it, and this then begs the reader to ponder the central question of Fleetwood's 
identity in this scene. 
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What this scene specifically foregrounds is Fleetwood's lack of identity-the 
absence at the center of his being-and the complex process of consumption that he has 
engaged in since childhood. As a solitary child raised amidst the feminized scenes of 
nature, Fleetwood had constructed "castles in the air" out of the raw materials presented 
by the natural scenery around him, consuming them (and, metaphorically at least, 
destroying them) in his attempts to script visionary fantasies around which he built a 
sense of masculine identity. In his later years in Paris, and in his marriage to Mary, his 
consumptive power over a feminized nature was displaced onto a series of female love 
objects who seemingly promised him the same sort of consumptive power and authorial 
control he had exercised over the natural scenes of his youth. The monstrous, 
"chattering" Mary in this scene is thus symptomatic of Fleetwood's failed consumption of 
not just Mary, but all the women in his life. In his rage and despair, Fleetwood's 
metaphorical attempts at consumption and destruction become quite literal: 
I dashed the organ into a thousand fragments. I rent the child-bed linen, 
and tore it with my teeth. I dragged the clothes which Mary had worn, 
from off the figure that represented her, and rent them into long strips and 
shreds. I struck the figures vehemently with the chairs and other furniture 
of the room, till they were broken to pieces. (388). 
Tysdahl points to the "cannibalism" of this scene (124), and Bruhm has 
highlighted how the sadistic intention of this spectacle (i.e., Fleetwood's desire to torture 
"Mary" through verbal and physical abuse) devolves into an exercise in masochism, 
whereby Fleetwood becomes the tortured body. "In effect," argues Bruhm, "the effigy 
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scene enacts a series of bodily displacements: the effigy first replaces Mary's body, but it 
is then replaced by Fleetwood's. He becomes the victim in the torture he has executed" 
(37). Despite this movement from torturer to victim, however, a strong sense of sadism 
still pervades the scene, for this displacement of bodies and identities is predicated on the 
necessary effacement of Mary's subjectivity (specifically, her very real identity as victim 
in both this enacted scene and in the reality of the novel) to make room for Fleetwood's. 
Indeed, as Bruhm recognizes, Fleetwood "claims a monopoly of victimization that centers 
pain solely in himself and obliterates the object with which he had claimed an identity" 
(37). 
It is with this scene of crisis that the novel seems to come full circle. From this 
point, Fleetwood's memoirs proceed quickly and terminate rather abruptly: we are told of 
Gifford's failed assassination attempt (391-92); are apprized, via Scarborough's extended 
autobiographical narration, of the detailed course of Gifford's treachery (396-416); and 
hear of Gifford's execution, as well as Kenrick and Louisa Scarborough's marriage (423); 
all in the final pages of the novel. Incredibly, we also hear of the unlikely reunion of 
Fleetwood and Mary (421-23). In general, the condensed and rather abrupt conclusion to 
the text proves unsatisfying for the reader, especially with regard to Fleetwood and 
Mary's reconciliation. We may feel optimistic about Fleetwood's ultimate redemptive 
potential; he has after all suffered in both a physical and psychological sense, and has 
weathered, apparently successfully, the trauma of the banquet scene and the crisis of self 
which it represented. The text, however, is conspicuously silent on this issue. While we 
hear of Scarborough as the "most indulgent of grandsires" (423), we hear nothing of the 
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later state of Fleetwood and Mary's marriage, nor of Fleetwood's later conduct as a 
husband. Fleetwood may have been punished, but we do not hear whether he has been 
reformed. 
Indeed, if we return to some of Fleetwood's initial remarks at the beginning of his 
memoir-which of course, in the chronology of his life, occur after his reconciliation with 
Mary-we may have cause to doubt any reformation on his part. Fleetwood's narrative is 
a retrospective one, and as such should theoretically be informed by the moral instruction 
he has received as a result of the events he will recount in the ensuing chapters of the text. 
What we find, however, is a Fleetwood who adopts a certain authorial position, namely, 
that of the masochist who scripts his authorship as the "act of [his] penitence and 
humiliation" (59). Fleetwood is the suffering body here, and thus enacts the same 
manoeuver at the beginning of his memoirs (when he should, theoretically, be "older" and 
"wiser" for the misfortunes he has endured, cured of his consumptive and destructive 
tendencies towards women and in particular Mary) as he did during the crisis of the 
banquet scene. As we saw in that scene, Fleetwood's construction of himself as victim 
was contingent upon a necessary destruction of Mary's subjectivity, a "displacement," as 
Bruhm calls it, of both Mary's body and her position as victim in the torturer-victim 
relationship. Ironically, a similar destruction or displacement occurs at the beginning of 
Fleetwood's memoirs, in that he scripts himself as the suffering body, the tortured author 
who inflicts pain on himself with every word he writes. In appropriating this role for 
himself, Fleetwood assumes Mary's position in the text, displacing her as the true victim 
of the narrative, the one who truly suffers at his hands. Fleetwood's cycle of 
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consumption is therefore complete, as Mary has indeed been "formed" to his body, mind, 
and narrative. 
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Chained Up in Silence: Language and Alienation in Mandeville 
When Godwin published Mandeville in 1817, it had been twelve years since his 
last novel, Fleetwood, and it would be thirteen years before he would publish another.1 
For B.J. Tysdahl, "Mandeville is the last novel from [Godwin's] pen which impresses by 
its originality" (126). Indeed, the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley praised the novel as one of 
the philosopher's finest. While St. Leon and Fleetwood were "moulded, with somewhat 
inferior distinctness," Mandeville possessed for Shelley an "interest and importance" that 
put it on a par with what he considered as Godwin's greatest novelistic achievement, 
Caleb Williams (Graham 357-58). The interest of the tale, writes Shelley in a review of 
the novel published in Leigh Hunt's Examiner, catches the reader like a "wind which 
tears up the deepest waters of the ocean of mind" (Graham 359).2 For George Woodcock, 
Mandeville is remarkable if only for the impressive sense of melancholy thait informs the 
book, a "misanthropic gloom whose consistency of texture is alone impressive" ("Notes" 
693). 
Indeed, we have in Mandeville, as in Fleetwood, another tormented misanthrope, a 
man who, by virtue of an unhealthy childhood and later social disappointments in 
adolescence, is unable to join in satisfying fellowship with family and friends. As both 
Marion Omar Farouk and Pamela Clemit have pointed out, the novel engages with the 
related issues of history and psychology and how both combine to produce character. As 
Clemit has argued, partly what makes Mandeville so compelling is the way in which the 
novel registers Godwin's increasing skepticism of the powers of rationality to overcome 
the damaging effects of historical and political trauma {Godwinian Novel 96). In 
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Mandeville, our protagonist's misanthropy rapidly takes the form of an unsettling 
emotional instability which eventually devolves into madness, a delusional paranoia that, 
in Mona Scheuermann's terms, produces the "most total alienation possible" ("Study of 
Mind" 29). As Scheuermann argues, Mandeville's alienation "is the most complete of 
any of the Godwin heroes, and in the course of his study of the roots and the effects of 
that alienation Godwin created his most intensely focused psychological study" ("Study 
of Mind" 29). 
The roots of Mandeville's alienation, as I shall argue in this chapter, stem from a 
childhood mis-education grounded in isolation, melancholy, and paranoia. In particular, 
the melancholic tone of formative years spent in the company of an emotionally broken 
and reclusive uncle, coupled with the overwhelming effects of a tutor's hyperbolic 
lessons in humility, operate to produce an environment that requires constant repression 
on Mandeville's part. This repression takes its most notable form in the suppression of 
voice that ultimately consumes Mandeville's character. Having internalized the 
imperatives of silence and restraint from childhood, Mandeville is incapable of 
effectively articulating his inner thoughts and emotions. His linguistic failures 
consequently marginalize him, and his melancholic isolation ultimately degenerates into 
paranoid madness as he moves into adulthood. Mandeville's only connective link to 
humanity rests in his relationship with his sister, Henrietta, for it is only through her that 
he is able to compensate for his own failures in self expression. As madness takes greater 
hold over his mind, however, Mandeville demands of Henrietta a complete identification, 
an effacement of self that displaces his own subjectivity and speaks to larger crises in 
identity. 
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"Shut Up in the Chamber of My Thoughts" 
In Political Justice, Godwin argues that character is purely a product of external 
social influences, that forces of society-history, politics, culture, and education-operate 
on the young mind to shape temperament, intellectual aptitude, and morality. "The 
actions and dispositions of mankind," asserts Godwin, "are the offspring of circumstances 
and events, and not of any original determination that they bring into the world" (Vol. 1 
of Political Justice 26). This theory of development is clearly evident in Mandeville. For 
Farouk, the important role that history plays in the development of the novel's plot and 
themes supports Godwin's vision of character as something shaped by historical events: 
"Godwin saw that human character originates in the special features of the times, and 
created his novel Mandeville according to this conception" (111). Similarly, Clemit 
argues that, in the novel, Godwin "explores the disabling pressures of politics and history 
on the individual psyche" (Godwinian Novel 101). Indeed, in detailing the events of the 
seventeenth-century English Civil War, Mandeville is much more of an overtly historical 
and political text than Godwin's previous novel, Fleetwood, which, while set in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, is largely a domestic tale that never engages with the larger 
contours of history with any detailed specificity. In this sense, Mandeville marks a return 
to Godwin's earlier experiment in historical fiction, the 1799 St. Leon. 
Despite the obvious historical context for the novel, however, Mandeville is, like 
St. Leon and Fleetwood before it, essentially a psychological study, a tale of one man's 
emotional and intellectual disintegration, a disintegration that occurs against a backdrop 
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of larger historical and cultural traumas. Significantly, the seeds for this later 
disintegration are planted in childhood, in that Mandeville's formative years are spent in a 
melancholic environment that blights his development into a well-adjusted adult. We 
may recall Godwin's argument, in Volume 1 ofPoliticalJustice, that "the characters of 
men are determined in all their most essential circumstances by education" (45); we 
might also remember his conception of education as a "comprehensive" process involving 
"every incident that produces an idea in the mind, and can give birth to a train of 
reflections" (Vol. 1 of Political Justice 45). 
In both St. Leon and Fleetwood, we saw how the heroes' later misanthropy 
developed from specific failures in this early childhood "education." Likewise, in 
Mandeville, the narrator draws a direct connection between the educative experiences of 
his youthful years and the later tragedy of his life, between the melancholic isolation and 
paranoia of his childhood and his ultimate development into a misanthrope who will 
never find peace or happiness in society or social relationships. In the 1797 Enquirer, 
Godwin emphasized the desirability of early socialization in the education of the young. 
"The child should early begin in some degree to live in the world, that is, with his 
species," argues Godwin (143). "He should neither be bred apart from the world, nor in 
ignorance of what passes in the world. He should be accustomed to behold the faces of 
his species. He should know something of the story of their passions, their singularities, 
and even of their vices" (143). In both Fleetwood and Mandeville, Godwin constructs 
protagonists who are denied this type of early interaction with society, protagonists who 
are " bred apart from the world" and are ignorant of their "species," and both novels 
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ultimately document the deleterious effects of such social isolation on the developing 
psyche. 
There are numerous echoes of Fleetwood in the opening chapters of Mandeville, 
and it is significant that both protagonists experience many of the same blighting 
environmental influences. Orphaned at the age of three, his parents massacred in the 
1641 Irish rebellion, Mandeville is escorted by a Protestant clergyman named Hilkiah 
Bradford from Dublin to his uncle's estate in Derbyshire, England. He spends the next 
nine years at the estate, in the guardianship of his uncle and under the tutelage of 
Bradford. Like Fleetwood's ancestral home in Merionethshire, North Wales, Mandeville 
House is isolated both geographically and socially. Nestled atop a rocky cliff overlooking 
the English Channel, the estate is surrounded by an "immense extent of barren heath," 
with the "nearest market-town [] at a distance of seventeen miles" (24). Visitors are 
virtually unknown at the House, and Mandeville's only social connections, like 
Fleetwood's, are with a tutor, whose companionship proves dissatisfying and even 
deleterious to his pupil, and a distant, withdrawn paternal figure. Although his 
withdrawal and dejection are by far the more extreme, Audley Mandeville is similar to 
Fleetwood's father in that he has been broken by a loss in love, and his heartbreak, 
combined with a sensible nature that exacerbated-and was exacerbated by-the effects of 
this heartbreak, renders him unfit as either a mentor or a companion to his young nephew. 
For both Fleetwood and Mandeville, the social and geographical isolation of their 
childhood years, combined, perhaps, with a latent sensibility that renders them acutely 
sensitive to the effects and possibilities of this isolation, lends itself to solitary habits and 
aimless wanderings which are productive of reverie and mythmaking. Ironically, the 
"barren heath" is fertile ground for both "rambles" and fantasy. For "a wanderer like 
myself," Mandeville declares, "the desolateness of the scene, the wideness of its extent, 
and even the monotonous uniformity of its character, favourable to meditation and 
endless reverie, did not fail to be the source to me of many cherished and darling 
sensations" (24-25). He is "formed [] early to a habit of reverie" in which "visionary 
scenes" occupy his thoughts (44). An appreciation of the solitary natural spaces around 
them inspires, in both Fleetwood and Mandeville, an urge towards creativity. Unlike 
Fleetwood, however, whose immersion within the sublime grandeur of his childhood 
home cultivates a visionary mythmaking that gives him a sense of omnipotence and 
authority, Mandeville is prone to a melancholic reverie structured around visions of pain, 
despair, and death. 
As we saw in the last chapter, Fleetwood found much to inspire the self in the 
rugged beauty and awesome sublimity of North Wales. For Mandeville, however, the 
geographical and social isolation of his uncle's estate is compounded by the "eminently 
insalubrious" state of its natural surroundings (24). As Mandeville tells the reader, 
"various portions of bog and marshy ground" surround Mandeville House, enveloping its 
inhabitants in an "endless succession of vapours" or "steams" which threaten "healthful 
animal life" (24). The distinction between day and night, moreover, is confounded by 
"thick fogs and mists" that plunge the estate and its occupants into a perpetual and no 
doubt metaphorical darkness (24). Throughout Mandeville's description of the House, 
there is the strong implication that the "insalubrious" influence of the landscape and its 
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climate cultivates both physical and mental disease in those who dwell in or near it. 
Perhaps consequently, then, Mandeville is drawn to the melancholic images of the 
violence and sterility of nature: 
I delighted to wander; but I was not delighted with objects of cheerfulness. 
It will already have been seen, that I was not often intruded on with 
impressions of this sort. I loved a hazy day, better than a sunshiny one. 
My organs of vision, or the march of my spirits, gave me an aversion to 
whatever was dazzling and gaudy. I loved to listen to the pattering of the 
rain, the roaring of the waves, and the pelting of the storm. There was I 
know not what in the sight of a bare and sullen heath, that afforded me a 
much more cherished pleasure, than I could ever find in the view of the 
most exuberant fertility, or the richest and most vivid parterre. (44) 
Repulsed by beauty and fertility, and attracted to nature in its violent and sterile 
manifestations, Mandeville indulges in the construction of "visionary scenes"-images 
and narratives that take shape in his mind while roaming over this "bare and sullen 
heath." Inspired by the dour and hostile scenes of nature, Mandeville finds himself 
nursing violent fantasies, reveries which form themselves into "a perpetual succession of 
flight, and pursuit, and anguish, and murder" (44). Moreover, the melancholic turn of 
Mandeville's imagination is further inflamed by the horrific barbarities he witnessed as a 
child during the Irish rebellion: "I recollected distinctly the expiring bodies I had beheld 
along the roadside in my flight, some perishing with hunger and cold, and some writhing 
under the mortal wounds and tortures that had been inflicted by their pursuers" (44). 
Significantly, the aggressive tone of Mandeville's imaginative reveries also 
extends to himself. Whereas Fleetwood's visionary indulgences produced delusions of 
grandeur, in which he was "the occupier of palaces, or the ruler of nations" (56), 
Mandeville's fantasies are of a more complex and ominous sort, combining both an 
inflated perception of his own importance with a crippling sense of persecution. 
"Habitually a visionary," he is mired in fantasies in which he is victimized by forces 
attempting to thwart his inherent greatness: 
My visions were frequently of long duration, and branched out into a 
variety of minuter circumstances. In these moods I sometimes imagined 
that every thing around me was engaged in a conspiracy against me, that I 
was, in some inexplicable way, a captive, whose genuine destiny led to 
higher things, but who, like some imperial bird that had fallen into the 
hands of lawless men, was shorn of its strongest feathers. (60) 
For Fleetwood, consuming the natural scenes around him produced the sense of a 
visionary authorship that allowed him to carve out a sense of omnipotence against the 
passive backdrop of an acquiescent nature. Imaginative daydreaming amounted to 
building "castles in the air" (56), a metaphor that attests to the grandeur of Fleetwood's 
visions and the powerful position he plays in them. In these childhood visions, 
Fleetwood retains the controlling hand and wields considerable power, and this sense of 
authority ultimately comes to pervade his perception of his place in the "real" world as 
well. One may recall, for example, the way in which he projects himself as a confident 
and fearless colonizer of the North Wales landscape, "descend[ing] the most frightful 
declivities, and often penetrating] into recesses which had perhaps never before felt the 
presence of a human creature" (55). 
In contrast, Mandeville is haunted by a perception of himself as helpless victim, 
incapable of exerting any control over his being or destiny. He does of course, like 
Fleetwood, suffer from a destructive overabundance of pride. "I was proud," Mandeville 
declares, "because I felt my value. I was conscious that my intellectual powers far 
exceeded the common rate [....] I felt an inborn pride of soul, which, like an 
insurmountable barrier, seemed to cut me off for ever from every thing mean, despicable 
and little" (56). This overweening pride, moreover, lends itself to an ambitious 
anticipation of his future achievements: "I felt like one for whom adventures and great 
events are reserved, and, as we find it expressed in the common story-books, who is 'to 
go out, and seek his fortune'" (53). Despite such expressions of pride and optimism, 
however, Mandeville's visionary meditations suggest that more compelling fears of 
persecution dominate his inner world. Adventures, great events, and fortune may be 
reserved for him, but these rewards are by no means guaranteed, as larger conspiracies 
will organize themselves against him, robbing him of these advantages and rendering him 
as passive and helpless as a bird in the hands of "lawless men." It is perhaps his acute 
belief in the persecutory forces which he perceives to be aligned against him that draws 
him so strongly to the narratives and images in the Book of Martyrs. With its gruesome 
descriptions of torture, the text has an indelible effect on his young mind, cultivating the 
fearful and suspicious turn of his temperament and "producing] a strange confusion and 
horror in [his] modes of thinking" (52). 
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Mandeville's paranoia ultimately produces the paradox of a young boy who, while 
feeling inherently superior in his intellectual and moral capacities, is nevertheless prone 
to anxious insecurities regarding his ability to withstand the forces of life, or to exert any 
power or authority over his own being. Like Fleetwood, Mandeville is a wanderer, an 
explorer of nature; unlike Fleetwood, however, who had the authoritative confidence to 
"descend[] the most frightful declivities" and "penetrat[e]" obscure "recesses" (55), 
Mandeville, in his wanderings across the "barren heath," resigns himself to the "firm 
ground," "avoiding as carefully as might be a deviation into quaggy and treacherous 
paths" (24). Whereas Fleetwood courted challenge and potential danger, Mandeville 
shrinks from these things, a response suggestive of his insecure need to protect himself 
(and his ego) from challenges he feels unable to withstand. What is present in Fleetwood, 
but strikingly absent in Mandeville, is the colonizing instinct that is often both a symptom 
of, as well as a contributor to, a defined sense of one's authoritative selfhood. Ironically, 
for all his pride, Mandeville is not confident, but fearful of persecution, suspicious of 
others, and anxiously aware of his helpless and victimized state, at least as he perceives it. 
For a number of critics of the novel, Mandeville's later misanthropy and madness 
are inextricably bound up with this early failure in establishing a confident selfhood. For 
Tysdahl, Mandeville's schizophrenic misanthropy is the result of the "weak hold" he has 
on his "identity;" this, argues Tysdahl, is the product of social isolation, the lack of "those 
contacts with others that could have given him a definite and secure idea of his own self 
(142). Mandeville is isolated socially, and this social alienation no doubt contributes to 
his uncertain sense of identity. I would argue, however, that the few social "contacts" 
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Mandeville does experience in his youth-namely, his interactions with his uncle and tutor 
at Mandeville House-contribute, perhaps more than his isolation does, to the anxious 
insecurities and feelings of powerlessness and rage that form the foundation for his later 
hatred and fear of humanity. The social dynamics of Mandeville House, structured as 
they are around the demands of excessive silence and passivity, on one hand, and the 
silencing effects of hyperbolic discourse, on the other, operate to produce an environment 
that requires constant repression on Mandeville's part. 
The "insalubrious" gloom of the estate's landscape and climate is mirrored in the 
melancholy of its master, whose "passive mode of existence" mires him in sadness and 
regret over the past. His uncle, Mandeville declares, "loved his sadness, for it had 
become a part of himself [....] He found a nameless pleasure in the appendages and 
forms of melancholy, so great, that he would as soon have consented to cut off his right 
hand, as to part with them. In reality he rather vegetated than lived" (41). Audley has so 
internalized a languid passivity into the very fabric of his existence that he has rendered 
himself quite incapable of withstanding the realities of life-its mutability, its activity, and 
its noise. As such, a sense of restraint and solemnity pervades the House and governs the 
behaviour of its occupants. The domestic staff, for example, exhibit a "solemn 
countenance, and a slow and measured step" (43). 
Although only a boy, Mandeville is also expected to restrain any signs of activity 
or life around his uncle. As he describes, 
if by any rare accident I came within sight of [my uncle] unexpectedly, I 
was instructed to hide myself, to steal away with cautious steps, and to do 
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nothing that might excite observation [....] if the restlessness of boyish 
years chanced at any time to awake me to a gayer tone, the sight of my 
uncle checked my buoyant spirits at once, my countenance fell, and my 
thoughts became solemn. (42) 
Although Mandeville declares himself to be of a naturally "gloomy and saturnine cast" 
(53), it is apparent from descriptions like these that his youthful solemnity was, at least to 
some extent, a consciously performed act that required a certain repression of "natural" 
tendencies towards gaiety and activity. Indeed, as Scheuermann remarks, "Mandeville's 
earliest manifestations of withdrawal and sadness are learned behaviours, inculcated both 
by precept and by emulation of his uncle" ("Study of Mind" 24). 
Such a performance, moreover, seems to carry within it a certain denial of one's 
very existence. Mandeville, after all, must "hide himself," "steal away," and "do nothing 
that might excite observation"-all of which implies a conscious removal of one's being 
from the realm of acknowledgment. It becomes clear that Mandeville, from a young age, 
experiences a certain effacement of his identity, an effacement that demands not only a 
restraint of the "buoyant spirits," but a suppression of voice as well. Indeed, it is 
particularly significant that the passive solemnity which governs the domestic staff is 
specifically registered in their reluctance to speak and the consequent brevity of their 
speech: "When you spoke to them, they seemed to hesitate whether they should answer 
you; and if the final decision was in your favour, the answer was framed by the most 
concise and sententious model" (43-44). 
209 
In the presence of Audley, even Mandeville's verbose tutor, Hilkiah Bradford, is 
subject to a self-imposed silencing, in that his "surprising powers of copiousness and 
amplification" are consciously limited to perfunctory and concise comments on his 
pupil's progress (42-43). Mandeville sees his uncle once a month in formalized and 
stilted meetings which "seldom last[] more than two minutes" (42). He is not encouraged 
to speak during these meetings, nor does the rigid and controlled nature of the scene 
allow for fluid and natural exchange. There are no opportunities at Mandeville House for 
true and unmediated expressions of emotion and sentiment. From these experiences, 
Mandeville is taught to suppress his voice and efface the very sights and sounds of his 
existence. 
Within this environment of silence and controlled discourse, Mandeville is also 
subject to another force compromising his psychological development. While he 
internalizes the imperatives of emotional and verbal restraint from his uncle's example, 
he is also paradoxically subject to the dominating effects of the overwhelming ferocity of 
Bradford's lengthy discourses on the glories of Protestant martyrdom, the corruption and 
heresy of the Catholic Church, and the moral and spiritual necessity of renouncing pride 
and self-conceit. Bradford's anti-Papal discourses, in particular, "inflamed his blood, and 
made his eye sparkle with primitive and apostolic fury" (46). Indeed, Bradford's 
religious fervour on this topic borders on mania, and in the intense energy and 
overwhelming verbosity of his speech he seems the very antithesis of everything 
Mandeville House represents. 
210 
Moreover, Mandeville's relationship with Bradford is fraught with conflict. "I 
scarcely loved Hilkiah," he admits, claiming that the "magisterial tone" and "elaborate 
style" of his discourse proved "insupportably galling," especially when applied to his own 
character and behaviour (54-55). Despite his resentment on these occasions, however, 
Mandeville's relationship with Bradford is more generally informed by extreme feelings 
of worshipful dependence: "I was convinced of his integrity; I admired his intellectual 
powers; I was lost in astonishment at the greatness of his attainments. I was conscious of 
the limited sphere of my own knowledge; I distrusted my judgment; I looked up to him as 
an oracle" (54). Fleetwood, as we may recall, also refers to Gifford as an "oracle" (337), 
describing, with a certain belated alarm, the "ascendency" which the orchestrator of his 
downfall obtains over his judgment and thought processes (384). Similarly, Mandeville 
speaks of Bradford in terms of the "ascendency he possessed over [his] mind" (54). As 
Mandeville asserts, "he was [...] my oracle and guide, the master of my theories, and the 
regulator of my faith" (69). 
The connections suggested here between Fleetwood's friendship with the 
manipulative Gifford and Mandeville's relationship with his tutor are not misplaced, for 
Mandeville, like Fleetwood, finds his own voice and subjectivity subsumed by those of 
his "oracle," to similarly tragic results. Bradford, of course, is not the incontestable 
villain that Gifford, a man ruled by greed and driven by intentional deceit, proves himself 
to be. Indeed, Bradford's motivations are largely honourable, in that he hopes to instill in 
his young charge a becoming sense of humility and religious piety. Despite his best 
intentions, however, Bradford's pedagogical approach-which seems dominated by 
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lengthy and hyperbolic lectures on chosen topics-only serves to further Mandeville's 
alienation and misanthropic tendencies, as Bradford himself suspects on his deathbed (66-
67). 
Godwin was particularly sensitive to the fact that the educative process, in his day, 
so often involved a certain tendency towards "despotism" on the part of the tutor or 
"preceptor." In the Enquirer, he argued that "all education is despotism. It is perhaps 
impossible for the young to be conducted without introducing in many cases the tyranny 
of implicit obedience. Go there; do that; read; write; rise; lie down; will perhaps for ever 
be the language addressed to youth by age" (60). This dangerous tendency can infect 
even the best-intentioned educative programmes, but Godwin emphasizes that "private" 
education-such as the one experienced by Mandeville-is particularly susceptible to this 
type of tyrannous control-or, at least, the student will experience the despotism more 
acutely because he suffers alone, without peers. "The most wretched of all slaveries," 
contends Godwin, "is that which I endure alone; the whole weight of which falls upon my 
own shoulders, and in which I have no fellow-sufferer to share with me a particle of my 
burthen" (Enquirer 60). The social isolation of private education necessarily results in 
solitary suffering, and such suffering, argues Godwin, creates antagonism between the 
tutor and the pupil, and can lead to despair on the part of the student. Under the "slavery" 
of such despotic control, "the mind pusillanimously shrinks. [The student is] left alone 
with [his] tyrant, and [is] utterly hopeless and forlorn" (Enquirer 60). The tutor-pupil 
relationship modeled by Bradford and Mandeville is a striking portrayal of the 
antagonism which can result from the despotism of private education. 
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On one level, Mandeville's alienation from Bradford is simply a product of his 
excessive pride, of the anger and humiliation produced by Bradford's instructions in 
humility. Mandeville's "soul revolt[s] from the ignoble comparison" of himself to a 
beggar-boy or a kitchen hand (57), and he bitterly resents having to perform manual 
labour (58). On another, more compelling level, however, Mandeville's rage and 
resentment seem to be products of the silencing effects of Bradford's overwhelming and 
insistent discourse, discourse that, ironically, also inspires his worshipful reverence of his 
tutor. "Tickled with the speciousness of his discourse" (56), Bradford "amply [] unrol[s] 
the volume of his lessons" (54); he "accompanies] his instructions with a full statement 
of the causes and considerations by which they are inforced" (54); he "dwelt upon those 
conceptions" (54-55), and never failed to "comment[] with great rigour" (55). 
Taught by both his uncle and by his socialization at Mandeville House to repress 
the sight and sounds of his existence, Mandeville is furthered silenced by Bradford's 
excessive speech. The insistent energy of Bradford's lectures leaves no room for his 
pupil's own voice, and, as such, Mandeville feels helplessly passive in the face of 
Bradford's overwhelming discourse. Mandeville is thus split between outward 
compliance to his tutor and an inner rage he cannot verbally articulate: "I submitted 
indeed outwardly, for my nature did not prompt me to scenes of violence; but I retained 
the principle of rebellion entire, shut up in the chamber of my thoughts" (59). Internal 
rebellion, for Godwin, was too often the unfortunate consequence of private education, 
where "control" leads to a "contention of the passions" (Enquirer 61). Godwin 
articulates this contention from the perspective of the student: "I feel all the bitterness of 
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being obliged unmurmuring to submit the turbulence of my own passions to the 
turbulence of the passions of my preceptor [....] [M]y heart pants with indignation 
against the injustice, real or imaginary, that I endure" (Enquirer 61). 
Such contention, and the internal rebellion it necessarily engenders, contributes to 
the development of a spiteful disposition in the pupil. For Mandeville, however, 
rebellion is simply the exercise of his own voice, the freedom and ability to articulate, 
without fear or restraint, the sentiments or emotions of his mind. Furthermore, it is the 
very necessity of repressing this "rebellious" tendency, his voice, that cultivates the rage 
and bitterness that form the foundation for his later misanthropy. "I was not indeed a 
tumultuous and refractory pupil," Mandeville declares. "I did not give much trouble to 
my preceptor; but on that very account these things revolved incessantly in my mind, and 
worked themselves more deeply into the substance of my character" (55; emphasis 
added). His misanthropy, in other words, is a direct product of his silence, in that the 
very act of not articulating his anger furthers the hateful turn of his mind. Indeed, for 
Mandeville, an unhealthy mind is the product of repressing the voice: 
I said little; but this circumstance only deepened the effect on my mind. 
'Give sorrow words', says the great master of the human soul.3 Whatever 
sentiment finds its way to the lips, and vents its energies through the 
medium of language, by that means finds relief. 'Out of the abundance of 
the heart the mouth speaketh'; and we feel satisfied, if we have told, even 
to the desert air, but much more in the hearing of an intelligent creature, 
the story of our griefs.4 But my silent nature was an ever-living and 
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incessant curse to me. My displeasures brooded, and heated, and inflamed 
themselves, at the bottom of my soul, and finding no vent, shook so my 
single frame of man, like to an earthquake. (59-60) 
While Mandeville is insistent that these early experiences are responsible for the 
later development of his personality-they "worked themselves [] deeply into the 
substance of my character," he argues (55)-he nevertheless considers the possibility of an 
inherent misanthropy contaminating his soul. He wonders, for example, if he might be a 
"monster, not formed with the feelings of human nature" (44). The description of his 
childhood, however, serves to support Godwin's view that external environment, above 
all, shapes human character, and we get a clear sense that the combined forces of 
Audley's example, the somber imperatives of Mandeville House, and the effects of 
Bradford's pedagogy shape Mandeville into the mentally unstable misanthrope he will 
ultimately become. In particular, we see how the silencing effects of these three forces 
operate on Mandeville's mind to produce a child, and then a young man, who feels unable 
to exercise his own voice, who feels silenced by the overwhelming pressures of his social 
environment. Unable to express outwardly, in speech, his emotions or thoughts, 
Mandeville increasingly turns inward, internalizing the imperative of silence and 
perceiving himself as a passive victim of various persecutory forces, a perception which 
then structures his imaginative conceptions of himself and his place in the world. As we 
will see, Mandeville soon becomes aware of the power inherent in using language, and 
using it well. His inability to take an active or effective role in expressing his thoughts or 
emotions, his inability to escape being "shut up in the chamber of [his] thoughts" (59), 
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will come to symbolize his ultimate failure in life. This failure, furthermore, will be the 
most compelling factor in the development of his misanthropy and his eventual mental 
disintegration. 
"The Interchange of Defiance and Debate" 
The potentially deceptive power of language is a central theme in Mandeville. 
Bradford's discourse after all is articulate, yet "specious," crafted into "well sounding 
periods," yet "vague and indefinite"(56). Indeed, in this sense, Bradford's language 
mirrors the geographic murkiness of the land surrounding Mandeville House, with its 
"vapours" and "steams," its "thick fogs" which envelop everything within an opaque and 
confounding mist (24). The eloquence of his lectures on Mandeville's character masks 
the flaws in his reasoning, the lack of clarity in his advice. "If I desired to correct myself 
in conformity to its admonitions, I knew not where to begin [....] it furnished me with 
no light to direct my course," declares Mandeville (56). Bradford's example serves as an 
instructive lesson for his pupil regarding the seductive appeal of eloquent speech, but he 
will receive a much more extreme lesson in the deliberate manipulation of language for 
deceitful ends. We see this most obviously in the character of Coke Holloway, the 
unscrupulous attorney who designs numerous schemes to bring both Audley Mandeville 
and his nephew under his sway of influence and to ultimately deprive Mandeville of the 
estate entailed on him. 
Godwin had made an earlier indictment of lawyers, and of the profession of the 
law in general, in his Enquirer essay, ""Of Trades and Professions." In that essay, 
Godwin criticizes the law as "necessarily captious and technical, pregnant with petty 
subtleties and unmeaning distinctions" (225). "[A lawyer's] great object," contends 
Godwin, "is to puzzle and perplex. His chief attention is given to the enquiry, how he 
may distort the law so as to suit the cause in which he is engaged" (Enquirer 225). 
Lawyers, in Godwin's view, thus operate in a manner antithetical to that of the rational 
philosopher, who is guided by the principles of justice, reason, and the pursuit of 
universal benevolence. 
Indeed, in Caleb Williams, Godwin had already created a fictionalized portrait of 
the dishonourable attorney motivated by greed and self-interest, rather than the pursuit of 
justice and truth. In that novel, the tenant farmer Hawkins correctly perceives the law as 
an instrument of persecution, rather than justice, a tool "better adapted for a weapon of 
tyranny in the hands of the rich, than for a shield to protect the humbler part of the 
community against their usurpations" (138). Although he is initially reluctant to redress 
his wrongs through the law, he eventually brings an action against Tyrell, his former 
landlord and current persecutor. Tyrell in turn instructs his lawyer, Swineard, to 
manipulate the case in order to pervert the course of justice: "the business was, by 
affidavits, motions, pleas, demurrers, flaws, and appeals, to protract the question from 
term to term and from court to court" (139). Swineard, thus directed by Tyrell, is not 
concerned with justice, or even with a successful "repelling of the charge" against his 
client (139); instead, he employs the "whole series of his subterfuges" to manipulate the 
legal system and evade disclosure of the truth (138). 
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In Mandeville, Godwin returns to the figure of the unethical lawyer to illustrate 
the potentially deceptive nature of language. In a letter, Audley's steward informs 
Mandeville of Holloway's presence at the estate and the unlikely influence he wields over 
the master. '"Such a scoundrel as this,'" writes the steward, '"ought to have no power'" 
(185). Holloway does have power, however, and his power is a direct function of the way 
in which he uses language to manipulate others' perceptions of reality. For Holloway, 
that "pettifogger of the law," as Mandeville terms him (231), an ambitious man's greatest 
skill is in learning to veil his true motives with false rhetoric, with a performance of 
kindness and flattery. '"The whole world [...] the civilised world, was a scene of 
warfare under the mask of civility,'" and for the lawyer, the '"most advantageously 
disposed'" of all modern professionals to use language as a weapon, '"flattery is the art, 
that makes him who is accomplished in it, the master of the masters of the earth'" (234). 
With his well-chosen words and carefully orchestrated actions, Holloway is able to 
ingratiate himself into Audley's home and confidence. 
It is his skill with obfuscation, however, that serves, on at least one significant 
occasion, to bring Mandeville under his control. After Audley's death, Holloway 
manages to retain autonomous control over Mandeville's legal and financial affairs by 
overwhelming the young man with the "sublime obscurities of [his] explanations" (220). 
In deliberately shaping his explanations of business concepts and terms in such a way as 
to intentionally obscure Mandeville's comprehension of such things, and in 
overwhelming his young client with largely irrelevant jargon and minutiae, Holloway 
uses language to cultivate ignorance, rather than knowledge. He "was a master in his 
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art," asserts Mandeville. "He knew how to 'perplex, and dash maturest counsels',5 and to 
congregate a cloud that should baffle the acutest vision" (220). Indeed, even Mallison, 
Holloway's unscrupulous nephew, is impressed with the lawyer's facility in the 
manipulation of language and legal discourse: '"He has the law at his fingers' ends, with 
all its quirks and its cranks, and its ins and its outs,'" he boasts towards the end of the 
novel (304). As a "pettifogger of the law," Holloway engages in obfuscation in a 
deliberate attempt to veil his true intentions within a shroud of "sublime obscurities" 
(220). Mandeville House, with its "thick fogs and mists" (24), is thus a fitting 
environment for Holloway to practise his rhetorical deception: in their ability to trap 
auditors within an entanglement of lies and confusion, Holloway's words evoke the "vast 
quantities of sargassos and weeds" thrown up by the tides around Mandeville House (24). 
Holloway's nephew serves as his apprentice in such deception. Mallison, whose 
very name speaks to the malevolence of his character ("wa/ww" being Latin for "evil" or 
"crime"), is a former schoolmate of Mandeville from Winchester College, the public 
school Mandeville is sent to after Bradford's death.6 At the College, Mallison takes a 
sadistic pleasure in encouraging the verbal harassment of his fellow students, in "seeing 
his fellows writhe with mental pain" (84). His weapon of choice, like Holloway's, is his 
keen control over language, his ability to pervert the words of another to suggest 
something entirely different, something calculated to inspire the humiliation and torment 
of his chosen victim. From "honey itself," declares Mandeville, he could "extract a 
poison" (84). Significantly, when Mallison resurfaces in the text as Holloway's nephew 
and apprentice, he manipulates Mandeville, not through "poison," as he had done years 
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earlier, but through the "honey" of false flattery and well-designed conversation. With 
his carefully worded "stock of anecdotes and panegyric" (244) on Mandeville's character, 
combined with a memory that allows him to recite long passages from Mandeville's 
favourite authors and mimic the idiosyncrasies of their former school masters, Mallison is 
able to ingratiate himself into Mandeville's confidence through the power of 
conversation. 
It is at Winchester School that Mandeville meets Lionel Clifford, the young man 
he will perceive as his life-long nemesis, the "evil genius" who will blight his every 
chance at happiness or success (106). For Mandeville, Clifford's defining characteristic 
is his unparalleled eloquence, his ability to expound on a variety of topics with 
remarkable ease and articulate energy. Whereas Mandeville labours under the 
imperatives of silence inculcated in childhood, and feels "shut up in the chamber of [his] 
thoughts" as a result, Clifford seems to "attract all eyes, and to win all hearts" with the 
gaiety of his wit and the open nature of his interactions with others (82). To Mandeville, 
Clifford's discourse is a manifestation of the sublime, and the natural and unmediated 
nature of his rhetorical effusions seem to be the inevitable overflow of an inspired soul 
superior to Mandeville's own. In one of his many long speeches to his schoolmates, 
Clifford declaims against the evils of wealth and touts the glories of poverty, and 
Mandeville acutely recognizes the sublime effects of Clifford's eloquence on the 
sensibilities of his peers: "these discourses of Clifford, while he spoke them, appeared 
almost divine. He charmed, as it were, our very souls out of our bodies, and might have 
led us through the world" (89). "He spoke," Mandeville continues, "because he could not 
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help it, and to give vent to his full bosom. And his discourses were always so well timed, 
so aptly rose out of the occasion in hand, and were so animated and pithy, that every one 
longed for the occasion, and were delighted to listen to the magic of his tongue" (89-90). 
Mandeville is clearly in awe of Clifford's rhetorical prowess and, more 
significantly, of the power he commands over his auditors. However, as the above 
descriptions suggest, he is also deeply suspicious of language and, perhaps more 
importantly, of those who use it too well. He had after all, from his early interactions 
with Bradford, sensed that excessive eloquence can potentially mask "specious" 
argument. Eloquence, as Mandeville also knew, tends to lull its auditors into a passive 
position of reverence. Mandeville thus perceives something deceptive in Clifford's 
discourse, an incongruity between surface appearance and actual reality. His "discourses'' 
may appear to be spontaneous expressions of the authentic self, but, to Mandeville, they 
also potentially bear the stamp of careful orchestration, of being "well timed," "aptly 
[rising] out of the occasion in hand" (89-90). Mandeville increasingly comes to regard 
Clifford as a sort of sophist, a supernatural "enchanter" who distorts reality to manipulate 
the perceptions of those around him (90). In this way, Clifford, in Mandeville's eyes, 
operates as a corrupting force at Winchester. While Mandeville admits to feeling envious 
of Clifford, the "root" of his aversion towards him lies in a "sort of moral 
disapprobation": "I considered Clifford as a kind of mountebank, debauching the 
character of his equals, and destroying that sobriety and concentration of soul, without 
which there can be no considerable virtue" (83). In Mandeville's mind, the sophistries of 
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Clifford, combined with the gaiety and wit of his speech, fosters an unbecoming levity in 
his peers which will lead to vice. 
Mandeville's first interactions with Clifford at Winchester School initiate a life-
long pattern whereby his sense of self is organized around a conception of himself as the 
very antithesis to Clifford and his eloquence. Ironically, despite Mandeville's moral 
disapprobation of Clifford and the power he wields through language, it is on precisely 
this ground that he feels most envious of his rival. In contrast to Clifford's easy sociality 
and open style of communicative exchange with his schoolmates, Mandeville's "rooted 
habits" are organized around the introverted processes of "reflection, silence, and reverie" 
(83). "I was not like Clifford," Mandeville soon realizes upon arriving at Winchester: 
I could not put my soul into my tongue, and witch all hearers with my 
eloquence. Envious nature had denied to me this privilege. But I felt my 
deficiency with fierce and burning impatience. Why should this youth 
steal away the souls of his companions with glozing words, and I have no 
tongue to check his mistakes, and expose his sophistries? (91) 
We see here the ambivalence of Mandeville's relationship with language and rhetoric. 
While language is something to be mistrusted, as it can "witch all hearers" into an 
acceptance of false logic and ultimately vice, it is also perceived by Mandeville as both 
the source and the manifestation of authentic selfhood, whereby the "tongue" becomes 
the conduit for the genuine expression of one's "soul," as well as a moral force in the 
correction of "mistakes" and "sophistries." 
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Certainly, Mandeville feels his lack of rhetorical prowess as a decided 
"deficiency" on this altruistic level. In his inability to "check [the] mistakes" and "expose 
[the] sophistries" he perceives in Clifford's discourse, Mandeville fails, in his mind, to 
act as a corrective force in the "sacred cause of truth" (91). More significantly, however, 
Mandeville's failures with language threaten his very sense of a coherent self. Incapable 
of expressing, verbally, the sentiments of his mind-unable to "unbosom [his] thoughts" to 
another (96)-Mandeville increasingly projects his frustration through the body, taking 
solace in the brutal physicality of inflicting violent harm on himself and his schoolmates. 
"I delighted in the sight of blood," Mandeville remarks of these boyhood confrontations. 
"Whether it flowed from the person of my competitor or from my own, in the one case no 
less than the other, it seemed to lighten and dilute the impure and substantial fluid that 
weighed on my heart. I gained some, but an imperfect relief to the injustice I felt" (93). 
The masochism of this comment suggests the extent of the alienation between 
Mandeville's mind and body. Trapped inside a body that, in his perception,, fails him, he 
can only experience a limited sort of relief and pleasure by inflicting pain on an offending 
body he cannot entirely claim as his own. "I had no respect for the limbs and members of 
my body," he declares, "and viewed them as an incumbrance upon the activity of my 
spirit. They were mine, not me. My arm was but an implement and a tool, of the same 
nature as a hooked stick, and of no value but for the commission in which it was 
employed" (94). 
It is therefore significant that Mandeville describes his own subjectivity in terms 
of the disconnection which he feels exists between his mind and his body. "The habit of 
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my soul was endless rumination," he writes, "in which the tongue was chained up in 
silence, and the limbs almost forgot their office, but the thinking part of the machine 
worked incessantly, like the members and wheels of a vast machine, or like the eternal 
descent of the waters in a foaming cataract" (68). Although Mandeville details his early 
development in terms of the overwhelming role that silence comes to play in forming the 
substantive part of his character and in structuring his interactions with the world around 
him, the reader is nevertheless aware of a tremendous intellectual energy (the "endless 
rumination" of a mental "machine" that operates "incessantly") which can find no release 
or expression in a body from which Mandeville feels inherently alienated. 
Due to a childhood spent at Mandeville House conforming to the imperatives of 
silence inculcated through his experiences with a vegetative uncle and a domineering 
tutor, Mandeville has retreated so far into his own mental space that he finds it almost 
impossible to breach the dictate of silence he has imposed on himself. By the time he 
arrives at the "moving and busy scene" of Winchester School (82), this self-silencing has 
played such a central role in the development of his subjectivity that it functions more as 
an involuntary silencing whereby he is unable to speak, or voice his case, even when it is 
socially imperative for him to do so. Indeed, it is precisely his inability to assert his voice 
at Winchester School that initiates the train of misunderstandings that will ultimately 
blight his future prospects. As Mandeville tells the reader, "political party ran very high" 
at Winchester (80), and the various ideological and religious tensions structuring the 
School and its student body lend a combative tone to social interaction.7 
Mandeville falls victim to such political prejudice when a book of satirical prints 
lampooning Charles I is found in his apartments and shown to Clifford, Mandeville's 
nemesis. Although the book is found in Mandeville's rooms, some doubt exists as to its 
actual ownership given that Mandeville at the time had struck up a limited sort of 
friendship with a boy named Waller, another social misfit at Winchester and, 
significantly, the son of a famous Presbyterian military commander. As both boys are 
Presbyterian and thus considered possible owners of the book, an informal judicial 
assembly headed by Clifford and comprised of other head-form boys is convened to 
determine both the book's owner and the penalty he will face for possessing such 
seditious material. Although, in private, Waller claims the book as his own, he 
nevertheless cowardly imputes ownership to Mandeville in a fearful, yet rhetorically 
effective, speech delivered to the assembly of his peers. It is Mandeville's pervasive 
silence in the situation, however, that allows for Waller's deception. When brought 
before the assembly, Mandeville stands in "mute astonishment" (99), convinced that, in 
his innocence, he is freed from the necessity of defending himself in speech. "It was not 
my business to speak to justify myself" Mandeville declares, "and still less to cast the 
charge upon [Waller]; and I left my companion to explain the matter as he could" (99). 
Waller is thus able to weave an artful tale out of the vacuum created by Mandeville's 
silence, and even when faced with the reality of his friend's treachery, Mandeville is 
capable of no greater articulation in his own defence than an "interjection of 
astonishment" (99) and a one-sentence denial of ownership that he naively assumes will 
be credited as the truth (100). 
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On one level, Mandeville ascribes his silence to choice, to his sense of pride in 
refusing to justify himself on so base an accusation. "Could I have stooped," he asks, "to 
make an elaborate defence against an infamous charge, which I felt within myself to be 
void of the slightest foundation?" (100). Moreover, he eventually enters into Waller's 
deception as a willing accomplice, agreeing to accept ownership of the book and shoulder 
both the punishment and social ostracism that such a choice will yield. The masochism 
of such an act, however, is ironically perceived by Mandeville as a source of power, 
particularly as it allows him to effect a posture of silent suffering: 
[T]here was something gallant, that at this time suited my savage temper, 
in braving the imputation of guilt, when secretly, in the chambers of my 
own heart, I knew that I was innocent, and more than innocent [....] 
There appeared to me, while I thought of it, a sort of lordly delight in 
standing the scorns and reproaches of my companions, when all the time in 
my own reflections I smiled contemptuously at their error, and rose serene 
above the clouds in which their misconstructions sought to envelop me. 
(103) 
For Mandeville, "braving" the "scorns and reproaches" of his peers will prove both his 
moral superiority and strength of character, and it is significant that the demonstration of 
his superiority in this regard rests on the silence he must sustain in the face of social 
disapprobation. In Mandeville's conception, his moral superiority is a direct, function of 
not only innocence but, more specifically, of an innocence that is never verbally 
expressed, an innocence that can only be recognized in the introspective space of his own 
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mind, "in the chambers of [his] own heart" (103). Mandeville thus retreats into his own 
mind yet again, taking refuge in constructing his silence as a sort of masochistic choice on 
his part. There is a definite sense, however, that Mandeville's decision to brave the 
charge on Waller's behalf grows out of a conscious awareness of his inability to assert his 
voice before his hostile peers. Even before he shoulders the blame for Waller, 
Mandeville is cognizant of his rhetorical failings: "I was not eloquent," he laments. "My 
nature refused to supply me with the stream of a copious discourse on any occasion" 
(100). 
We see another missed opportunity at vindication a few years later, when, as a 
seventeen-year-old student at Oxford, Mandeville returns from a disappointing adventure 
as attempted secretary to the commander-in-chief of the Royalist and Presbyterian forces 
arming against the government of Cromwell. Mandeville, anxious to play a role in the 
upcoming engagement, and eager to assume the post for which he had been strongly 
recommended by an ambitious statesman, sees in this "first scene upon the theatre of real 
life" (120), a chance to assert a burgeoning sense of masculine independence. When 
Mandeville is denied the post, however, on the account of it being promised already to 
Clifford, he returns to Oxford in quiet despair over this missed opportunity, his violent 
hatred of Clifford strengthened all the more by the humiliation Mandeville feels he has 
received at his hands. 
Mandeville's inability to defend himself against the accusations of his Winchester 
schoolfellows had allowed for the rumours of his anti-Royalist sentiments to take root, 
and we see the fallout of this unfortunate circumstance when, after returning to Oxford, 
he becomes the subject of spiteful misconstructions regarding his time spent with the 
Royalist forces. When Lisle, a fervently Royalist schoolmate previously befriended by 
Mandeville, accuses him of being both a cowardly deserter and a potential spy for 
Cromwell's regime, a "king-killer in [his] heart" (137), Mandeville is faced, for the 
second time in his life, with defending himself against false charges. Although Lisle tells 
Mandeville that his "ambiguous adventure [...] admits of no honourable explanation" 
(137), the very characterization of the "adventure" as "ambiguous" suggests that there is 
at least a limited potential for Mandeville to clear his name in this matter. He fails, 
however-just as he had failed at Winchester School-to speak up in his own defense and 
launch an adequate explanation of his actions. Rather, just as at Winchester, he listens, 
"with astonishment" (137), and nurtures a rage that he then refuses to express: 
I thought scorn of the idea of vindicating myself, of making appeal, as to 
the scales of a balance, casting the foul aspersions to which I had listened 
into one scale, and my own explanations and protestations into the other, 
and carefully watching which way the beam would turn. This, of all 
things, was the most contrary to my temper [....] He that did not 
understand me from the impulse of his own mind, that did not find in his 
own heart the explanation of my conduct, and the true estimate of my 
thoughts, was unworthy to hear me. (138). 
Just as at Winchester, Mandeville constructs his silence as both a source and a 
manifestation of his pride and superiority of character, refusing to accept a social reality 
that may require him to explain himself or his conduct. His character, he believes, should 
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be known and felt, in the "impulse" of the "mind" or the "heart," and should not be 
reliant on any "explanations or protestations" on his part. 
Just as at Winchester, however, Mandeville's "voluntary" silence carries within it 
marks of a passive resignation that underscores his awareness of his own rhetorical 
failings. Later in his memoir, he reflects on his schoolboy days and the "diffidence" 
which "sealed up [his] lips" and destroyed his attempts at persuasive rhetoric: "I fell into 
blunders inconceivable," he laments. "All that I knew before seemed to have left me at 
the moment it was wanted; I could never command the recollection of things, in the 
interchange of defiance and debate, that were most fully at my disposal in the cool 
element of meditation" (243). Although, in the context of his memoir, Mandeville is 
specifically referring to his failures in the persuasive discourse of debate, the sentiments 
he expresses speak to his larger failures with language and self-expression. Damaged by 
a childhood mired in silence and repression, Mandeville is, at this point in his life, unable 
to assert his own voice at precisely those crucial moments of "defiance and debate," those 
moments which will help shape not only his future, but his sense of self and his 
perception of his own subjectivity. 
Significantly, after both of his public failures in self-defense, Mandeville suffers 
either a physical or mental collapse. Immediately following the judicial assembly at 
Winchester, he falls into a "raging fever" that incapacitates him for several weeks. When 
he recovers, he is an "altered creature," a pale and "languid" version of his former self, a 
"meagre, unlaid ghost" (105). Similarly, after his confrontation with Lisle, Mandeville 
plunges into the forest surrounding Oxford, mad with rage and despair, and collapses 
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senselessly. Confined to an asylum for a short period, he sinks into a delirium filled with 
grisly images that send him into hysterics. Struggling against those attempting to subdue 
him, he is truly the picture of a madman: "My teeth were ground almost to pieces; my 
head shook, and my mouth scattered foam, like that of a war-horse in the midst of the din 
of arms" (144). In both of these cases, Mandeville suffers either a physical or mental 
collapse in the wake of social embarrassments which underscore his failures in self-
expression. In this sense, both incidents not only foreshadow what is to come for 
Mandeville, but document the very strain of silence on the mind and the body. 
For Mandeville, his "first scene upon the theatre of life" (120) results in 
humiliating disappointment that underscores his failed attempt at entering into masculine 
life. As he relates to the reader, the post of secretary to Sir Joseph Wagstaff was so 
appealing precisely because it offered him the opportunity to "count for something" in the 
world of men: 
I felt that the door of manly existence had just been opened upon me, that I 
had been permitted for a moment to contemplate prospects that appeared 
to me delicious and rapturous (for what sensation exists more rapturous, 
than that which a young man experiences, when he feels for the first time, 
that he is counted for something substantive in the dramatis personae of 
society, that his voice is numbered, that his opinion is listened to, that 
some eyes are turned upon him to remark the part he shall act?)-and then 
the door was suddenly and violently clapped in my face. I was left alone, 
in the narrow line between being and no-being. (123) 
Like Fleetwood, who spoke of the "theatre of life" during his early years in Pans (95), 
Mandeville is also aware of the performative nature of social life, and, like Fleetwood, he 
also uses a theatrical metaphor to describe the process whereby one must cultivate an 
exterior image of identity which then serves as the standard by which he or she will be 
judged. Playing a major role in the "dramatis personae" of "manly" life would have lent 
Mandeville, in his eyes, a certain masculine authority that might have compensated for 
the rhetorical failures that seemed to relegate him to the margins of society. Denied such 
a role, however, Mandeville retreats even further into misanthropic isolation, 
experiencing a certain existential crisis of sorts, in which he feels himself occupying the 
anxious space between "being" and "no-being." 
The crisis Mandeville experiences at this point in his life is reminiscent of the 
numerous other instances in which he exhibits a problematic sense of his own identity. 
As Tysdahl has pointed out, Mandeville is fundamentally flawed in that he lacks a 
"definite and secure idea of his own self (142), and we see this most obviously in his 
life-long obsession over Clifford as his "evil genius" (106). Like Caleb, who sees the 
"whole fortune of [his] life" as "linked" to Falkland's tragic "story" (66), Mandeville 
similarly perceives himself as existentially connected to Clifford. Upon his entrance at 
Winchester School, Mandeville constructs his own identity as a direct function of his 
conception of Clifford. Just as Clifford has no significant existence in Mandeville's 
memoirs apart from his role as Mandeville's "evil genius," Mandeville has no sense or 
perception of his own identity apart from Clifford. Indeed, he uses a variety of 
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compelling images to convey what he sees as his monstrous union with Clifford. "I have 
read of twin children," he declares, 
whose bodies were so united in their birth, that they could never after be 
separated, while one carried with him, wherever he went, an intolerable 
load, and of whom, when one died, it involved the necessary destruction of 
the other. Something similar to this, was the connection that an eternal 
decree had made between Clifford and me. I was deeply convinced, that 
his bare existence, was essentially the bane of mine. (141) 
Just as Caleb perceives his dyadic bond with Falkland in pathological terms-"we 
were each of us a plague to the other," he writes (199)-Mandeville experiences his 
"eternal" union with Clifford as equally destructive (although in Mandeville's case it is 
only he who faces annihilation, and not his rival). Indeed, as his hatred and envy of 
Clifford take deeper root, Mandeville indulges in images even more pathological. 
"Clifford is my fate," he declares after the failed reconciliation with his rival at Beaulieu 
House. "He is part of myself, a disease that has penetrated to my bones, and that I can 
never get rid of, as long as any portion of consciousness shall adhere to the individual 
Mandeville" (176). Notice how, in both images, Mandeville perceives himself as the 
passive victim of circumstances entirely beyond his control: an "eternal decree" binds 
him to Clifford, not his own obsessive insecurities, and his corporeal "union" with 
Clifford is likewise perceived as an incurable disease unjustly imposed upon him for no 
explicable reason. Just as Mandeville perceived himself in childhood as the helpless 
victim persecuted by people and forces beyond his control, he continues in adulthood to 
see himself as the unwilling casualty of a capricious fate. 
Such images foreground the extent to which Mandeville relies on others to 
consolidate a sense of his own identity. Although Clifford serves as the most obvious 
reference point in Mandeville's construction of his own subjectivity, we see, in his 
relationship with Mallison, another and perhaps more compelling example of 
Mandeville's uncertain hold on his own selfhood. This is particularly true in terms of 
Mandeville's weak sense of masculine authority. Tormented by the failed reconciliation 
with Clifford and feeling trapped by living arrangements which-in the wake of his 
uncle's death-had left him sharing a domicile with the detested Holloway and Mallison,8 
Mandeville takes solitary refuge in his enjoyment of horsemanship, a pastime that affords 
him a welcome sense of physical vitality. "The motion of a horseman was agreeable to 
me," he relates, as "it communicated a new alacrity to the circulation of the blood; it 
excited the animal spirits" (236). Riding, furthermore, "brings nameless relief to [his] 
wearied spirit" (236), and he relishes the image of manly nobility conveyed, he believes, 
by him and his horse. "I was no ill model of a cavalier," he declares (237). 
A fall, however, abruptly ends these solitary pursuits, and Mandeville finds 
himself bed-ridden for a fortnight, a period during which he forges a vexed 
companionship with Mallison, the hated nephew of Holloway and the malignant schemer 
responsible for much of Mandeville's social embarrassment at Winchester School. As a 
lawyer, Holloway functions as the archetypal spokesman for the Law of the Father, and 
Mallison, as Holloway's apprentice, is similarly at home in the Symbolic Order of 
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language from which Mandeville feels so alienated. Indeed, as Mandeville relates, the 
artfulness of Mallison's temperament rendered him a particularly keen disciple of 
Holloway's philosophies regarding the manipulation of people and language. Holloway 
had preached of the necessary "'mask of civility'" one must don to veil one's malevolent 
ends (234), and Mallison becomes, in turn, an "admirable mimic," an "excellent actor," 
who "could compose the phrases and the sentences of the part he had to play" (249). 
Mallison takes his lessons in mimicry a fundamental step further, however: rather 
than simply donning a "mask" or playing a "part," he seems to empty himself of any 
inherent being or disposition that exists prior to his chosen performance. Mallison, 
Mandeville remarks, 
without being any thing in himself intrinsically, superior to the dirt upon 
which he trod, [] had that pliancy of disposition, that he could remove 
himself for the moment into the person he wishes to represent, with a 
power something similar to that, with which Fadlallah in the Persian Tales, 
could shoot himself into any organized body that lay inanimate before him. 
(249-50)9 
When Mallison effects a posture of friendship towards Mandeville, therefore, the 
performance carries within it a certain authenticity that Mandeville is unable to resist, 
despite his inner conviction of Mallison's duplicity. Mallison's primary weapon is of 
course flattery, and his carefully chosen words of admiration and amusing anecdotes 
function to lull Mandeville into an acceptance of, and then a reliance on, his company. 
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It is significant, however, that Mallison's flattery, and his bedside ministrations to 
Mandeville, situates him within a gendered dynamic that casts him in a feminized role. 
While Mandeville is physically incapacitated, Mallison assumes the specifically 
feminized role of doting nurse. Mallison, Mandeville remarks of this period, "tended my 
couch with unwearied care; nor was there any species of tenderness and attention left by 
him undischarged" (239). As care giver, his actions appear to be perpetually informed by 
the "utmost watchfulness and tenderness" for his charge (240): as Mandeville relates, "he 
seemed to have no object but my gratification, no study but of what would be acceptable 
to me, and no standard of good, but what depended on my will" (245). Such 
characterizations of Mallison as self-effacing helpmeet to a male companion align him 
with other compelling images of the doting female partner found in Godwin's novels.10 
Indeed, this term of Mandeville's convalescence reads almost like a period of courtship, 
whereby Mallison, with contrived gestures and artful conversation, not only engages 
Mandeville's attention, but wins his approbation as well. "I began comparatively to like 
Mallison," Mandeville tells the reader (244), displaying an awkward sense of both 
ignorance and knowledge regarding the way in which he is manipulated in these 
exchanges. Mallison is even characterized by Mandeville in terms of those archetypal 
symbols of female seduction, the Sirens, who, with their "ravishing strains," threatened to 
render even "wily" Ulysses a "fool" (245). "The company of Mallison was in some 
measure to me like the song of the Sirens," Mandeville declares (245). 
Such a simile, however, is double-edged and speaks to the way in which 
Mandeville's sense of masculine authority is simultaneously fortified, as well as undercut, 
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by his relationship with Mallison. On one level, Mandeville's masculinity is no doubt 
affirmed by the feminine posture adopted by Mallison, a posture which not only relieves 
Mandeville's boredom and soothes his anxieties but, most importantly, always defers to 
his superior judgment. Mallison, Mandeville tells the reader, "was so implicit, bowed so 
completely to all my judgments, and drank in all my suggestions, that it was a pleasure to 
talk to so accommodating a pupil" (244). The Siren simile, therefore, can function as a 
way for Mandeville to cast himself in the active role of Ulysses, the clever hero who, 
while tempted by the Sirens, is nevertheless able to outwit them. As we see in his 
exchanges with Mallison, however, Mandeville is no Ulysses, and he ultimately fails to 
resist the temptations of Mallison's flattery. Rather, his ego soothed by Mallison's Siren 
song, he quickly falls prey to the machinations of Holloway and his nephew. Indeed, the 
seductive force that Mallison seems to exert over Mandeville's mind disempowers him to 
the point of complete incapacitation. Falling "victim to the machinations of this precious 
pair of devils" (254), his physical body is ultimately marked with the signs of his 
psychological submission: "My health wasted daily; my powers of action seemed reduced 
to almost nothing [....] My skin was dried up; my flesh perished from my bones; my 
eyes became unacquainted with sleep; my joints refused to perform for me the ordinary 
functions of a living being" (257). 
While Mandeville is anxiously aware of the dangerous state of his dependence on 
these two men, he feels physically unable to shake their hold over him, a dilemma 
strikingly suggestive of Fleetwood's similar reliance on Gifford. "Holloway and 
Mallison became in some degree a part of myself," laments Mandeville, and "I felt that 
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day maimed and incomplete, in which I did not sup up my allotted dose of the nauseous 
draught they administered" (257). Moreover, the masochism of his dependence takes on 
sexualized connotations, whereby Mandeville's masculinity is compromised by the 
feminized position he is forced to assume in his dealings with Holloway and Mallison: 
"They had me in their hands, to play upon me as they pleased" (254); "when by their 
flatteries they had laid me most naked to be assailed, that was the moment they chose to 
aim at me the most deadly wound" (255). 
However, despite his physical weakness in the face of "this precious pair of 
devils," Mandeville is tormented by a mental energy-a "preternatural activity" of the 
mind (258)-that demands he violently resist the machinations launched against him. "My 
mind balanced between two tones, that of inexorable rage, and that of the lowest 
despondency. The former urged me to revenge; the latter to suicide," declares Mandeville 
(258). We thus see Mandeville haunted, yet again, by powerful emotions and sentiments 
he is unable to articulate or act upon, and it is this inability to speak or act that feeds the 
misanthropic rage that ultimately destroys his sanity. 
"The Sister of My Soul" 
The image of Mallison as nursemaid to Mandeville during his convalescence from 
the riding accident brings to mind Henrietta's similar role as Mandeville's care giver, 
particularly after the mental collapse occasioned by his public humiliation at Oxford. 
With Mallison, Mandeville's attachment was a gradual development, one which 
ultimately devolved into a dependence that left him anxious whenever his nursemaid "left 
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[his] bed-side but for a moment" (240). With Henrietta, however, Mandeville's affection 
(and dependence) runs much deeper, having taken root in a childhood deprived of any 
other emotionally satisfying social connections. Indeed, it is only upon meeting his sister 
Henrietta for the first time at age twelve, that he feels connected to another creature by 
virtue of their shared humanity: "I seemed now for the first time to associate with a being, 
with whom I felt an affinity, and whom I recognized as of the same species as myself. 
This was indeed a memorable era in my existence" (63). That Mandeville recognizes this 
meeting as a "memorable era in [his] existence" is significant, for it speaks to the way in 
which his sister will assume for Mandeville a humanizing and connective role in his life. 
From this point on, and with increasingly tragic consequences as the two grow into 
adulthood, Henrietta will serve as Mandeville's link to humanity and the mediator of his 
social exchange. As Mandeville recognizes at even this young age, it is only through 
Henrietta-only through her soothing presence and, significantly, her inspiring 
discourse-that he is reconciled to society and human interaction. 
Of course, Mandeville's reliance on Henrietta as his mediator or connective link 
to humanity only underscores his own troubled sense of identity, something we have 
witnessed in his exchanges with both Clifford and Mallison. When Mandeville writes 
that "Henrietta was father, and mother, and every thing to me in one" (63), we may recall 
Macneil's similar words to Fleetwood: '"If you marry my daughter,'" he warns him, 
'"you must be to her, father, and mother, and sisters, and all the world in one'" (262), a 
declaration that highlights the vulnerability of Mary's position in the world. However, 
whereas Mary struggles to maintain her own identity in the face of her husband's 
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controlling tendencies, Mandeville, as we have seen, has never managed to consolidate 
any coherent sense of his own selfhood. We thus witness Mandeville vacillating between 
a conception of Henrietta as the complement to his own somewhat completed 
existence-the "sister of [his] soul" (308)-and an understanding of her as inextricably 
bound up with his own being, as forming the other half of his own uncompleted 
subjectivity. 
"As the dearest half of [his] soul" (62), Henrietta becomes the subject of 
Mandeville's numerous fantasies regarding the transmutation of their souls. While 
recovering from his mental collapse, Mandeville attributes his ensuing serenity and calm 
to the displacement of his own soul in favour of Henrietta's: "Why was it that I felt a 
serenity and a calm during this awful crisis, that I had never before experienced at any 
period of my life?" asks Mandeville. "The soul of Mandeville seemed to have left me, 
and the soul of Henrietta to have entered my bosom in its stead" (159). At the end of his 
memoir, right before the disastrous kidnaping attempt that finally severs Mandeville's last 
tie to both his sister and the familial and social community she represents, Mandeville 
recounts his loss in terms of an early self hatred that compelled him to "live in," and 
through, Henrietta: 
I loved, as never man loved. I poured out my heart and my soul, all my 
faculties, and all my thoughts, upon Henrietta. Early I learned to be 
dissatisfied with myself, and to despise myself [....] Early therefore I 
learned to go out of myself; and, like the dervise to whom I once before 
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alluded, in the Persian Tales, I left my own rejected and loathsome corse, 
to live in another, to feel her pleasures, and rejoice in her joys. (319-20) 
In this allusion to the Persian prince who could enter into another's body at will, 
Mandeville displaces Mallison as the empty vessel that can appropriate another's 
subjectivity. As Mandeville realizes at this point in his narrative, the one consolation that 
had sustained him throughout his various misfortunes was his perception that he could 
cast off a "loathsome" selfhood he could not claim as his own and live vicariously 
through the subjectivity of Henrietta. 
It is ironic, yet at the same time highly fitting, that the one attribute which so 
acutely draws Mandeville to Henrietta is his perception of her unrivaled wisdom as it is 
revealed in their discursive exchanges. In her numerous speeches to Mandeville 
regarding the potential perfectability of humanity and the necessity of a benevolent and 
tolerant philanthropy, Henrietta exhibits a remarkable eloquence that aligns her with 
much of the social idealism expressed in Political Justice. The nurturing patience of her 
discourse to Mandeville also looks back to Marguerite's similar speeches to St. Leon 
regarding humanity's responsibility to achieve happiness, even in the face of misfortune. 
Indeed, for Elton Edward Smith and Esther Greenwell Smith, Henrietta is best viewed as 
the "bearer of the Godwinian philosophic line in the novel" (104), and, for Shelley, this 
was precisely the most appealing aspect of her character. As he declares to Godwin in a 
December 7th, 1817 letter, "I do not think [...] that there ever was produced a moral 
discourse more characteristic of all that is admirable and lovely in human Nature-more 
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lovely and admirable in itself-than that of Henrietta to Mandeville as he is recovering 
from madness" (260). 
The humanizing role that Henrietta plays in Mandeville's life largely stems from 
the way in which her eloquence and perceptive use of language reconcile him to both 
himself and to the demands of sociality. After his first visit to Beaulieu Cottage, 
Mandeville appropriates Henrietta as the guiding force in his life, the standard of 
judgment against which he shapes his sense of self and plans his future conduct. 
"Henrietta was the whole world to me," he declares. "In every thing I thought of her 
approbation; and I resolved to accomplish myself in whatever was praise-worthy, because 
I felt that she was capable of being my umpire and my judge [....] What should I do to 
make myself the worthy mate of such a sister, was therefore the perpetual burthen of my 
thoughts" (77). 
Besides assuming for Mandeville the earthly roles of "umpire" and "judge," 
Henrietta also takes on qualities of the supernatural and the mystical, becoming a 
"heavenly monitress" (152) who shapes Mandeville's opinions and guides his conduct 
towards the path of benevolence and philanthropy. With her "divine discourses" (155), 
she seemed to hold for Mandeville the "master-key of [his] soul" (173), and his "heart" is 
consequently "tuned" in accordance to the sentiments she expresses (148). Indeed, in the 
face of Henrietta's almost supernatural influence, Mandeville is unable to resist resigning 
himself over to her guiding hand. In response to her repeated entreaties regarding a 
reconciliation with Clifford, Mandeville ultimately responds, '"take me, and mould me as 
you please. I can refuse you nothing. I will be the friend of Clifford!'" (159). 
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Henrietta assumes a definite and rich existence in Mandeville's mind, her memory 
inspiring him with an intellectual energy that nurtures his own creative impulses: "She 
made me a painter. Whenever I shut my eyes, I saw her: whenever I let my thoughts 
loose in imagination, I pictured to myself her gestures and her air" (62). However, unlike 
Henrietta, whose "divine discourses" situate her firmly within the Symbolic Order, 
Mandeville is primarily functioning on the level of images, the pre-verbal Imaginary. 
Henrietta seems to realize this about her brother, and she attempts to morally reform him 
by combining the verbal-her "divine discourses"-with the visual: "She talked to me of 
love," recalls Mandeville of the period immediately following his emotional collapse at 
Oxford. "She told me tales of her own daily experience, and the earthly paradise of 
Beaulieu [....] She drew a bewitching portrait of an obscure and rural life" (148). 
Although Henrietta makes Mandeville a "painter," it is telling that these creative 
impulses are purely introspective. Just as he is unable to express the intellectual activity 
of his mind around his peers at Winchester and Oxford, Mandeville is, around Henrietta, 
similarly constrained in speech. "She talked," he remembers, "and my soul hung on the 
enchanting sounds" (63). '"I have always been the principal talker,'" observed Henrietta 
to Mandeville, '"and you have answered me with silence or few words'" (65). As 
Mandeville later discloses to the reader, however, "Henrietta talked best, but I loved the 
most" (66). This remark is significant, for it conveys Mandeville's awareness of the 
disjunction between speech and feeling, his awareness that eloquence and fluid discursive 
exchange are not necessarily the most authentic measures of truth. 
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Indeed, it soon becomes apparent to the reader that Henrietta and her "divine 
discourses" (55) are not immune to Mandeville's deep-rooted suspicion of eloquent 
speech. The very act of characterizing her discourse as "divine" brings to mind 
Mandeville's similar description of Clifford's extended speeches to his fellow 
Wintonians (89), a characterization meant to highlight both the seductive appeal of well-
phrased speech and its deceptive potential. As we may recall, Mandeville had 
disapproved of Clifford and his rhetorical eloquence on the grounds that it gave him 
undue power over his auditors and influenced them into accepting falsehoods as truth. 
Similarly, we witness Mandeville become increasingly suspicious of Henrietta's powers 
of persuasion and critical of the ways in which she employs these powers. Indeed, at 
certain points in his memoir, Mandeville describes Henrietta's influence over him in 
almost colonizing terms: She held an "empire over [his] soul" (158), and served as the 
"despotic mistress of [his] faculties," irresponsibly carrying him away from all 
"recollections," "associations," and "griefs" (178). 
Whereas Mandeville assumes the role of painter solely in the introspective 
processes of his own mind, Henrietta's artistry, her authorship of "bewitching portraitfs]" 
and "tales" idealizing a rural life devoid of ambition (148), is very much a public process. 
Such "tales" were "fiction," Mandeville realizes, "and not adapted to real life" (149). He 
nevertheless emphasizes the powerful effect they had on his sensibilities, highlighting the 
conscious artistry of Henrietta's "Arcadian pictures": 
She drew a bewitching portrait of an obscure and rural life [.. .and] 
however the Arcadian pictures drawn for me by Henrietta, might be 
243 
imperfect in a general view, they were accurately adapted to my disease. I 
was just recovered from a state of fearful perturbation; the very principles 
and foundations of humanity within me, had been shaken; and music was 
the restorative my condition required. Never was there so consummate an 
artist in this respect as my Henrietta. Her voice was melodious; her 
sentiments were all one mighty scheme of harmony; and the gay, yet 
peaceful and serene pictures, with which she amused me from morning till 
night, gave me a new sort of existence, to which I had hitherto been a 
stranger. (148-49; emphasis added) 
As a "consummate artist," Henrietta is able to manipulate her sentiments, gestures, and 
the very modulation of her voice to craft a fantasy for Mandeville "accurately adapted to 
[his] disease." As Mandeville implies, Henrietta's inspirational discourse is not 
necessarily the unmediated and artless expression of her authentic sentiments but, rather, 
a well-crafted "fiction" meant to shape his mind and conduct in accordance to her own 
wishes, which, as we soon find out, involve Mandeville's reconciliation with Clifford.11 
In this sense, Henrietta's "fiction" operates much like Mallison's deceptive flattery, and it 
is striking that Mandeville similarly describes the effect of Henrietta's speech as "like the 
song of the Sirens," which "lulled [him] into forgetfulness" (149). "I was all ear," 
Mandeville laments. "Every other sense was suspended; or was made tributary and 
subordinate, to assist the impressions that the sense of hearing conveyed" (149). It thus 
becomes clear that, while Mandeville may idealize Henrietta as his "heavenly monitress" 
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(152), he also feels an acute anxiety regarding the nature and degree of her influence over 
him. 
With Clifford, we saw that Mandeville's disapproval of what he perceived as his 
rival's sophistry was also matched by an envious desire for similar rhetorical powers, as 
well as a resentful perception that his own voice will be perpetually eclipsed by that of his 
"nemesis." It would seem that Mandeville's relationship with his sister is informed by a 
similar perception that the "divine" nature of her eloquence overwhelms his own self-
expression, and it is this perception, I would argue, that ultimately alienates Mandeville 
from his sister. As he relates to the reader on more than one occasion, he is desperate for 
a "friend," a friend being, in his terms, one whom he can "bear to hear," but also one to 
whom he can "bear to speak" (174). It is only within this conception of friendship that 
Mandeville feels he would be able to engage in the reciprocal act of both listening and 
speaking. 
Despite this yearning for a friend, however, it is clear that Mandeville feels he can 
never fulfill this conception of friendship with his sister. "Why could not Henrietta be 
my friend?" he asks, anticipating the reader's question. 
She could speak with eloquence divine; and I could bear to hear her; and, 
while she spoke, my soul became her prisoner, and all her accents had over 
me the power of enchantment. But, unfortunately, the converse of the 
proposition totally failed. I could not speak to her in return. I pined for 
her approbation [....] How then could I premeditatedly lay bare my 
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bosom in her sight, and expose all its blackness and deformities? [....] 
My lips therefore were, in this regard, for ever closed in her presence. 
(174) 
In much the same way as Mandeville had been unable to assert his own voice as a child, 
he is similarly silenced in his relationship with Henrietta. Whereas Bradford's 
overwhelming ferocity of speech left little space for the dissenting voice of a boy, 
Henrietta's "eloquence divine" (174), at least as it is perceived by Mandeville, renders her 
brother a diffident observer of her superior rhetorical powers. Obsessively solicitous for 
her good opinion, and perhaps anxiously resentful of the passive position to which he 
feels relegated, Mandeville is unable to express the true sentiments of his heart or mind. 
"I secretly stood in awe of her judgment," he declares, and "tremble[d] lest she should 
discover the extent of my infirmities" (244). 
It is perhaps to compensate for his own failures in self-expression that Mandeville 
clings so strongly to a conception of himself as somehow linked, in body and soul, with 
Henrietta. The nature of Mandeville's relationship with his sister is both complex and 
paradoxical. While, on the one hand, she seemingly robs him of the opportunity for 
confident self-expression, on the other, she symbolizes for him an opportunity to achieve 
a definite sense of his own selfhood. If Henrietta plays a humanizing role in reconciling 
Mandeville to social interaction, she also assumes, in Mandeville's mind, an important 
position as the conduit of his own sensibilities. Some of his earliest fantasies regarding 
Henrietta involve an almost incestuous union with her that transcends larger social 
realities such as marriage. Although he claims to recognize Henrietta's probable destiny 
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as a wife and a mother, and declares that he is not "vain and selfish enough" to want her 
as his "slave" (151), he still clings to a fantasy of domestic union with his sister: "The 
most pleasing vision I could frame to myself, was of our living together, and having the 
daily fruition of her society. Our delicious wanderings, as at Beaulieu, might then be 
made perpetual; and, under the fashioning care of my Henrietta, I could not fail to become 
peaceful, virtuous and happy" (150-51). It is only through Henrietta-her "fashioning 
care"-that Mandeville feels he can be "peaceful, virtuous and happy"-in short, that he 
can be conditioned for a life he feels unable to sustain without her. In this sense, 
Mandeville becomes much like his uncle Audley, who, after losing his childhood 
sweetheart, "rather vegetated than lived" (41). 
It is clear that a compelling part of Henrietta's appeal for Mandeville rests in his 
perception of her as the socializing agent who may ultimately allow him to assert his own 
selfhood. Like Fleetwood, Mandeville indulges in a fantasy of complete sympathy with 
his female partner. He is aware that his attempts to live through Henrietta are predicated 
on a complete identification of himself with his sister, and vice versa. "I demanded from 
her a complete sympathy," Mandeville remarks, "and a sentiment in all respects 
responsive to mine. It was my delight to believe, that she loved as I loved, that she would 
sacrifice herself as I would, that for all the world she would not be persuaded to an act 
that would give me pain, and that she was the sister of my soul" (308). Learning of 
Henrietta's love for Clifford thus marks a crisis in Mandeville's conception of himself, as 
he now finds himself aligned with his rival in a process that quite clearly undermines any 
constructed sense of self. The loss of Henrietta to Clifford thus becomes, for Mandeville, 
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the loss of the self. As his last and only tie to the world, Henrietta symbolized for 
Mandeville perhaps the last hope of ever being reconciled to himself and to life. With the 
ultimate loss of that hope, Mandeville enters into a misanthropic madness that literally 
marks him for life. 
It is therefore quite appropriate that Mandeville sees Henrietta's marriage to 
Clifford as also a union between Clifford and himself-their blood will be "mingled 
together" in the form of any children Henrietta may bear, he laments (312). Such an 
image speaks to the larger thematic displacements between Henrietta, Mandeville, and 
Clifford, displacements which have played themselves out throughout the text, but which 
now, in the final pages of the narrative, become the ultimate symptom of Mandeville's 
failed attempt at self-actualization. 
We see this failure most acutely in the final pages of the novel, in which the 
attempted kidnaping of Henrietta is thwarted and Mandeville is left disfigured by a sword 
stroke to the face that leaves a grisly scar. His left cheek severed with a "deep trench," 
Mandeville characterizes his wound as the imprint left by his colonizer: "I bore Clifford 
and his injuries perpetually about with me. Even as certain tyrannical planters in the 
West Indies have set a brand with a red-hot iron upon the negroes they have purchased, to 
denote that they are irremediably a property, so Clifford had set his mark upon me, as a 
token that I was his for ever" (325). Without the humanizing touch of Henrietta, 
Mandeville does in fact see himself as nothing more than a commodity or piece of 
"property" to be "branded" as such. Indeed, in this sense, Mandeville's scar-his une 
balafre or cicatrix luculenta-is quite simply the presence of an absence, a corporeal 
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symbol of an inner emptiness that allows, and even invites, the colonizer to place his (or 
her) mark. 
The balafre thus evokes the presence of the absence within Mandeville's 
subjectivity. His scar functions as a fitting symbol of his inability to self-actualize, to 
achieve a coherent sense of self and present an integrated "face" to the world. 
Throughout his narrative, Mandeville has experienced his identity as split or divided. 
Without Henrietta, for example, he cannot experience himself as a whole being. She is 
the "dearest half of [his] soul" (62), and he feels himself compelled to "live in," and 
through, her (319-20). Likewise, Mandeville's appreciation of his own subjectivity is 
inextricably bound up with his hatred of Clifford, whom he envisions as part of his 
corporeal existence-"a disease that has penetrated to my bones" (176). Such 
displacements of self speak to the split nature of Mandeville's subjectivity, a divided self 
that ultimately manifests itself on the body in the symbol of the balafre-o. scar that 
literally divides Mandeville's face in two. The balafre thus functions as a material 
inscription testifying to the madness that has fractured Mandeville's psyche. 
"Of History and Romance": Modern Man and the Dystopian World of Godwin's Fiction 
As I discussed in the Introduction, Godwin measured the value of written history 
by its moral effects on the reader. "Those histories alone are worthy of attentive and 
persevering study, that treat of the development of great genius, or the exhibition of bold 
and masculine virtues," argues the philosopher in his 1797 essay, "Of History and 
Romance" (458). In that essay, Godwin makes the argument for the degeneracy of a 
modern humanity whose potential is blighted by oppressive social and cultural 
institutions. Ancient Greece and Rome, with their democratic states and republican 
sentiments, produced men with "bold and masculine virtues" (458). Modem states, 
however, built on a foundation of political oppression that is maintained by social 
prejudice and superstition, simply enslave and debase their citizens. 
"The ancients," contends Godwin, "were giants, but we, their degenerate 
successors, are pygmies. There was something in the nature of the Greek and Roman 
republics that expanded and fired the soul [....] The ancients [...] are men of a free and 
undaunted spirit" (459). In contrast, the "greatest personages" of modern history, 
appear in the comparison encumbered with their rank. Their march is 
slow, weighed down as they are on every side with prejudices and 
precedents. They are disciplined to dull monotony [....] There is 
something in the nature of modern governments and institutions, that 
seems to blight in the bud every grander and more ample development of 
the soul. When we attempt to display the agility or the grace, the capacity 
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for which inheres in our nature, we resemble a vaulter or figurante that 
should undertake to dance in fetters. (459) 
While humanity carries within it this capacity for spiritual greatness-the "capacity" for 
such greatness, contends Godwin, "inheres in our nature"-modern men fail to achieve the 
"free and undaunted spirit" that informed the ancients. Whereas the ancients were able to 
"proceed to their object with an unerring aim" and a "full and undivided soul," modern 
men "lose themselves in dark, inexplicable windings" (460). The difference between 
both groups of men is so distinct and compelling, argues Godwin, that the student of 
history "will almost imagine that he is reading of a different species" (460). 
For Godwin, the spiritual failings of modern humanity reside not in some inherent 
inferiority of the mind or soul, but in the social context in which the modern man finds 
himself, a context which "blight[s] in the bud every grander and more ample development 
of the soul" (459). "There is something in the nature of modern governments and 
institutions" that keeps modern humanity from achieving the greatness of their ancient 
predecessors (459). Of course, for Godwin, that "something" is political oppression and 
the various social injustices which debase modern man. The oppression of monarchies 
and other forms of tyrannical government, religious and cultural superstitions which 
impede the rational development of humanity, violence that goes unchecked by the forces 
of reason and education-all of these phenomena come together in a history informed by 
"fanaticism and hypocrisy," where "scarcely a trace is to be found of a sense of the rights 
of men" (461). Whereas the republican institutions and sentiments of ancient Greece and 
Rome nourished "giants," the political and social tyranny of Britain's history has created 
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"pygmies," men "lost" in "dark, inexplicable windings." Our history, argues Godwin, is 
the "history of corruption and political profligacy," "not the history of genuine, 
independent man" (461). 
As I argued in the Introduction, Godwin's vision of the political included broader 
social forces like education, which was understood by the philosopher in the "most 
comprehensive sense" as all those childhood experiences "that produce[] an idea in the 
mind, and can give birth to a train of reflections" (Vol. 1 ofPolitical Justice 45). This 
childhood education, for Godwin, serves as the single most important element in the 
creation of a happy and virtuous subject capable of universal benevolence through 
enlightenment and reason. If a sound childhood education can produce this happy and 
virtuous subject committed to benevolence and philanthropy, a defective education, a 
"mis-education," can do much to thwart the development of happiness and virtue in the 
subject. The forms of mis-education experienced by the "modern" men in this study 
operate, in much the same way as political oppression does, to create "pygmies" out of 
protagonists who might have been "giants." 
Godwin's description of modern men in this 1797 essay thus serves as a useful 
theoretical framework for Caleb Williams and the three "middle" novels I have examined 
in this study. Indeed, Godwin's description of men "encumbered with their rank" and 
"weighed down [. ..] on every side with prejudices and precedents" aptly evokes the 
experiences of Caleb, Falkland, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville. Like Godwin's 
modern man, whose "march is slow" and whose soul is blighted, these Goclwinian heroes 
are also mired in the "fetters" of both society and their own minds: "lost" in the "dark, 
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inexplicable windings" of misanthropy and neuroses, all of these "heroes" struggle to 
find their place within social environments from which they are hopelessly alienated. In 
the case of each hero, a childhood mis-education manifests itself in a later crisis of 
subjectivity that radically compromises his experience of identity. All of these 
protagonists "lose" themselves in some way. 
Moreover, it is significant that the crises brought about by childhood mis-
education are never resolved for any of these characters. Each narrative ends 
ambivalently without a clear sense of closure: Falkland dies a disgraced man, and Caleb's 
formal vindication only serves to make him more miserable than ever; St. Leon's new-
found self-assurance is compromised by the fact that it is only gained through his 
connection with a son from whom he is forever estranged; although Fleetwood, at the end 
of his narrative, is formally reconciled with Mary, he still seems a broken man, and the 
reader is left unconvinced of his moral reformation; finally, in the case of Mandeville, the 
reader is presented, at the end of the novel, with an utterly fragmented and psychotic 
figure, a madman cut off from the social order. All of these Godwinian heroes seem, at 
novel's end, perpetually "lost" in the "dark, inexplicable windings" of their own fractured 
psyches. 
Godwin's disillusionment with modern humanity, as he expresses it in "Of 
History and Romance," locates itself in these fictional portraits. This disillusionment, 
however, speaks to a fascinating disjunction between the Utopian idealism of Political 
Justice-where humanity is potentially perfectible and the irrational passions of the soul 
can be brought under the sway of the rational mind through education and reason-and the 
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dystopian world of Godwin's fiction-which is littered with men who seem irrevocably 
damaged by the destructive influences of a childhood "mis-education." Indeed, as 
George Woodcock has pointed out, "nowhere in his novels does Godwin in fact describe 
the Utopian world to which his reasonings as a political philosopher would seem to lead" 
(696). B.J. Tysdahl likewise argues that, in Godwin's fiction, "we often hear another 
voice than that of the confident spokesman of late eighteenth-century radicalism and 
rationalism" (6). 
The other "voice" which Tysdahl identifies in Godwin's fiction evokes Mikhail 
Bakhtin's notion of the "dialogic" text, a work-usually a novel, in Bakhtin's 
theorization-permeated with the dialogue of multiple voices, forms, and perspectives. In 
The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin celebrates the novel for its unique brand of "novelistic 
discourse" which structures the narrative and provides a complex and rich 
"heteroglossia." The novel, contends Bakhtin, contains a "diversity of individual voices, 
artistically organized" (262). "Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted 
genres, the speech of characters are merely those fundamental compositional unities with 
whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel," argues Bakhtin (262). Godwin's novels 
embody these dialogic characteristics: in these texts, an optimistic philosophy of human 
perfectibility collides with the brutal realities of the human condition to produce texts 
which offer a "diversity of individual voices." Godwin as rational philosopher seems at 
odds with his neurotic fictional creations, and even within the texts, there are tensions 
that exist between individual characters as symbolic representations of humanity's 
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potential. There is, in these novels, a stark incongruity between what could be and what 
is. 
Moreover, it is striking that the women in the three "middle" novels come much 
closer to achieving the sort of human perfectibility espoused by Godwin in Political 
Justice. Indeed, the female characters in these texts serve as foils for the moral and 
spiritual failings of their male counterparts. St Leon's Marguerite is selfless and utterly 
gracious in forgiving a vain husband who has just beggared his family through gambling; 
a committed advocate of Wollstonecraft's "culture of the heart," Marguerite takes solace 
in her philosophical celebration of the domestic affections. Likewise, Fleetwood's Mary 
exhibits a striking moral virtue and generosity in forgiving a husband who throws her, 
pregnant and penniless, out of their marital home. Finally, Mandeville's noble sister, 
Henrietta, remains loyal and committed to a brother whose misanthropic nature alienates 
everyone around him; in contrast to Marguerite, who celebrates the private affections, 
Henrietta is an advocate for the philosophical doctrine of universal benevolence, and, as 
such, she serves as a spokeswoman for much of Godwin's own philosophy. 
While the female characters in these middle novels are portrayed in idealized 
terms, the male characters are complex representations of human struggle-of the 
psychological turmoil, emotional frailty, and moral failure which inform the human 
condition. As complex case studies of masculine identity in crisis, these novels are 
compelling portraits of modern man as the philosopher theorized him in "Of History and 
Romance." If, as Godwin contends in his essay, modern history is the history of 
"fanaticism" and "corruption," and "not the history of genuine, independent man," then it 
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is fitting that the philosopher offers, in his fiction, portraits of modern men who are both 
caught up in the corruption of modern life, and mired in the fanaticism of their own 
minds. Caleb, Falkland, St. Leon, Fleetwood, and Mandeville are thus quintessential 
examples of Godwin's modern man, and the profound identity crises each experiences 
can surely be read as the philosopher's fictional representation of how modern men "lose 
themselves in dark, inexplicable windings." 
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Notes to Introduction 
1. My decision not to include a full chapter-length reading of Caleb Williams in this 
study was also influenced by a desire to focus on those novels of Godwin which have 
received little attention by scholars and readers. Modern critics of Godwin's fiction have 
directed the bulk of their energies towards Caleb Williams, and that novel is thus well 
represented in the scholarly literature examining the philosopher's fiction. It was one of 
my larger goals in this study to provide critical readings of Godwin's lesser-known 
novels. 
2. As Godwin recorded in an autobiographical sketch, he wrote and published these three 
novels in quick succession over a period of five months at the end of 1783 and the 
beginning of 1784 (Woodcock, "Notes" 685-86). All three of these texts were long 
considered "lost," only to be "rediscovered" by scholars in the 1960s and 1970s. 
3. Most critics are in agreement that Godwin's last two novels are reductive and poorly 
structured in terms of plot and character development. For George Woodcock, Godwin's 
final novels suffer from a "decline" in his "inventive powers," and he singles out 
Cloudesley as the "worst crafted" of all his books ("Notes" 695), as does Mona 
Scheuermann {The Novels of William Godwin 188-89). Moreover, although critics 
concede that Deloraine is superior to Cloudesley on a structural level, most do not find 
the text particularly engaging. "Its final interest is probably biographical," contends 
Woodcock ("Notes" 696), referring to the scholarly consensus that views Emilia, 
Deloraine's first wife, as Godwin's last fictional portrait of Wollstonecraft. Deloraine 
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becomes even more significant on a biographical level when one considers the possibility 
that Catherine-the impassioned, fiercely loyal, and articulate daughter of Deloraine and 
Emilia-is quite likely a fictional portrait of Godwin's own daughter Mary Shelley, who 
remained emotionally and intellectually close to her father in the last decades of his life. 
A notable exception to this overwhelming critical dismissal of Godwin's last two 
novels is A. A. Markley, who reads Cloudesley as the culmination of Godwin's attempts 
to "transform" traditional conceptions of manhood and put forth a new image of 
masculinity. In Cloudesley, argues Markley, "the social benefits of a particular 
Godwinian ideal of love and devotion between men is fully illustrated and celebrated" 
(39). 
4. This quotation is taken from the third edition of PoliticalJustice, published in 1798. 
In the original edition of the text, this passage was perhaps made even more scandalous 
by the fact that the "valet" was a "chambermaid," and the sacrificed relative consequently 
a "wife" or a "mother," rather than a "brother" or a "father." 
5. The Reverend Richard Polwhele (1760-1838) was an outspoken critic of the radical, or 
"jacobin," cause. Most notoriously, his 1798 anti-feminist satire, The Unsex'dFemales, 
attacked Godwin's wife, feminist reformer Mary Wollstonecraft, who had recently died 
giving birth to their daughter, the future Mary Shelley. In his poem, Polwhele presents 
Wollstonecraft as the "intrepid champion of her sex, " the leader of her band of "unsex'd" 
female followers (13). She is represented by Polwhele as a pathological aberration, a 
vision of bodily disease and moral sickness that threatens the "healthy" state of femininity 
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best embodied by the "seraphic" Hannah More, the conservative poet, dramatist, and 
moralist. The climax of Polwhele's poem presents More, a "seraphic" vision of grace and 
happiness, recalling her "unsex'd" "sisters" from the "pale form" and "livid limbs" of 
Wollstonecraft, the "dire apostate" and "fell suicide" (28). 
Less virulent, but just as damning, was Elizabeth Hamilton's Memoirs of Modern 
Philosophers, a satirical novel published in 1800 which caricatured a number of 
intellectuals well known for their radical, "jacobin" views. Godwin is caricatured in the 
novel as the founder of a "New Philosophy" modelled on the principles of Political 
Justice; his ideas attract ridiculous devotees who take his ideas to absurd levels. 
6. Along with the Memoirs, Godwin edited and published the 1798 Posthumous Works of 
the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, a four-volume collection of 
Wollstonecraft's unpublished texts, her unfinished manuscripts, and some of her private 
correspondence. 
7. For a general overview of the shifting assessment of Wollstonecraft throughout the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, see Amy Rambow, '"Come Kick Me': 
Godwin's Memoirs and the Posthumous Infamy of Mary Wollstonecraft," 45-54. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1. Godwin's resistance to Rousseau's educational model has been traced in a number of 
critical examinations of his fiction-most notably, Anne Chandler's "Romanticizing 
Adolescence: Godwin's St. Leon and the Matter of Rousseau," and Gary Handwerk's 
"Mapping Misogyny: Godwin's Fleetwood and the Staging of Rousseauvian Education.'' 
2. Godwin's novel was also quite effective in its narrative mode. As Gerard A. Barker 
has argued, Godwin's choice of first-person narration for his novel, a mode he was both 
inexperienced in and which sometimes created technical difficulties for the construction 
of the text, nevertheless contributes to the reader's engagement in the story, lending an 
urgent realism to the narrative which innovatively conveys Godwin's philosophical and 
political arguments. 
3. See, for example, Robert J. Corber, "Representing the 'Unspeakable': William 
Godwin and the Politics of Homophobia;" Alex Gold, Jr., "It's Only Love: The Politics 
of Passion in Godwin's Caleb Williams;" Kenneth W. Graham, The Politics of 
Narrative: Ideology and Social Change in William Godwin's Caleb Williams; Mitzi 
Myers, "Godwin's Changing Conception of Caleb Williams;" Masao Miyoshi, The 
Divided Self: A Perspective on the Literature of the Double; Andrew J. Scheiber, 
"Falkland's Story: Caleb Williams' Other Voice;" Rudolf F. Storch, "Metaphors of 
Private Guilt and Social Rebellion in Godwin's Caleb Williams;" and Robert W. 
Uphaus, "Caleb Williams: Godwin's Epoch of Mind;" 
4. David McCracken, in "Godwin's Caleb Williams: A Fictional Rebuttal of Burke" and 
"Godwin's Reading in Burke," has also highlighted the influence of Burke on Godwin's 
writing of Caleb Williams, and on his creation of Falkland. 
5. For a full discussion of the pedagogical framework underpinning eighteenth-century 
sentimental fiction, see the first two chapters of Todd's Sensibility: An Introduction. 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
1. As a tormented drifter, St. Leon prefigures the quintessential Romantic trope of the 
troubled wanderer, as represented most compellingly by Lord Byron's Manfred, S. T. 
Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, and, ultimately, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. For a 
reading of St. Leon's textual and thematic influence on Shelley's novel, see Gregory 
Maertz's "Family Resemblances: Intertextual Dialogue between Father and Daughter 
Novelists in Godwin's St. Leon and Shelley's Frankenstein.'" 
2. Dubois's St. Godwin has recently appeared in Volume 9 of Pickering and Chatto's ten-
volume series, Anti-Jacobin Novels, published in 2005. 
3. As Marie Roberts has shown, however, Godwin's interest, and subsequent belief, in 
the clearly fantastic possibility of human immortality is paradoxically grounded in the 
rationalist philosophy laid out in PoliticalJustice. In the section entitled "Of Health, and 
the Prolongation of Human Life," Godwin had theorized that, as humanity gradually 
progressed, through the exercise and refinement of its rational faculties, into a state of 
ultimate perfection, the limits of mortality could be overcome. Although Godwin 
declares that "it would be idle to talk of the absolute immortality of man," he nevertheless 
contends that, "by the immediate operation of intellect," the "term of human life may be 
prolonged [...] beyond any limits which we are able to assign" (Vol. 2 of Political 
Justice 527). Thus, for Roberts, Godwin's central critique in St. Leon is not of 
immortality, but of an immortality obtained through the dangerous and unnatural means 
associated with scientific advance and magic. As Roberts argues, St. Leon "is a warning 
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to those enlightened thinkers who sought to shortcut the path of human progress, which 
Godwin believed should be achieved only by evolutionary means" (1199). 
4. P.N. Furbank points out that St. Leon's fear of poverty is made particularly poignant 
by Godwin's own financial troubles during this time (227). It would seem that Godwin 
was only too acutely aware of the anxiety and deep shame associated with pecuniary 
distress. 
5. For an alternative interpretation of the novel's gambling theme, one which reads St. 
Leon as the quintessential capitalist, see Kate Ferguson Ellis, The Contested Castle: 
Gothic Novels and the Subversion of Domestic Ideology, 160-64. 
6. Godwin's changing views on the importance of the domestic affections are in fact 
quite compatible with the theoretical principles underpinning his philosophic vision of 
progressive enlightenment. In the Enquirer, Godwin had argued that "the salutary 
condition of the human mind, is that in which it is prepared to bring every principle upon 
which it proceeds, within the scope of its own examination" (223). All ideas and 
opinions should therefore be subject to a rational analysis that is both rigorous and 
continual, argues Godwin, for "nothing is more suspicious than a system of conduct, 
which, forming itself inflexibly on general rules, refuses to take the impression, and yield 
to the dictates, of circumstances as they may arise" {Enquirer 195). By thus modifying 
his opinions on cohabitation based on his personal experiences living with 
Wollstonecraft, Godwin is participating in this rational practice of continual examination, 
and his changing views on the subject represent an inevitable progression of his thought: 
"Who is it that is likely, through Shakespear's seven ages of man, to think always alike?" 
asks Godwin. "The slave of prejudice, or the slave of idleness. The active and 
independent mind, the genuine lover of and enquirer after truth, will inevitably pass 
through certain revolutions of opinion" (Enquirer 325). 
7. St. Leon and Marguerite's living arrangement is suggestive of Godwin's own 
complicated views on marriage and cohabitation. While he celebrates the "domestic and 
private affections" in the 1799 Preface to St. Leon, deeming them "inseparable from the 
nature of man" (52), he had previously, in the 1797 Enquirer, warned against "excessive 
familiarity" as the "bane of social happiness" (86). In the essay, "Of Cohabitation," 
Godwin argued that 
the ill humour which is so prevalent through all the different walks of life, 
is the result of familiarity, and consequently of cohabitation. If we did not 
see each other too frequently, we should accustom ourselves to act 
reasonably and with urbanity. But, according to a well known maxim, 
familiarity breeds contempt. The first and most fundamental principle in 
the intercourse of man with man, is reverence; but we soon cease to 
reverence what is always before our eyes [....] In order that we may 
properly exercise this sentiment, the occasions for calling it forth towards 
any particular individual, should be economised and rare. (91-92) 
In his description of St. Leon and Marguerite's domestic habits, Godwin seems to have 
struck a balance between the dangers of "excessive familiarity" and the benefits he had 
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come to recognize in the private affections. Moreover, St. Leon's narration of the 
satisfactions attendant on a marriage partially informed by "separate pursuits" evokes 
Godwin's description, in the Memoirs, of his own relationship with Wollstonecraft. 
Recalling his practice, during their marriage, of maintaining a separate residence a short 
distance from their marital home, as well as their shared practice of maintaining separate 
social engagements and intellectual pursuits, Godwin asserts that he and Wollstonecraft 
were thus able to "combine, in a considerable degree, the novelty and lively sensation of 
a visit, with the more delicious and heart-felt pleasures of domestic life" (Memoirs 110). 
8. Marguerite's celebration of rural retirement prefigures William Wordsworth's similar 
philosophical meditations on "low and rustic life" in the 1802 Preface to the Lyrical 
Ballads. Freed from the "influence of social vanity," argues Wordsworth in the Preface, 
"the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their 
maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language" (357). 
For Wordsworth, rustic life is thus more conducive to spiritual development and moral 
elevation. Marguerite's impassioned speeches to St. Leon on this issue also foreshadow 
many of the arguments against wealth put forth by a character in Mandeville, one of 
Godwin's later novels. In that text, the morally virtuous Clifford argues against wealth 
on the grounds that it compromises one's self-sufficiency and true appreciation of life. 
Moreover, in Fleetwood, Godwin will explore even further the Wordsworthian elements 
of nature, rural life, and the effects of both on imagination and intellectual development. 
265 
9. For a discussion of the ideology of "separate spheres" in Victorian marital culture, see 
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-
1895. 
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Notes to Chapter 3 
1. Mona Scheuermann also points out how Fleetwood's expressed preference for day 
dreams over night dreams in this passage indicates his significant "preoccupation with 
power" (Novels of William Godwin 159) and the need to exert that power "over all and 
sundry" (Novels of William Godwin 160). 
2. Despite Scheuermann's contention that Fleetwood is unable to "adjust himself to 
another human being" ("Study of Mind" 19), never able to make that "total human 
connection" ("Study of Mind" 20) with another creature that would enable him to 
overcome, even temporarily, the destructive misanthropy of his temperament, we see a 
number of significant instances where Fleetwood cultivates interpersonal relationships 
that are emotionally, morally, or intellectually salutary. The friendship that the young 
Fleetwood shares with Ruffigny, for instance, develops into a bond not only predicated on 
a sense of duty, but also on mutual respect and affection, a bond that endures until 
Ruffigny's death and provides the catalyst for Fleetwood's moral improvement in the 
form of his ultimate repudiation of the libertine tendencies that had marred his youth. In 
middle age, Fleetwood again manages to transcend his misanthropic inclinations enough 
to forge a stimulating intellectual alliance, built on "temperate and sober discussion" 
(259), with Macneil, the father of his future wife, Mary. Note, however, how all of these 
satisfying emotional connections are with men. In contrast, not once in the novel is 
Fleetwood able to develop and sustain a similar relationship with a woman. 
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3. Gary Handwerk, in particular, has argued that Fleetwood's misogyny functions as 
Godwin's critique of Rousseau's discussion of gender in Book Five of Entile. Although 
Rousseau's philosophical conception of gender conforms to the traditional construction of 
women as passive and weak relative to men's superior intellectual and physical powers, it 
also posits them as singularly informed by a propensity towards guile and deception. 
"Cunning is a natural gift of woman," argues Rousseau (Emile 334). "This special skill 
with which the female sex is endowed is a fair equivalent for its lack of strength; without 
it woman would be man's slave, not his helpmeet" (Emile 334-35). "Women have a 
natural gift for managing men," continues Rousseau, but their control is artfully 
concealed under a facade of weakness and soft manners (Emile 370). "Woman's reign is 
a reign of gentleness, tact, and kindness; her commands are caresses, her threats are tears" 
(Emile 370). As Handwerk points out, Rousseau's emphasis on the inherent guile of 
women dovetails with his construction of a passive Emile who is manipulated into a 
subordinate and dependent position by a deceptive tutor. In the novel, argues Handwerk, 
Ruffigny plays the role of Rousseauvian tutor to Fleetwood, manipulating, often through 
subterfuge, Fleetwood's emotional responses and his moral development. The tutor's 
(Ruffigny's) deceptive "mode of operation," asserts Handwerk, "feminizes" him (388), 
and he argues that Fleetwood's later misogyny could thus be read as the "displacement of 
resentment toward his paternal figures and of their rational (or rationalized) insistence 
upon his immaturity" (396). 
For another example of Godwin's revisionist approach to Rousseauvian 
educational theory, see Anne Chandler's "Romanticizing Adolescence: Godwin's St. 
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Leon and the Matter of Rousseau." As Chandler argues, Godwin took issue with what he 
saw as the reductive nature of Rousseau's highly structured and tightly controlled 
pedagogical model. In his depiction of a middle-aged St. Leon in a young man's body, a 
body which then comes into contact with numerous "tutor figures," notably Bethlam 
Gabor and his own son Charles, Godwin complicates the established age and power 
differentials between tutor and pupil, restoring-in Chandler's view-"the libidinous 
energy so readily tamed in Rousseau's accounts of male adolescence" (410). 
4. Significantly, this metaphor also points to Fleetwood's position as the despotic 
"Other." A "sultana" is of course the female relative or mistress of a sultan; as the 
Countess is the mistress of Fleetwood, the metaphor then serves to situate Fleetwood as 
the sultan-a figure conventionally associated, within the western imagination, with 
corruption, vice, and despotic power. In St. Leon, we see such a figure represented in the 
character of Muzaffer Bey, the Turkish military governor and extortionist. Also see note 
6 in the chapter on Mandeville. 
5. Ruffigny's narrative, while seemingly unconnected with the later events of the text, is 
nevertheless one section of the novel consistently praised by critics for its original 
depiction of child labour in a silk mill at Lyons. Handwerk and A. A. Markley deem it 
"an example of literary realism [...] remarkable for its time" (Introduction to Fleetwood 
36), while Ivanka Kovacevic calls it the "first occurrence in prose fiction of social 
criticism directed against the factory system" (qtd. in Tysdahl 109). 
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6. Mrs. Macneil's history is almost parodically recounted by Fleetwood, who seems to 
savour every sensational detail of the tale, but it is troubling how the mother's 
past-particularly her abusive union with a controlling older man who won the approval of 
her father through "conversation" (234)-will be eventually resurrected as the daughter's 
future. 
7. The play recounts the tragedy of Valerio, who enters into an agreement with the ruler 
of Naples that allows him to marry his beloved, Evanthe. The agreement requires Valerio 
to submit to decapitation after one month of marriage. 
8. Specifically, Act 2, lines 34-40 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
1. Godwin's novel was published, in three volumes, in London and Edinburgh on 
December 1,1817. In 1818, a French translation of the novel appeared, as well as two 
pirated versions of the text by American publishers in New York and Philadelphia 
(Marshall 340). In both American editions, the original three volumes of the novel are 
conflated into two. Moreover, the unfinished quality of the novel's ending no doubt 
encouraged the anonymous 1818 publication of a spurious and highly satirical fourth and 
"final" volume of the text, entitled Mandeville; or The Last Words of a Maniac! As both 
Burton R. Pollin and Mona Scheuermann have observed, a number of later critics have 
mistaken this spurious volume as an authentic addition to the novel (34, n. 7; Novels of 
William Godwin 210, n. 53). 
2. Pollin has proposed that Shelley's enthusiasm for Mandeville can be traced in the 
several linguistic and thematic similarities with the novel that he identifies in the poet's 
"Ozymandias" (1818) and "Love's Philosophy" (1819). See "Godwin's Mandeville in 
Poems of Shelley." Moreover, as John Colmer and, more recently, James Mulvihill have 
argued, signs of Mandeville's influence can also be found in the work of another 
Romantic author, Thomas Love Peacock, whose 1818 novel Nightmare Abbey includes a 
scene in which the characters receive a packet of texts, one of which is entitled Devilman, 
a novel. Described by one of the characters as a tale of'"hatred-revenge-
misanthropy-and quotations from the Bible [....] the morbid anatomy of black bile,'" 
Devilman has traditionally been read as an allusion to Godwin's Mandeville, the former 
being an anagram for the latter (qtd. in Colmer 331). As Colmer demonstrates, 
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Nightmare Abbey's setting, as well as its satiric depiction of a gloomy misanthropy, was 
at least partially influenced by Mandeville and the "popular cult of misanthropy" to which 
it both contributed and helped to produce (332). See Colmer's "Godwin's Mandeville 
and Peacock's Nightmare Abbey," as well as Mulvihill's "A Prototype for Mr. Toobad in 
Peacock's Nightmare Abbey." 
3. Shakespeare, in Macbeth (4.3.209) 
4. Matthew 12:34 
5. Milton, in Paradise Lost (2.114-15) 
6. Like Gifford, who had a "dark complexion, approaching to the mulatto" (337), 
Mallison also possesses a "dark, sallow complexion" (84). Significantly, in both cases, 
villainy seems to reveal itself on the body in particularly racialized terms. In St. Leon, 
Godwin directly represented racial difference in his portrayal of Muzaffer Bey, the 
Turkish bashaw to whom St. Leon appeals for protection when he becomes a target of 
Hungarian civil unrest. In the novel, Bey's "muddy" complexion and "coarse," 
"distorted" features are reflective of his corrupt and avaricious character (374), a trope 
very much in keeping with contemporary representations of the Oriental "Other." 
7. Despite the uneasy alliance between the Royalist and Presbyterian factions of the 
English state, both of which were united, at least in theory, in their desire for an 
overthrow of Oliver Cromwell's rule and the restoration of at least a limited form of 
monarchy, conflict between the two parties created suspicion and mistrust, especially on 
the part of the Royalists towards their new allies {Mandeville 81-82). This, Mandeville 
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explains, was the historical context that determined the social climate at Winchester 
School, where every boy was a Royalist and on guard against any Presbyterian sentiment 
deemed injurious to the house of Stuart (80-81). 
8. This is yet another instance in which Mandeville's inability to speak forcefully, or at 
all, on an issue sets up the train of events that consequently result in his future 
misfortunes. Although his "whole soul rose against the thought" of sharing a domicile 
with Holloway and Mallison and being thus subject to their company and potential 
duplicity (232), Mandeville is unable to formulate any verbal response or plan of 
confrontation. Instead, he retreats further into the isolation of a resentful silence: "I shut 
myself up, more than I had ever yet been accustomed to. When my occasions or my 
inclination prompted me to go out of my apartment, I asked myself, 'Now, the moment I 
open the door, shall I not meet these scoundrels?' [....] Often I saw nothing of them: 
when I did, for the most part I scowled, and turned away in silence" (232; emphasis 
added). 
9. Godwin's allusion here is a reference to "The History of Prince Fadlallah, Son of Bin-
Ortoc, King of Mousel," a tale found in The Thousand and One Days: Persian Tales, 
compiled by Francois Petis de la Croix and translated into English by A. Philips in the 
early eighteenth century. Of course, Mandeville's allusion to this tale is an anachronism, 
since he is presumably narrating his history in the mid-seventeenth century. 
10. One may recall St. Leon's Marguerite, a quintessential example of a self-effacing care 
giver who unwearingly ministers to her husband's psychological and physical needs 
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during his lengthy and recurring periods of incapacitation. As we will soon see, 
Mandeville's sister, Henrietta, also figures significantly as a nursemaid. 
11. Shelley registered his extreme disappointment in the character of Henrietta on 
precisely this ground. For Shelley, the philosophical beauty of Henrietta's eloquent 
appeal to Mandeville for a disinterested philanthropy is undercut by what is later revealed 
to be her true motivation-her love for Clifford and her understandable desire to reconcile 
her brother with her suitor. On December 7th, 1817, Shelley wrote to Godwin: "Shall I 
say that, when I discovered that she was pleading all this time secretly for her lover, and 
when at last she abandoned-weakly abandoned poor Mandeville, I felt an involuntary 
and, perhaps, an unreasonable pang?" (260). In his Examiner review, Shelley elaborates 
in greater depth on Henrietta's character as a failed experiment in the ultimate 
representation of truth and virtue: 
One regrets that Henrietta, who soared far beyond her contemporaries in 
her opinions, who was so beautiful that she seemed a spirit among 
mankind should act and feel no otherwise than the least exalted of her sex; 
and still more that the author capable of conceiving something so 
admirable and lovely should have been withheld by the tenor of the fiction 
which he chose from executing it to its full extent. It almost seems in the 
original conception of the character of Henrietta that something was 
imagined too vast and too uncommon to be realized; and the feeling 
weighs like disappointment on the mind. (Graham 359) 
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